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For nearly seventy years, historians have scrutinized the origins of the Cold War and 
debated the Truman Doctrine’s significance to this international conflict. These sometimes 
emotional deliberations produced three distinct narratives, which sought to justify, assail, or 
simply explain the thirty-third president’s impact on US-Soviet relations between 1945 and 
1947. Not surprisingly, all of these interpretations accept the premise that the chief executive’s 
appeal for the Greek-Turkish aid package constituted a fundamental change in Washington’s 
foreign policy towards Moscow. This thesis, however, posits that Truman never intended to 
establish an open-ended universal policy designed to govern America’s international agenda for 
the Cold War’s entire duration. On the contrary, an analysis of government documents, personal 
memoirs, oral histories, and contemporary periodicals reveal the commander-in-chief as an 
inexperienced world leader whose ambivalence towards the USSR created an initial reluctance 
on his part to publicly criticize the Kremlin’s leadership. Evidence suggests that negative 
domestic factors in late 1946 prompted the chief executive to openly embrace a confrontational 
policy towards the Soviet Union.  Determined to revitalize his beleaguered administration, 
Truman readily co-opted the Republican’s anti-communist position when he decided to 
safeguard Athens’ government from Greece’s ongoing insurgency. Consequently, he countered 
Moscow’s perceived aggression in the Balkans with an extreme rhetorical stance calculated to 
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gain immediate support from a hostile Congress and indifferent American public. Truman’s 
zealous pursuit of this short term goal, however, inadvertently altered the public’s long-term 
conception of US-Soviet relations. Though he never meant to establish a new doctrine, the 

























On March 12, 1947, the president of the United States addressed a special joint session of 
Congress to request $400 million dollars in aid for Greece and Turkey. Standing at the podium 
before a hushed chamber of anxious lawmakers and dignitaries, Harry S. Truman carefully 
explained why these two reactionary governments in the Balkans and Near East deserved to 
receive immediate economic assistance from the American People. Communist subversion, he 
argued, threatened to undermine Athens and Ankara’s sovereignty, which hindered the 
development of democracy in these nations. Furthermore, the chief executive warned that a 
Marxist victory in this region endangered the political stability of Europe and the Middle East. 
US national security, he observed, required Washington to adopt a more proactive strategy in the 
post-war world.1 Consequently, the commander-in-chief announced the following tenets of the 
White House’s foreign policy: 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I 
believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own 
way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid 
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process.2 
 
Stunned by the sweeping breath of the president’s statement, legislators and citizens alike 
contemplated the implications of America’s apparent new role in world affairs. Within two 
                                                          
1 “New Policy Set Up: President Blunt in Plea to Combat ‘Coercion as World Peril,” New York Times, 
March 13, 1947, 1. 
2 “Text on President Truman’s Speech on New Foreign Policy,” New York Times, March 13, 1947, 2. 
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months, skeptical lawmakers begrudgingly gave the administration authorization to assist both 
Greece and Turkey.3   
 Since 1947, politicians, historians, and the public have reasonably viewed the Truman 
Doctrine Speech as an open-ended global commitment to contain the Soviet Union. Its precepts 
provided the rationale for America’s military intervention in Korea, Vietnam, and numerous 
smaller conflicts throughout Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. However, a 
reevaluation of the primary sources associated with Washington’s foreign policy between 1945 
and 1947 suggest a different conclusion. Despite his speech having the obvious hallmarks of a 
major doctrine, Truman never intended to establish a universal policy designed to govern 
America’s international agenda for the Cold War’s entire duration.4 On the contrary, an analysis 
of the president’s first two years in office portray him as an inexperienced world leader whose 
ambivalence towards the USSR created an initial reluctance on his part to publicly criticize the 
Kremlin’s leadership. Only when domestic factors threatened to undermine his presidency in late 
1946, did the chief executive openly embrace a confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Determined to revitalize his beleaguered administration, the commander-in-chief readily co-
opted the Republicans’ anti-communist position when he decided to safeguard Athens’ 
government from Greece’s ongoing insurgency. Consequently, he countered Moscow’s 
perceived aggression in the Balkans with an extreme rhetorical stance calculated to gain 
immediate support from a hostile Congress intent on cutting the Federal Budget. In his zealous 
pursuit of this short term goal, Truman inadvertently altered the public’s long-term conception of 
                                                          
3 "PASS GREEK-TURK AID BILL: House Shouts Down Foes of US Crusade Action, Called ‘War against 
Russia’s Bullets for Greece.’" Chicago Daily Tribune, May 10, 1; “Truman signs bill for Near East Aid,” New York 
Times, May 23, 1947, 1.  
4 Webster’s Dictionary defines doctrine as “an official statement of a nation’s policy, especial toward other 




US-Soviet relations. Though he never meant to establish a new doctrine, the president’s speech 
ultimately resulted in a major paradigm shift in world affairs.   
Historiography 
 A surprisingly small number of book-length monographs exist regarding the background 
and drafting of the Truman Doctrine Speech. Most Cold War scholarship, therefore, incorporates 
this event within larger studies concerning the origins of America and Russia’s post-war conflict. 
Divided into three main schools of thought, the historiography of this subject occasionally defies 
clear chronological divisions, which create interesting anomalies for researchers of this era. 
Some orthodox historians, for example, published their books during decades already dominated 
by revisionist works. Likewise, there are instances where post-revisionist literature appeared 
before important orthodox and revisionist text entered the academic discourse. Consequently, the 
thematic divisions in the following historiographical review are divided into categories, which 
reflect the occasional non-linear nature of this scholarship.  
          Orthodox 
The Orthodox, or Traditionalist, historical interpretation of the Cold War’s origins 
emerged immediately after Truman proclaimed his doctrine in 1947. Lacking access to classified 
primary sources and writing in an oppressive political climate that discouraged dissent, historians 
during the 1950s naturally produced works that reflected Washington’s official positions vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union. Thomas A. Bailey’s America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations 
from Early Times to our Day is notable because it helped establish many of the themes found in 
subsequent texts from this era. Published in 1950, this book claimed that the American people 
entered the post-war period with unrealistic expectations concerning Moscow’s future 
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intentions.5 Highlighting Russia’s intransigence during World War II, the author asserted that the 
Kremlin’s aggressive policies in Eastern Europe and Germany made it impossible for the White 
House to work with its former ally.6 Consequently, he praised Truman for replacing Roosevelt’s 
“be-kind-to Russia policy” with a diplomatic initiative designed to contain Soviet expansionism.7 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Bailey dismissed domestic opponents of this new strategy as 
“hidebound isolationist” and “timid souls” who wanted to appease the USSR.8 In his opinion, US 
citizens needed to support the president’s new proposal because it ultimately extended and 
fulfilled the Monroe Doctrine’s concept of national self-defense.9  
In 1955, Foster Rhea Dulles’ book, America’s Rise to World Power, 1898-1954, 
acknowledged the possibility that Washington’s post-war economic and military strength might 
have enhanced Russia’s suspicion of its capitalist rival.10 This observation notwithstanding, the 
author agreed with Baily’s contention that the Soviet Union violated its wartime agreements 
because it wanted to create an ever-expanding empire around its periphery. Worried about the 
American public’s apathy towards foreign policy, Dulles applauded the Truman Doctrine Speech 
because it articulated a “broad and challenging conception of America’s new world role…which 
                                                          
5 Bailey deplored the American peoples’ general ignorance concerning Russia’s history and its people. In 
his opinion, Roosevelt’s “policy of appeasement” and pro-Moscow war-time propaganda capitalized on this lack of 
knowledge, which unfortunately created a naive outlook amongst the US populace. Thomas Bailey, America Faces 
Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to our Day (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1950), 291-5.  
6 The author insisted that the Soviets failed to cooperate with the US and Britain throughout World War II. 
At most, he concluded, one could view the White House and the Kremlin as “quasi allies” who never fully trusted 
each other. Ibid., 308. 
7 Ibid., 295, 333-5. 
8 Bailey argued that the US, as the “historic champion of liberal movements,” needed to assume its 
responsibility for the Free World’s defense. Ibid., 336. 
9 According to the author, the US adopted the Monroe Doctrine in response to Russia’s aggressive actions 
in the Western Hemisphere. While he acknowledged the older strategy’s apparent contradiction with the Truman 
Doctrine, the author believed these policies enunciated principles that complimented each other. America’s “defense 
line” he asserted, “moved from the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of Corinth.” Ibid., 336-7. 
10 Foster Rhea Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, 1898-1954 (New York: Harper, 1955), 227. 
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necessarily involved intervention and entanglement on a heretofore unimagined scale.”11  The 
president’ dramatic statement, he claimed, ended isolationist tendencies that traditionally 
hindered Washington’s ability to combat emerging threats.12 The author happily concluded that 
US citizens now accepted the idea that “a threat to freedom anywhere was…a threat to their own 
freedom.”13 Reiteration of these assertions appeared in John W. Spanier’s text, American 
Foreign Policy since World War II. Published in 1962, his book maintained that “the United 
States had no choice but to act” in Greece because the USSR intended to dominate the Turkish 
Straits and the Middle East.14 The author argued that the psychological impact of losing this 
region threatened to undermine Western Europe’s political stability, which could force the White 
House to adopt a perpetual “garrison state” mentality.15 Such a development, he contended, 
created “a condition incompatible with the American way of life” because it sacrificed liberty for 
increased national security.16 Spanier, therefore, commended the Truman Doctrine because 
“what was a stake in Greece was America’s survival itself.”17  
As the 1960s progressed, Washington’s military involvement in South East Asia 
prompted orthodox Cold War historians to defend America’s containment policy from an 
increasing number of revisionist critiques. In 1967, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote in Foreign 
Affairs that Truman’s post-war strategy represented a “brave and essential response of free men 
to Communist aggression.”18 In his opinion, Stalin’s paranoia and the Kremlin’s commitment to 
                                                          
11 Like Bailey, Dulles worried about the American peoples’ impatient approach towards foreign policy 
matters. Ibid., 231. 
12 Ibid., 231-2. 
13 Ibid., 232. 
14John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Prager, 1962), 39. 
15 Ibid., 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Orthodox historian such as Spanier generally accepted and restated Washington’s official cold war 
policy. This uncritical attitude inspired revisionist scholars to question the basic assumptions underlying the Truman 
Doctrine. Ibid., 40. 
18 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, 46, no. 1 (October, 1967): 23. 
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Marxist ideology made conflict between the superpowers unavoidable.19 The president, he 
concluded, could never have adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Moscow because the Soviet 
Union did not act like a traditional nation state.20 Consequently, the chief executive’s academic 
critics premised their numerous arguments on false assumptions.    
In 1970, Herbert Feis devoted an entire book, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the 
Cold War, 1945-1950 to correcting what he viewed as misconceptions about the conflict’s 
origins.21 According to the author, Moscow’s aggressive post-war decisions made it necessary 
for Washington to “take a public stand against Soviet intrusion into the lives of other nations.”22 
The White House’s policy, he argued, conformed to the Monroe Doctrine’s 124 year old precepts 
concerning national security.23 Interestingly, Feis admitted that the Truman Doctrine contained 
vague statements, which invited a wide range of interpretations. For example, terms such as “free 
peoples” and “support,” possessed a variety of meanings to different groups in American 
society.24 Remarkably, he also acknowledged his uncertainty about the Doctrine’s true scope. 
Lacking access to still classified White House records, the author relied on his interviews with 
Clark Clifford, who admitted that a Cabinet-level discussion concerning this topic occurred in 
the days prior to the president’s landmark speech. Unfortunately, Truman’s special counsel 
claimed that he did not remember how the chief executive answered this question.25 Despite 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 49-50.  
20 Ibid., 46-9. 
21 Feis acknowledged that “All historical tales are tinted by the light of the times in which they are written.” 
In his opinion, historians needed “calmer, clearer days and…a more tranquil environment” to write an accurate 
account of the Cold War’s origins. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New 
York: Norton, 1970), x.  
22 Ibid., 192. 
23 The author argued that in 1823, Monroe briefly considered Madison’s suggestion to apply his doctrine on 
a global scale. Ultimately, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams persuaded the president to limit its scope to the 
Western Hemisphere. Ibid., 195. 
24 Ibid., 200. 
25 Ibid., 192. 
7 
 
these ambiguities, Feis defended the chief executive’s actions because he spoke “as flatly and 
openly as…Moscow had spoken out against Capitalist democracies.”26   
The end of the Vietnam War coincided with the arrival of the Post-Revisionist School; a 
new generation of historians who sought to analyze US-Russian relations without assigning 
blame to either nation. Ironically, one of its leading scholars, John Lewis Gaddis, published a 
neo-orthodox book in 1997, entitled, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Utilizing 
newly declassified Soviet archive material, the author concluded that responsibility for the Super 
Powers’ tensions lay primarily with Stalin, whose “authoritarian, paranoid, and narcissistic 
predisposition” made the conflict inevitable.27 The Communist leader, he added, remained 
dangerous because of his adherence to the principles of Marxist-Leninism, which required the 
USSR to undermine the capitalist world’s political stability.28 Gaddis argued that Moscow’s 
open-ended geopolitical threats forced Truman to preserve the West’s balance of power with the 
Kremlin. The president’s 1947 doctrine, therefore, manifested Washington’s endeavor to 
safeguard London’s economic trade routes and, by extension, America’s economic and political 
strength.29       
The most recent neo-orthodox book, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, 
Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism, paralleled America’s post-war 
foreign policy with George W. Bush’s decisions concerning the War on Terror. Written in 2006 
by Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, the text declared that these two chief executives relied on deeply 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 198. 
27 While Gaddis admits the Cold War could have started without Stalin, he insisted that the Soviet leader’s 
personality made the conflict inevitable. “The more we learn,” the author observed, “the less sense it makes to 
distinguish Stalin’s foreign policies from his domestic practices or even his personal behavior.” John Lewis Gaddis, 
We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 25, 293. 
28 Marxist-Leninist wanted to eliminate the capitalist world’s imperial holdings in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. Once achieved, they believed that a world-wide communist revolution could occur in the advanced 
industrialized nations. Ibid., 29-31, 290. 
29 Ibid., 50.    
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held moralistic arguments to combat “tyranny’s ideological assault on human freedom.”30 In 
Truman’s case, the author argued that the president spent his first two years in office “educating 
and marshalling public opinion” in support of a comprehensive anti-communist policy.31 In her 
opinion, the commander-in-chief’s decision to sponsor Churchill’s “Iron Curtain Speech,” fire 
Henry Wallace, commission the Clifford-Elsey Report, and counter Soviet moves in the Near 
East constituted a coherent strategy against the Kremlin’s hostile designs. Furthermore, Spalding 
observed that the Truman Doctrine represented a conscious attempt by the White House to 
establish a new era in international affairs. The promotion of freedom, she concluded, remained 
the “centerpiece” of the president’s plan.32         
       Revisionist 
Perhaps not surprisingly, numerous historians eventually questioned the pro-
American/anti-Soviet assumptions propagated by their orthodox colleagues. In 1959, William 
Appleman Williams published The Tragedy of American Diplomacy to refute the commonly held 
belief that the USSR bore primary responsibility for starting the Cold War. In his opinion, 
Washington’s relentless pursuit of new markets and resources in Eastern Europe undermined 
Russia’s ability to safeguard its national security.33 Furthermore, the author maintained that 
Truman “seemed…to react, think, and act as an almost classic personification of the entire Open 
Door Policy.”34 As a result, the president adopted an aggressive foreign policy against Stalin, 
whom Williams argued only wanted to obtain an “economic and political understanding with 
                                                          
30 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of 
Liberal Internationalism (Lexington: University press of Kentucky, 2006), 4. 
31 Ibid., 225. 
32 Ibid., 71. 
33 The author argued that the Truman Administration viewed Eastern Europe as an essential market for 
America’s economy. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: The World 
Publishing CO., 1959) 172-5.  
34 Ibid., 168. 
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America” concerning Europe and the Near East.35 Consequently, the author viewed the Truman 
Doctrine as an “ideological manifesto of American strategy,” and thus served as a blueprint for 
establishing economic hegemony across the globe.36   
The notion of blaming America for the breakdown of US-Soviet relations resonated with 
numerous historians during the 1960s. D.F. Fleming, for example, explored this theme in his 
book, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1950. Published in 1961, the text accused Truman of 
being “belligerent-minded” with the Russians, which ultimately destroyed Roosevelt’s carefully 
constructed wartime alliance.37 According to the author, the president’s fervent anti-communist 
attitude unnecessarily strained his relations with Stalin, who sought only to secure the USSR’s 
legitimate interest in Eastern Europe and the Near East.38 Furthermore, Fleming argued that the 
chief executive intended to announce a new doctrine against the Kremlin as early as September, 
1945 but “on several occasions…some of his important advisors talked him out of it.”39 
However, when the situation in Greece “suited...his long held purpose,” the commander-in-chief 
used the opportunity to “proclaim from one of the world’s greatest rostrums the most gigantic 
encirclement ever conceived in the mind of man.”40 In essence, Truman’s personality instigated 
the Cold War.          
                                                          
35 Ibid., 155.  
36 Ibid., 175. 
37 D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1950 (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 268. 
38 The author defended Moscow’s post-war foreign policy during 1945-46. The Soviets, he argued, desired 
friendly governments in Eastern Europe to secure their western border. With respects to Iran, the Kremlin wanted to 
safeguard its southern oilfields in the Caucuses, while at the same time obtaining economic concessions comparable 
to those enjoyed by London. Finally, Russia’s proposal to share control of the Dardanelles with Turkey represented 
a legitimate national interest in protecting a strategic trade route. In Fleming’s opinion, the American and British 
government’s anti-communist beliefs motivated the western allies to undermine the USSR’s ability to recover from 
World War II. Ibid., 340-8, 418-9. 
39 Fleming based his assertion that Truman wanted to proclaim his Doctrine in 1945 on a New York Times 
article by Arthur Krock. Ibid., 441-2. 
40 Ibid., 447. 
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Fleming’s work heavily influenced David Horowitz’s 1965 book, The Free World 
Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War. Intent on examining the 
“fictional basis of Western cold war mythology,” the author hoped to reveal America’s true role 
in starting the Superpower conflict.41 Like his Revisionist predecessors, Horowitz believed the 
Soviet Union’s post-war policy focused primarily on economic reconstruction and national 
security. To that end, he highlighted the Kremlin’s reparation program in Germany, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria to prove that Moscow never intended to impose communist governments 
in these nations.42 Likewise, he cited Stalin’s decision to reign in Marxist movements in France 
and Italy as additional proof of the USSR’s desire to peacefully co-exist with its neighbors. In 
the author’s opinion, responsibility for the cold war lay with Truman, whose reversal of FDR’s 
policies caused the US to “launch an ideological crusade” against the Kremlin.43 Consequently, 
the president’s rejection of Russia’s “self-containment policy” doomed East-West relations, 
which forced the Soviet’s to adopt a more defensive posture in Eastern Europe.44  
In 1967, Walter LaFeber offered a more moderate and impartial interpretation of this 
topic in his book, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966. Utilizing William’s Marxist 
analysis, the author argued that the US government believed it needed to expand its access to 
foreign markets around the world in order to avoid another crippling economic depression.45 As 
such, Truman attempted to use Washington’s atomic bomb monopoly and economic influence to 
convince Moscow to open Eastern Europe to American trade.46 According to LaFeber, Stalin’s 
                                                          
41 The author believed that a better understanding of the Cold War’s origins could help the US and Russia 
normalize relations. David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold 
War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), 15. 
42 Ibid., 91-2. 
43 Ibid., 73. 
44 Ibid., 93. 
45 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York: Wiley, 1967), 6-10. 
46 Ibid., 22. 
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desire to establish a security zone along the Soviet Union’s western border, in addition to the 
dictator’s personal paranoia, prevented the Kremlin from accommodating the White House.47 
The author concluded that the president and his advisors mistook the USSR’s political 
intransigence in Europe and the Near East as being ideological in nature, which subsequently led 
them to adopt the Truman Doctrine’s open-ended containment policy.48   
In 1970, Lloyd C. Gardner published, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American 
Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 to challenge certain assumptions held by his fellow Revisionist 
historians. Unlike many New Left scholars, the author did not blame the US for starting the Cold 
War.49 In his opinion, this overly simplified a complex situation where “neither side could fully 
control events or even freely respond to them in many instances.”50 Likewise, Gardner disagreed 
with Fleming and Horowitz’s contention that Truman reversed Roosevelt’s policy towards the 
Soviet Union. The inexperienced and untested president, he insisted, tried in good faith to carry 
out many of the diplomatic initiatives his predecessor postponed for the sake of preserving 
wartime unity.51 Despite these differences, the author put forth a modified version of Williams’ 
“Open Door Thesis,” which stated that Washington’s post-war policy linked domestic freedom 
and prosperity to the establishment of free trade within a new liberal world order.52 The White 
House, therefore, opposed all blocs and spheres of influence, regardless of which nation 
controlled them. Consequently, whenever the USSR tried to advance its national interest in 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 Ibid., 23-5. 
49 The author did declare that “responsibility for the way in which the Cold War developed…belongs more 
to the United States. Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-
1945 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 317. 
50 Ibid., xi. 
51 Ibid., 55-7. 
52 The author disagreed with Williams’ belief that Eastern Europe’s economic orientation caused the Cold 
War. For Gardner, the Superpowers conflict occurred, in part, because the US wanted markets in every region of the 
world. Ibid., xi, 319.       
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Europe and the Near East, the US automatically construed these developments as an 
ideologically motivated move by the Kremlin to spread Communism.53 Within this context, 
Britain’s withdrawal from Greece necessitated the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in 
order to safeguard America’s ability to transport goods and raw materials in the Mediterranean 
Sea.54 Gardner concluded that the US, in effect, embraced containment as a policy because it 
reflected a “blend of puritan dogma and Yankee pragmatism.”55 
In 1972, Richard M. Freeland wrote The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of 
McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 to explore 
how political considerations in the US influenced Washington’s implementation of its 
Containment policy against the Soviet Union. The author reaffirmed Gardner’s assertion that 
Truman’s decisions in 1945 remained consistent with Roosevelt’s policy during World War II.56 
Like his predecessor, the new president downplayed the White House’s ongoing tensions with 
the Kremlin in the hopes that America’s military and economic superiority might persuade 
Russia to cooperate in the post-war era. When this strategy failed, the chief executive decided in 
early 1946 that he needed to eventually adopt a more aggressive posture towards the USSR.57 
According to Freeland, the administration chose to exploit the Greek crises in 1947 because it 
highlighted Britain’s need for indirect US assistance for its own fragile economy.58 Furthermore, 
                                                          
53 Ibid., xi. 
54 Ibid., 221. 
55 According to the author, the US assumed a pious attitude when it “declared to the world that it would 
decide when changes in the status quo violated the U.N. Charter.” Ibid., 225, 222. 
56The author declared that FDR secretly distrusted the USSR during World War II. In Freeland’s opinion, 
the president publicly portrayed Stalin as trustworthy because the White House needed Congress to pass legislation 
pertaining to post-war organizations such as the UN. Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of 
McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1972), 41. 
57 Freeland asserted that Truman’s efforts to minimize US-Soviet tensions gave the American people 
unrealistic expectations about Moscow’s post-war behavior. Ibid., 43-5, 68.     
58 The White House feared that America’s economy could suffer if British trade declined. Securing the 
Mediterranean, therefore, became a top strategic priority for the US. Ibid., 70-5.    
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America’s recent mid-term election allowed Truman to assume a more vocal anti-communist 
stance without fearing repercussions from his party’s left-wing base.59 The commander-in-
chief’s subsequent speech, the author contended, employed harsh rhetoric that exaggerated the 
Soviet threat in order to persuade a reluctant Congress and nation to support the proposed aid 
program.60 Moreover, nine days after he proclaimed his doctrine, the president singed executive 
order 9835 creating the Federal Employee Loyalty Program. This event, Freeland argued, further 
illustrated how the administration created and used fear at home to increase political support for 
its new aggressive foreign policy.61 The author concluded that this strategy inadvertently created 
the conditions necessary for the rise of McCarthyism, which led to the curtailment of civil 
liberties in America during the 1950s.62   
In 1974, David L. Heinlein published The Truman Doctrine: A Chief Executive in Search 
of the Presidency, to illustrate how the president’s political fortunes influenced the development 
of America’s Cold War policy. Undoubtedly influenced by the ongoing Watergate Scandal, the 
author asserted that Truman turned to foreign affairs in 1947 to establish a “public acceptance” 
of his leadership.63 With the Democratic Party’s mid-term loss and his domestic program 
frustrated by an obstructionist Republican-controlled Congress, the chief executive seized upon 
the Greek crisis as an opportunity to make himself relevant in Washington again.64According to 
Heinlein, Truman’s successful “quest for legitimacy” established an unfortunate precedent for 
                                                          
59 Ibid., 84. 
60 Ibid., 87-8. 
61 Ibid., 123-8. 
62 Ibid., 334-60.  
63 David L. Heinlein, The Truman Doctrine: A Chief Executive in Search of the Presidency (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University, 1974), 304. 
64 Despite the emphasis of his dissertation, the author did acknowledge that Truman sincerely worried about 
Soviet expansion in Europe and the Near East. Ibid., 147-9, 278, 302-3. 
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subsequent presidents, who readily intervened around the world for the sake of their own 
political stature.65  
    Post-Revisionist 
During the 1970s, an intellectual trend emerged that challenged many of the conclusions 
embraced by New Left historians from the Vietnam War era. John L. Gaddis led this movement 
with his book, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. Published in 
1972, the author rejected the Marxist claim that “economic determinism” motivated 
Washington’s post-war policy towards Moscow.66 In his opinion, various factors such as 
domestic politics, bureaucratic agendas, entrenched ideologies, personal traits, and honest 
miscalculations influenced how both Superpowers viewed each other’s actions.67 Applying this 
analytical framework to the Truman administration, he determined that disparate elements such 
as Secretary of State Byrnes’ independent style, Kennan’s Long Telegram, Clifford’s classified 
intelligence report, Henry Wallace’s Madison Square Garden Speech, and the 1946 mid-term 
election all helped shape the development of America’s foreign policy.68  
Gaddis’ multifaceted assessment concluded that the majority of Washington’s foreign 
policy establishment sincerely misconstrued Russia’s actions in Eastern Europe and the Near 
East as aggressive moves designed to threaten the United States’ geopolitical position in the 
world.69 According to the author, when “American omnipotence turned out to be an illusion” in 
early 1946, the White House, State Department, and Pentagon realized they needed to actively 
                                                          
65 The author concluded that President Lyndon “was fatally tempted by the mirage of a larger reputation to 
attempt a decisive victory in Vietnam.” Ibid., 301, 304-5. 
66 John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972), 357-8. 
67 Ibid., 281, 358-61. 
68 Ibid., 283-90, 302-4, 321-2, 338-41, 344. 
69 The author also declared that Stalin should have been clearer about his limited objectives in Eastern 
Europe. Ibid., 355. 
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counter the Kremlin’s expansionist policies in nations deemed strategically important to the 
US.70 The occurrence of the Greek crises in 1947, therefore, caused the president to exaggerate 
the nature of the Soviet threat around the entire world in order to mobilize the nation’s reluctant 
citizenry for this specific endeavor.71     
Gaddis further solidified his reputation as a prominent Cold War historian when he 
published an intriguing article in 1974, entitled “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real turning 
Point?” As his title suggests, the author argued that the president’s 1947 speech did not signal a 
true departure for America’s post-war foreign policy. In his opinion, the US opposed 
totalitarianism in principle since 1940.72 Furthermore, the White House already implemented its 
containment policy against the Soviets in 1946 when Washington actively opposed Moscow’s 
designs on Iran and Turkey.73 The Truman Doctrine seemed special at the time, Gaddis argued, 
because the chief executive used “sweeping language” to pressure Congress into supporting a 
large appropriations request for Athens and Ankara.74 The speech’s melodramatic rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the author insisted that the administration only wanted to have a limited 
doctrine to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East, not communism and 
                                                          
70 In this regard, Gaddis concurred with Gardner’s revisionist assessment concerning some of the 
misconceptions embraced by the Truman Administration. Furthermore, the authors agreed that both the US and the 
Soviets shared responsibility for starting the Cold War. Ibid., 356, 360.  
71 According to the author, the Truman Doctrine “constituted a form of shock therapy: it was a last-ditch 
effort by the Administration to prod Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of…world 
leadership. Ibid., 351, 356. 
72 “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point,” Foreign Affairs, vol.52 no 2 (Jan.., 1974)386-402., 
387. 
73 Ibid., 389. 
74 Ibid., 386. 
16 
 
totalitarianism everywhere.75 He concluded that universal containment did not become part of 
the president’s foreign policy until the Korean War.76   
In 1980, Bruce R. Kuniholm applied Gaddis’ post-revisionist ideas in his book, The 
Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, 
and Greece. Downplaying the role of ideology, the author maintained that US-Russian tensions 
in the Middle East grew out of Britain’s traditional conflict with Russia concerning warm-water 
ports, lines of communication, and oil concessions in the region’s Northern Tier77 In addition, 
bureaucratic factors highlighted the area’s importance to the White House. According to 
Kuniholm, anti-Soviet officials such as Lincoln MacVeah and Loy Henderson began expressing 
their concerns about the region’s future alignment as early as 1944.78 The latter’s leadership of 
the State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), in addition to his 
close friendship with undersecretary of state Dean Acheson, helped influence Washington’s 
perception of Moscow’s post-war actions towards Iran, Turkey, and Greece.79 In the author’s 
opinion, the Kremlin’s aggressive attempts to pressure Tehran and Ankara in 1946 justified the 
White House’s response, which he characterized as cautious and responsible.80 While he claimed 
that containment in the Near East “was a realistic and pragmatic policy,” the author questioned 
the Truman Doctrine speech’s “imagery and rhetoric which encouraged a misleadingly simplistic 
                                                          
75 Gaddis cited America’s aid to Tito’s Yugoslavia after the latter’s 1948 break with the USSR as proof that 
Truman never intended to contain communism. Ibid., 392. 
76 Ibid., 386. 
77 The author defined the “Northern Tier” as the region of the Near East that borders the Soviet Union. 
Brunce R. Kunilholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, 
Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), xv, xviii, 3. 
78 Kunilholm declared that Lincoln MacVeagh openly worried about London’s ability to safeguard its 
interest in the Near East after the war. Specifically, he expressed his concerns about Greece’s political future to 
Roosevelt throughout 1944 and 1945. Ibid., 96-100, 240. 
79 According to Kuniholm, Acheson initially appeared disinterested in the Near East. Henderson, however, 
quickly mentored him about the region’s significance to the US. Ibid., 240-1. 
80 Ibid., 378. 
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view or model of the world.”81 This erroneous conception, he concluded, helped create the 
mindset that made the Korean and Vietnam Wars possible.82 
In 1994, Melvyn P. Leffler wrote The Specter of Communism: The United States and the 
Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 to analyze how policy makers in Washington and Moscow 
relied on ideology to promote their respective national interest after World War II. Utilizing 
newly opened Soviet archives, the author argued that Stalin never implemented a coherent 
foreign policy between 1945 and 1947.83 Despite his tyrannical rule, the ill dictator “was often 
silent” about Russia’s post-war strategy, which allowed “cunning men and competing 
bureaucracies” in the Kremlin to “design policies and promote their own interest.”84 The result, 
Leffler observed, caused Moscow to highlight “ideological purification” within the USSR while 
it pursued contradictory goals in Eastern Europe.85 Consequently, the Truman administration 
misunderstood the Soviet’s intentions when it developed its own policy to advance Washington’s 
national interest. Though the White House “cared little about human rights and personal 
freedom” in other nations, American policy makers worried that Stalin intended to use 
communism to disrupt the “configuration of power in the international system.”86 This gave rise, 
the author concluded, to Truman’s anti-Marxist offensive with the Doctrine speech as its 
centerpiece.87  
                                                          
81 Interestingly, the author conceded that Truman needed a dramatic speech in 1947 because the president’s 
earlier efforts to educate the American people failed to elicit support. Ibid., xv, 415, 418. 
82 Ibid., 419-20. 
83 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 
1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 40. 
84 Shortly after World War II ended, the exhausted Soviet leader took an extensive vacation, which caused 
him to neglect his daily duties. Ibid., 40-1. 
85 Ibid., 41. 
86 Ibid., 49. 
87 Ibid., 52-61. 
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Gaddis and Kuniholm’s post-revisionist themes heavily influenced Denise M. Bostdorff’s 
work, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. Published in 2008, the 
text is unique because it is the only book-length evaluation of the president’s historical speech.88 
Like Gaddis, the author agreed that the address signified one of many turning points that 
occurred between 1945 and 1947.89 According to her analysis, speeches by Stalin, Churchill, 
Byrnes, and Wallace contributed to the world’s perception and understanding of the growing US- 
Soviet rift after World War II.90 Truman, however, inadvertently created uncertainty with the 
American people because he often made conflicting statements or simply remained silent with 
respects to foreign policy questions.91 When the Greek crisis occurred, the author observed, the 
chief executive used it as an opportunity to declare a comprehensive post-war strategy against 
the Kremlin. Bostdorff’s subsequent treatment of the administration’s intricate speech drafting 
process revealed how internal debates, bureaucratic competition, and public relations campaigns 
shaped one of the pivotal presidential statements of the Cold War.92                  
Methodology 
The following chapters examine the origins and development of America’s post-war 
foreign policy between 1945 and 1947. Utilizing government documents, personal memoirs, oral 
histories, and contemporary periodicals, this analysis will illustrate how Truman’s inexperience 
and personality traits complicated an already challenging international situation after World War 
II. His inconsistent decisions and public aloofness concerning Washington’s relations with 
                                                          
88 Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2008), ix. 
89 Ibid., 16. 
90 Ibid., 18-20, 25-7, 30-6. 
91 Truman initially endorsed both Churchill and Wallace’s speeches, only to publicly distance himself from 
their statements when they became too controversial. Ibid., 26, 32-4. 
92 The author evaluated the interdepartmental deliberations and debates concerning the scope and language 
of the president’s speech. Ibid., 65-7, 73-6.    
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Moscow in 1946 inadvertently created confusion with the American people. Consequently, when 
the Greek crises occurred in 1947, the president consciously overstated his case in order to 
garner support from a reluctant and generally uniformed citizenry. Unfortunately, the chief 
executive’s powerful message created the impression that the White House intended to embark 
on an open-ended world-wide crusade against communism. Though he never meant to establish a 
new doctrine, the president’s speech ultimately resulted in a major paradigm shift in world 
affairs.   
Chapter two explores Truman’s inheritance of Roosevelt’s vague contradictory foreign 
policy agenda at the end of World War II. Though he tried to use American political power to 
great effect, the new president failed to persuade the Soviet Union to accept Washington’s vision 
of a liberal international world order. Despite this development, the chief executive downplayed 
US tensions with the Kremlin in an effort to maintain good relations with his wartime ally. 
Moreover, this section illustrates how the commander-in-chief, though inexperienced, remained 
pragmatic and flexible towards Moscow, especially when compared with some of his hardline 
advisors in the cabinet and State Department.   
Chapter three analyzes the Iranian and Turkish Crises of 1946 and how it affected the 
Truman administration’s understanding of Stalin’s intentions in the Near East. While he adopted 
a tough diplomatic stance against the Russians during these confrontations, the president 
remained aloof about them in public. Furthermore, his failure to communicate the White House’s 
ongoing concerns regarding the USSR caused serious problems when he endorsed Wallace’s 
Madison Square Garden Speech in September, 1946. The resulting public outcry created 
confusion about the president’s foreign policy, which forced him to embrace Byrne’s 
increasingly hardline position. The section concludes with an evaluation of the mid-term 
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election’s impact on Truman’s domestic political standing and how it influenced his willingness 
to pursue a stronger strategy against the Kremlin.    
Chapter four examines the background of the Greek insurgency and why the White 
House believed it needed to safeguard Athens’ reactionary regime. An evaluation of the State 
Department’s records reveals that Dean Acheson and a small clique of advisors exercised 
considerable influence with both the president and the secretary of state concerning this matter. 
This group, in addition to the White House Special Counsel’s office, adopted many of the themes 
and concepts found in the Truman Doctrine when they drafted the president’s address in March, 
1947. This section also analyzes Acheson’s testimony before Congress and how he tried to limit 
the scope of the proposed Containment Policy.  
The Conclusion summarizes the previous chapters’ observations in an effort to create a 
new understanding of the president’s Cold War foreign policy. Initially ambivalent about Stalin’s 
post-war intentions, the chief executive eventually adopted an ad hoc policy to deter the Kremlin 
from expanding into strategically important nations such as Iran and Turkey. When the Greek 
crises developed in early 1947, the commander-in-chief consciously embellished the nature of 
the threat to obtain sufficient support from Congress and a largely indifferent public. Though the 
administration’s subsequent decisions and statements tried to restrict the application of the 
principles enunciated in the Truman Doctrine speech, the White House ultimately allowed the 
American people to believe in the address’s overly simplistic world view.        
Despite their disagreements about Truman’s possible motives for engaging the Soviets in 
the Cold War, all historians agree that the commander-in-chief intended to proclaim a major 
doctrine in March, 1947. Even scholars who claim that the administration purposefully 
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exaggerated the nature of the communist threat accept the premise that the chief executive 
intended to adopt a new world-wide strategy against Marxist groups and nations. This study 
challenges these assumptions and will show that the president viewed his speech as a pragmatic 
way to elicit support for an aid package ultimately designed to safeguard resources and lines of 























From Allies to Adversaries: The Origins of the Cold War 
 
Unlike most international conflicts, the Cold War lacks an easily discernable starting 
point. Its origins, however, arguably began during the latter stages of World War II when latent 
national rivalries amongst the Allies threatened to undermine their certain victory over Berlin, 
Rome, and Tokyo.1 After the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, the American, British, and 
Russian governments repeatedly failed to resolve their outstanding political differences regarding 
the future status of Eastern Europe and Germany. This ongoing diplomatic impasse unfortunately 
prevented the victors from converting their hard won military triumph into a secure postwar 
peace. Ultimately, long term national interest and mutual mistrust created a crises atmosphere 
which inexorably dominated the perceptions and judgments of the onetime allied leaders.   
Adolf Hitler’s aggression between 1939 and 1941 created one of the most unlikely 
wartime coalitions in history. Allied against a common existential threat, the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union temporarily put aside their ideological differences and worked 
together to defeat the Nazi regime.2 Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s leadership, 
America sent large amounts of Lend Lease supplies to the USSR, whose beleaguered troops 
fought against the bulk of the German army. In addition to this ongoing effort, the US and 
British high commands coordinated numerous military campaigns to reduce Berlin’s threat to the 
                                                          
1 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 52-3.  
               2 Between June and December, 1941, Hitler initiated Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union and 
declared war against United States. Together with Great Britain, which had been fighting Germany since 1939, this 
“Strange Alliance” of Imperialist, Capitalist, and Communist nations successfully coordinated their resources and 
strategic efforts against the Nazis. Ibid., 15.      
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Atlantic Ocean’s sea lanes, the Middle East, and the Russian Front. During 1942 and 1943, 
Allied industrial production and military assets exceeded the Third Reich’s resources, which 
enabled them to defeat and counterattack Hitler’s forces on numerous battle fronts in the 
European Theater of Operations.3 By mid-1944, the Red Army had successfully expelled the 
Wehrmacht’s outnumbered divisions from western Russia and begun its relentless advance 
across Eastern Europe. As Moscow’s troops “liberated” Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states, Allied policy makers in London and Washington DC grew 
increasingly concerned about the political future of these nations.4      
   As a lifelong foe of communism, Prime Minister Winston Churchill repeatedly tried to 
thwart Russia’s expansion into Eastern Europe. For example, the British leader attempted to 
persuade Roosevelt in early 1944, to use the Western Allies’ foothold in Southern Italy as a base 
of operations against German troops deployed along the Balkans’ Adriatic coast. Undeterred by 
this transparent British attempt to prevent the entry of Soviet armies into the region, the president 
rejected the proposed strategy because he feared it might delay or weaken the long planned cross 
channel invasion of North Western Europe.5 Disappointed by America’s intransigence and 
increasingly nervous about the Russian military’s westward march, the prime minister decided to 
pursue his own policy to safeguard the Balkans.   
In October 1944, Churchill traveled to Moscow and concluded an informal agreement 
with Stalin that established spheres of influence between their two nations. This hastily written 
pact, embarrassingly referred to as the “naughty document” by the English leader, gave the 
                                                          
               3 Allied victories at Stalingrad, El Alamein, Tunisia, and Kursk greatly reduced the number of effective 
German divisions in the field. While still formidable, the Wehrmacht no longer possessed the strategic initiative on 
any front. Ibid., 16-25.  
               4 Ibid., 31.  
               5 Ibid., 27. 
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Soviet Union control of ninety percent of Romania and Bulgaria’s post-war government, while 
Britain received the same level of influence in Greece.6 In addition, the two allied head of states 
decided to share equally in Yugoslavia and Hungary’s political future. Despite Churchill’s initial 
misgivings concerning their cavalier resolution of this issue, he believed this arrangement helped 
secure Greece, which protected London’s Mediterranean economic lifeline to its colonies in the 
Far East. Furthermore, he surmised that his meetings with the “Old Bear” improved overall 
relations between England and the USSR.7 “I like him the more I see him,” confessed the old 
Tory.8 “Now they respect us here and I am sure they wish to work with us.”9    
Unlike the British prime minister, Stalin had no compunction with the idea of trading 
nations to establish spheres of influence in the Balkans.10 Two German invasions, a Polish 
incursion in 1920, and the Western Power’s anti-Bolshevik intervention during the Russian Civil 
War convinced the Soviet dictator that the USSR needed to control nearby nations, especially 
those adjacent to its territory.11 One of his primary war aims, therefore, included the creation of a 
buffer zone in Eastern Europe where newly installed communist governments could help 
guarantee the Soviet Union’s security. In this regard, he viewed Russia’s domination of Poland 
as an essential requirement for Moscow’s foreign policy goals.12  
                                                          
 6 Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts, Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-Creation of World War II through the 
eyes and minds of Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 268.    
 7 Ibid., 269. 
 8 Ibid., 269. 
 9 Ibid., 269. 
               10 Stalin already had experience with the establishment of spheres of influence when he and Hitler 
concluded the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in August, 1939. That treaty included a secret protocol which gave 
the Russians free reign in Estonia and Latvia in return for German domination of Lithuania. Both nations also agreed 
to partition Poland. James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War II (New York: William Morrow & Co., 
1980), 65-6.        
               11Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, 55. 
               12 Ibid., 55. 
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For his part, Roosevelt rejected both Britain’s imperialistic designs and Russia’s plan to 
divide Europe. Contrary to Churchill and Stalin, he wanted the impending post-war international 
order to align with the democratic principles of the Atlantic Charter.13 To this end, FDR sought 
to promote free elections and open trade in every region of the globe, including colonial 
possessions and previously designated spheres of influence.14 As the war progressed, he 
increasingly envisioned the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union working 
together as the world’s “Four Policemen” in a collective effort to maintain peace through the 
auspices of the newly created United Nations.15 While somewhat vague, this idea dominated the 
president’s thinking in February, 1945 when he met with his colleagues on the Crimean 
Peninsula to discuss Europe’s future political status.        
The Yalta Conference highlighted the growing frustration and tension experienced within 
the Allied camp during the last months of the war. Thus far, military necessity had prompted the 
Big Three to overcome their differences in the interest of maintaining a united front against 
German aggression.16 The USSR’s need for Lend Lease supplies and a Second Front in France 
had encouraged Stalin to cooperate with the Western Powers, just as America’s and Britain’s 
desire to keep Russia fighting in the war prompted them to continue cordial relations with 
                                                          
               13 Unlike FDR, Churchill and Stalin did not want to apply the principle of self-determination to their 
respective empires. Additionally, both leaders deemed it imperative to exclude the United States’ influence from 
their economic blocs. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 (Boston: McGraw Hill, 
2008), 12-4.   
               14 Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the 20th Century (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 507-8.  
               15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Susan Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete 
Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2005), 189. 
               16 Numerous issues constantly threatened to weaken and destroy the Grand Alliance throughout the course 
of the war. Stalin viewed his allies’ reluctance to establish a second front in France until 1944 as evidence that the 
US and British governments, especially the latter, secretly wanted the USSR to suffer higher casualties before the 
conflicted ended. Likewise, the Western Allies’ exclusion of Russia from negotiations concerning Italy’s withdrawal 
from the war in 1943 upset the Soviet dictator and confirmed his suspicions that Washington, D.C. and London 
meant to hinder Moscow’s position in the postwar world. Paxton, Europe in the 20th Century, 495-6.     
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Moscow.17 The Nazi’s imminent defeat, however, removed the common enemy that had kept the 
Grand Alliance together for more than three years. With the war in Europe nearly won, the 
incentive to compromise quickly disappeared.18  
While the Yalta Conference resolved various diplomatic and military issues, the question 
of Eastern Europe’s political future threatened to divide the Allies.19 For example, Stalin 
demanded that the US and Britain join the Soviet Union in its recognition of the communist 
dominated Lublin Committee as Poland’s new government. Though FDR accepted the USSR’s 
insistence that a friendly regime control Warsaw, he endorsed Churchill’s request that the 
provisional administration needed to include pro-Western Polish politicians from the London-
based government-in-exile.  After numerous debates, the Soviet dictator agreed in principle to 
have his puppet organization in Lublin “reorganized on a broader democratic basis.”20 With the 
Red Army already deployed as far west as the Oder River in Germany, the president and prime 
minister had little recourse but to accept Stalin’s vague assurances. As the Conference 
concluded, FDR’s military chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, caustically observed that the 
language of the final agreement “was so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from 
Yalta to Washington without technically breaking it.”21          
Upon Roosevelt’s return to the United States, he addressed a joint session of Congress to 
report that the Allied governments had unanimously agreed to promote free elections in the 
newly liberated nations of Europe. Furthermore, he praised the coalition’s willingness to 
                                                          
               17 Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, 31-2.   
               18 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 16-9. 
               19 Stalin’s decision to have the Soviet Union participate in the new United Nations organization pleased 
FDR who deemed it essential for the maintenance of post-war peace in Europe. In addition, the Russian’s promise to 
enter the war against Japan within three months of Germany’s surrender greatly relieved Roosevelt. Paxton, Europe 
in the 20th Century, 499-500.          
               20 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 16. 
               21 Ibid., 16. 
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compromise on issues concerning Poland and its future political status. Though FDR 
acknowledged that the Big Three still had different views about certain post-war issues, he 
downplayed them and emphasized that the United States, Britain, and the USSR had never 
enjoyed better relations.22 Not surprisingly, the President’s positive characterization of the 
conference and its results gave the American people the impression that “Uncle Joe” still 
remained a steadfast ally who shared the United States’ desire to foster a free and democratic 
Eastern Europe.23 
Within days of FDR’s March 1st speech, Stalin began to openly violate the Yalta 
Agreement when he prohibited the formation of pluralistic democracies within territory recently 
liberated from Nazi Germany. In Romania, the Russian chairman of the three-power Allied 
Control Commission ignored his American and British colleagues and unilaterally imposed a 
communist government in Bucharest. Meanwhile in Poland, the NKVD ruthlessly suppressed 
civil liberties and employed intimidation tactics to ensure the Kremlin’s domination of Warsaw’s 
new leadership.24 Consistent with his belief that “everyone imposes his own system as far as his 
armies can reach,” the Soviet dictator defiantly established and consolidated the USSR’s sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe.25  
                                                          
                22 On March 1, 1945, the president addressed a joint session of Congress and optimistically reported that 
the Allies “made a good start on the road to a world of peace.”  He expressed his “firm belief” that the Yalta 
agreement created the necessary conditions for the realization of the “sound and just principles of the Atlantic 
Charter.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred 
Jonas, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975), 
657. 
               23 At Yalta, Roosevelt informed an unamused Stalin that he and Churchill referred to the Soviet dictator as 
“Uncle Joe” in their wartime correspondence. This term also reflected to the rehabilitation of Stalin’s reputation in 
America and Britain during World War II. Since 1941, US propaganda consistently portrayed the USSR and its 
communist government as faithful allies who fought for the same western ideals as the rest of the coalition. Jim 
Bishop, FDR’s Last Year, April 1944-April, 1945 (New York: W. Morrow, 1974), 320.     
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Stalin’s draconian measures alarmed Churchill, who considered his recent actions a 
betrayal of the understanding they had reached one month earlier at Yalta. On March 8, 1945, the 
Prime Minister informed FDR that Parliament increasingly expressed widespread concern about   
Poland’s fate and that he personally risked losing political influence in London if Moscow did 
not honor the Crimean agreement.26 Viewing the situation as a “test case” of Russia’s intention 
for Eastern Europe, he suggested that a joint message from the American and British heads of 
states could persuade Stalin to reverse his policy.27  Churchill concluded that future East-West 
cooperation should largely depend on whether the Soviet leader moderated his policy towards 
Warsaw’s government.  
While Roosevelt shared the prime minister’s concerns about the USSR, he also feared 
that their personal intervention might inadvertently aggravate an already tense situation. He, 
therefore, instructed the US ambassador to Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, to discuss and 
resolve the issues with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslay Molotov.28 The subsequent 
diplomatic exchanges, however, revealed the growing mistrust, frustration, and general 
animosity, which plagued the Grand Alliance. For example, Molotov’s consistent repudiation of 
Harriman’s assertions reinforced the ambassador’s assessment that Russia’s recent actions in 
Poland and Romania reflected “long-range plans established some time ago for the Balkan and 
Eastern European states.”29 The American diplomat warned Roosevelt that “unless we are 
                                                          
              26 Roosevelt, Churchill, Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime 
Correspondence, 662. 
              27 Ibid., 663.    
              28 Ibid., 669. 
              29 Ibid., 669.     
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prepared to live in a Soviet-dominated world, we must use our economic power to assist 
countries naturally friendly to us.”30   
In addition to his categorical denials of any Russian wrongdoing in Warsaw, Molotov 
angrily accused the Western Allies of secretly negotiating with German officers in Switzerland 
for the purpose of obtaining a separate peace with Berlin.31 Within days, Stalin complained 
directly to Roosevelt that these covert meetings allowed the Wehrmacht to redeploy three 
infantry divisions from Italy to the Eastern Front in Hungary.32 The seriousness of this 
accusation infuriated Roosevelt who immediately sent a terse telegram to the Soviet leader on 
April 4. FDR’s message, drafted by Admiral Leahy and Army Chief of Staff General George C. 
Marshall, declared that “I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, 
whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted 
subordinates.”33  Stalin responded on April 7 with assurances that his information came from 
trusted and reliable sources. Furthermore, he observed that it seemed “strange and 
incomprehensible” that Hitler’s forces continued to “fight savagely with the Russians for some 
unknown junction…in Czechoslovakia” while at the same time they surrendered several 
important cities in central Germany to the Anglo-American armies with little to no resistance.34 
Finally, the Russian leader dismissed Roosevelt’s concerns about the USSR’s domination of 
                                                          
              30 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 17. 
              31 In early March, 1945, General Karl Wolff of the Waffen SS secretly contacted OSS agent Allen Dulles in 
Switzerland to explore the possibility of surrendering German forces deployed along the Italian front. Harriman and 
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall advised FDR not to include the Soviets in the negotiations because 
they feared the Kremlin might complicate the process. The ambassador also concluded that the Russians “would 
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Roosevelt, Stalin, and Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 302. 
               32 Roosevelt, Stalin, and Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 306.  
               33 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947 (New York: 
Columbia University, 1972), 93.   
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Warsaw’s provisional government and declared that “matters on the Polish question have 
…reached a dead end.”35  
The deterioration of US-Soviet relations became readily apparent when, in the midst of 
these dueling dispatches, the Kremlin abruptly cancelled Molotov’s planned attendance for the 
April 25 opening session of the new United Nations organization.36 Exasperated with the Russian 
leader’s obstinate behavior, Roosevelt privately expressed to a close friend that “Averell is right; 
we can’t do business with Stalin. He has broken every one the promises he made at Yalta.”37  
FDR’s belated realization of Moscow’s aggressive policies prompted him to assure Churchill 
that the US and Britain “must not permit anybody to entertain a false impression that we are 
afraid”38 Interestingly, the president added that “our armies will in a very few days be in a 
position that will permit us to become ‘tougher’ than has heretofore appeared advantageous to 
the war effort.”39 While this statement strongly suggest that Roosevelt intended to adopt a more 
assertive policy towards the USSR, his subsequent messages to the prime minister minimized 
recent differences between the Allied leaders and expressed a desire to maintain a good working 
relationship in the post war world.40 Whatever his future intentions, Roosevelt’s death on April 
12, 1945 dramatically altered the tone and dynamics of US-Soviet relations.   
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               36 Stalin informed FDR that “circumstances have developed in such a way that Mr. V.M. Molotov really, is 
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FDR’s untimely passing thrust Harry S. Truman into the Oval Office at a moment when 
fast moving world events challenged the acumen of even the most experienced statesmen. Prior 
to his brief eighty-two day tenure as vice president, the former senator from Missouri had served 
ten years in Congress where he eventually gained national prominence during World War II as 
chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.41 In 1944, 
Truman reluctantly accepted Roosevelt’s request to run with him on the Democratic ticket in that 
year’s election. Once in office, however, the new vice president quickly became frustrated with 
his limited access to FDR and his inner circle of advisors. He later complained that Roosevelt 
failed to brief him “about the war, or about foreign affairs or what he had in mind for peace after 
the war.”42 Thus handicapped, Truman entered the White House without the benefit of knowing 
how his predecessor viewed US-Soviet relations and what specific policies he intended to pursue 
in the near future. 
Lacking foreign policy experience and a personal familiarity with either Churchill or 
Stalin, the new president heavily relied on advice from officials in Roosevelt’s cabinet and State 
Department.43 Within twenty-four hours of taking the oath of office, Truman met with Secretary 
of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who briefed him about Washington’s growing problems with 
Moscow. For the first time the commander-in-chief learned about the Kremlin’s “firm and 
uncompromising position” concerning Eastern Europe and how it had repeatedly violated the 
Yalta agreement in recent months.44 Angered by what he viewed as Soviet intransigence, the 
president responded during the meeting that the United States “must stand up to the Russians” 
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because “we had been too easy with them.”45 One week later Truman met with Ambassador 
Harriman who warned in stark terms that America must confront the USSR or face a “barbarian 
invasion of Europe.”46 In the diplomat’s opinion, “elements around Stalin misinterpreted our 
generosity and…desire to cooperate as an indication of softness.”47 He suggested that the 
president could rectify this problem by using US financial aid, which Moscow desperately 
needed for post-war reconstruction, as leverage in their ongoing political disputes. Truman 
agreed that “the Russians needed us more than we needed them” and that he expected the US to 
obtain at least eighty-five percent of what Washington proposed.48 After the new chief executive 
promised to address the Polish issue with Molotov “in words of one syllable,” Harriman 
confided that he was “greatly relieved to discover…we see eye-to eye on the situation.”49 
Prior to his meeting with the Russian foreign minister on April 23, the president held his 
first foreign policy conference with his advisors to receive their recommendations as to how to 
proceed.50 Secretary of State Stettinius reiterated his opinion that the Soviets needed to comply 
with the Yalta agreement, as did Ambassador Harriman who again proposed that the US should 
use economic aid as a diplomatic tool to remedy the situation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
disagreed with his colleagues and reminded them that “the Russians conception of freedom, 
democracy and independent voting was quite different from ours or the British.”51 Furthermore, 
he expressed his alarm that American officials did not fully appreciate Moscow’s security 
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concerns and Poland’s key role in alleviating them. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
responded that the Kremlin’s desire to dominate Warsaw’s government “was not an isolated 
incident” and that similar actions had already occurred in Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey and 
Greece.52 In his view, “if the Russians were to be rigid in their attitude we had better have a 
showdown with them now rather than later.”53  For his part, Admiral Leahy declared that the 
vague provisions of the Crimean settlement could be interpreted in multiple ways. While he 
emphasized his belief that the USSR never intended to honor their pledge to hold free elections 
in Poland, he also maintained that the US should not allow this issue to jeopardize overall 
relations between the two allied nations. Likewise, General Marshall counseled a cautious 
approach because he did not want the Soviet Union to reconsider its previous pledge to enter the 
war against Japan. Although no clear consensus emerged at the meeting, Truman predictably 
sided with Stettinius, Harriman, and Forrestal and reiterated his intentions to demand Moscow’s 
adherence to the Yalta agreement.54  
Within hours of the White House conference, the president met with Molotov and 
immediately admonished him for Russia’s recent behavior in Poland. He strongly insisted that 
the USSR must honor its agreements to include democratically elected representatives in 
Warsaw’s new government. A failure to do so, Truman warned, threatened America’s future 
political and economic “collaboration” with the Soviet Union.55 When the foreign minister 
objected to these allegations, the president abruptly ended the meeting and asked Molotov to 
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convey his message to Stalin. Taken aback by what had transpired, the Russian diplomat 
immediately withdrew from the conference and communicated this new development to the 
Kremlin.56 The next day the Soviet leader responded with an angry telegram addressed to both 
Truman and Churchill in which he denounced the US and UK’s persistent refusal to recognize 
the Lublin communist as Poland’s legitimate government. He emphasized that “the question on 
Poland has the same meaning for the security of the Soviet Union as the question on Belgium 
and Greece for the security of Great Britain.”57 He then reminded them that London and 
Washington never consulted with Moscow about the composition of Brussel’s and Athens’s new 
governments, nor did Russia try to interfere with their formation. Stalin concluded that even 
though his allies “demand too much,” he still hoped for a “harmonious solution.”58  
The Kremlin’s concern about the new president’s initial behavior towards Molotov 
appeared well founded. Already aware of Truman’s past anti-communist statements in the 
Senate, Moscow viewed his first series of decisions in the White House as confirmation that he 
intended to depart from FDR’s more subtle and accommodating foreign policy.59 For example, 
within seventy-two hours of V-E Day, the president signed an executive order that immediately 
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ended most Lend-Lease shipments to the USSR and Britain. Drafted by Foreign Economic 
Administrator Leo Crowley and Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, this authorization put 
into law a policy originally contemplated by Roosevelt shortly before he died.60 While designed 
to satisfy Congressional critics who wanted to prevent the US aid program from being used for 
post-war reconstruction, the clumsy implementation of the executive order angered America’s 
allies, especially the Soviet Union, which viewed the abrupt cessation of deliveries as a form of 
economic coercion. Embarrassed by the diplomatic faux pas, Truman rescinded the order and 
sent Harry Hopkins, an experienced presidential aide, to Moscow to reassure Stalin that the US 
had not intended to harm relations with the USSR.61 Though he accepted the president’s 
explanation, the Soviet dictator commented to Hopkins that if America intended to put “pressure 
on the Russians in order to soften them up, then it was a fundamental mistake.”62 
The Lend-Lease incident can be attributed primarily to Truman’s inexperience in the 
White House and not from a sudden desire to alter the nation’s foreign policy towards the 
Kremlin. Contrary to the Russian government’s mistaken assessments, the president consistently 
tried to adhere to his predecessor’s known post-Yalta agenda. For instance, when Churchill 
attempted to persuade Truman to delay the westward redeployment of Allied land units from 
Germany’s Elbe River , the commander-in-chief insisted that they honor their agreements and 
begin the withdrawal of all their forces to the previously agreed upon zones of occupation.63 
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Likewise, the president sought to maintain the Soviet Union’s previous pledge to enter the war 
against Japan within three months of Hitler’s defeat.64 Finally, Truman continued FDR’s policy 
of keeping the Russian government ignorant of the Manhattan Project and refused to share 
information of its existence with his counterpart in Moscow.65 Despite these attempts, it fell upon 
the new chief executive to address the numerous unresolved problems he had inherited in a 
manner that advanced America’s long term national interest. 
In June 1945, the president adopted a more pragmatic approach towards Stalin when he 
agreed to recognize Poland’s provisional government, which had recently added a small number 
of pro-western politicians to its cabinet. Truman’s acceptance of Warsaw’s predominantly 
communist regime reflected his tacit acknowledgement that Washington could do very little to 
influence the political situation in the Russian dominated nation. It also illustrated the president’s 
desire to maintain good relations with the Soviet leader whom he feared might retaliate by 
withdrawing the USSR’s pledge to attack Japan in East Asia.66 A month later, however, Truman 
and many of his top officials arrived in Germany with renewed determination to resolve the 
remaining post-war issues in a manner that advanced US interest.67 The successful detonation of 
America’s first atomic bomb twenty-four hours prior the Potsdam Conference’s opening session 
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emboldened the president’s delegation, whom deemed it imperative to confront Stalin’s policy 
towards Eastern Europe.68 Not surprisingly, the conflicting agendas pursued by Washington, 
London, and Moscow created a series of contentious debates that threatened to destroy the unity 
of the wartime alliance.   
One of the first issues that dominated the Big Three’s summit centered on a Soviet 
proposal to revise the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governed the legal status of the Turkish 
Straits. Stalin’s suggestion that the USSR be allowed to establish military bases in this strategic 
waterway encountered immediate opposition from Churchill and Truman who both agreed that 
an internationalized Bosporus and Dardanelles provided the only acceptable solution.69 Likewise, 
the prime minister and president rejected the Russian delegation’s demand that Germany must 
pay $20 billion in reparations directly to Moscow to fund the Soviet Union’s post-war 
reconstruction.  London and Washington expressed justifiable concern that this punitive policy 
jeopardized the economic recovery and political rehabilitation of their defeated adversary. While 
Stalin remained unmoved by his colleague’s anxieties, he eventually agreed to a compromise that 
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reduced reparation payments from the western zones to twenty-five percent of what the USSR 
originally demanded. In exchange, Britain and the US begrudgingly accepted Russia’s unilateral 
grant of governing power to Poland concerning the military occupation of German Pomerania 
and Silesia.70 The reparation solution notwithstanding, the Potsdam sessions quickly degenerated 
into a series of increasingly adversarial disputes concerning the political future of Germany and 
Europe. 
Disagreements at the Conference reached a new antagonistic level when America and the 
UK stated that they intended to withhold diplomatic recognition of Eastern Europe’s communist 
governments unless the USSR allowed free and open democratic elections to take place 
throughout the region. Stalin and Molotov refused to concede this issue, which they deemed 
imperative to the Soviet Union’s national security.71 Frustrated by the continuing impasse, 
Churchill bluntly declared that an “iron fence” threatened to divide Europe; a charge that the 
Russian dictator dismissed as “fairy tales.”72 The Prime Minister’s defiance continued under the 
leadership of Clement Attlee, the Labor Party leader who defeated and replaced Churchill 
midway through the conference. When Stalin inquired about the possibility of obtaining 
reparations from German assets located throughout Eastern Europe, Atlee’s new Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, bluntly responded that “Greece belongs to the British” and that London 
had no intention of giving the USSR the right to acquire resources from western occupation 
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zones.73 For his part, Truman deplored the proceedings’ general lack of progress and informed 
his counterparts that “he did not wish to sit here as a court to settle matters which will eventually 
be settled by the United Nations.”74 The US delegation, he observed, “did not wish to waste time 
listening to complaints.”75 With all sides unwilling to make further concessions, the three week 
conference concluded with a communiqué that, in addition to a series of vague statement 
concerning the administration of post-war Europe, announced the creation of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers. This diplomatic body, the Big Three hoped, might address and resolve the 
numerous outstanding issues that threatened to end Washington and London’s cooperation with 
Moscow.76   
The Allies departed Potsdam with mixed results but strong opinions. While Truman 
achieved his primary goal of obtaining a Soviet pledge to enter the war against Japan, he still 
believed the US and Britain had made too many concessions to Russia, especially concerning 
Eastern Europe. In his opinion, Moscow had not adhered to the spirit of the Yalta agreement and 
could not be considered trustworthy in important matters of post-war diplomacy. To this end, the 
president decided to exclude the Kremlin from having any role in the occupation of Japan once 
the war ended.77 Stalin and Molotov, likewise, returned from the conference convinced that the 
Western Powers intended to pursue an Imperialistic policy designed to keep the Soviet Union 
economically weak and militarily vulnerable.78 In a conversation with US diplomat Joseph E. 
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Davies, the Russian foreign minister bitterly complained about Truman’s adversarial position 
with regards to German reparation payments and commented that the president seemed to care 
more for Berlin’s welfare than Moscow’s. “It is not easy,” Molotov concluded, “for us to 
understand your new president.”79 Clearly, by August, 1945 the Grand Alliance had begun to 
disintegrate in a growing atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion.80   
Within days of the Potsdam Conference’s closing session, the US dropped atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki while the USSR initiated a massive invasion of Japanese-held 
Manchuria. The twin shock of these attacks overwhelmed Tokyo, which promptly surrendered to 
the Allies on August 15, 1945. With the final cessation of hostilities, representatives from the 
Big Three prepared to meet in Britain to address various unresolved issues and draft the 
necessary peace treaties to officially end the war.  
The London Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held between September 11 and October 2, 
1945, revealed the Grand Alliance’s numerous conflicts of interest, which had thus far been 
downplayed to the public. Despite Potsdam’s shortcomings, America’s new Secretary of State, 
James F. Byrnes, remained confident that he could still induce the Russians to make serious 
compromises at the negotiating table. Molotov, however, zealously defended the USSR’s 
prerogatives and refused to concede any important issues to the US. For example, when Byrne’s 
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accused the Soviet Union of dominating Eastern Europe, specifically Romania and Bulgaria, the 
Russian foreign minister responded that London currently controlled Greece with an unpopular 
pro-British government in Athens.81 Furthermore, Molotov insisted that Moscow must have 
friendly governments in the region, especially in former Axis countries that had aided the 
German invasion of the USSR during the war.82 Ominously, the Russian foreign minister 
emphasized that if the US and UK did not acknowledge Eastern Europe’s new regimes and the 
Soviet peace treaties associated with them, then the Kremlin might not be able to accept 
Washington and London’s proposed settlement with Italy.83 In addition to this threat, Molotov 
demanded that the US give the Soviet Union, Britain, and China joint occupation rights in Japan. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the secretary of state rejected this request and subsequently failed to 
persuade Molotov to accept the status quo in Tokyo.84 Shortly after the three-week meeting 
adjourned in complete failure, Byrnes publicly acknowledged the various disagreements 
encountered at the London conference but characterized them only as “temporary set-backs.”85 
He conceded “the hard reality that none of us can expect to write the peace in our own way” and 
concluded with a confident prediction that future conferences could resolve any outstanding 
issues between the Allies.86 Interestingly, Truman privately minimized the meeting’s tense 
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sessions when he acknowledged that conferences do not always produce “immediate tangible 
results.”87 Successful negotiations, he concluded, still remained a viable option.88      
The diplomatic stalemate in London surprised Byrnes who firmly believed that 
America’s atomic bomb monopoly gave the US a distinct advantage over the USSR.89 His 
reliance on the new weapon, however, already appeared misplaced to several of his colleagues 
within the Truman Administration. For instance, on September 11, 1945, outgoing Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson warned Truman against “having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our 
hip” because it only magnified the Soviet’s suspicions and distrust of Washington’s motives.90 
Likewise, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson advised the president on the 25th to voluntarily 
end the Unites States’ continued exclusion of the USSR from atomic technology because it 
inevitably created the preconditions for an expensive nuclear arms race.91 The solution, both 
Stimson and Acheson independently concluded, must incorporate the open exchange of technical 
information with the Russians.92 Despite these well-reasoned appeals, Truman ultimately chose 
to maintain America’s atomic secrets rather than risk sharing them with Moscow.93  
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While the state of US-Soviet relations had deteriorated significantly since V-E Day, both 
nations still made efforts during late 1945 to maintain the alliance that had achieved so much 
during the Second World War. For his part, the president ordered his cabinet to refrain from any 
negative public statements concerning the Russian’s adversarial attitude at London and 
Potsdam.94 Truman adhered to this advice when he gave his first major post-war foreign policy 
speech on October 27, 1945. Though the president indirectly criticized the Soviet Union for its 
domination of Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest, he still specifically referred to the USSR as an ally 
whose citizens desired world peace as much as the American people.95 Similarly, Byrnes spoke 
four days later about Moscow’s “special security interest” in Eastern Europe and declared that 
the US, despite its insistence on self-determination, accepted Russia’s need for friendly 
governments in the region.96 Stalin, meanwhile, temporarily moderated Soviet policy in Hungary 
when he permitted Budapest to hold free elections on November 4. The Kremlin’s reluctant 
acceptance of the balloting’s outcome, which resulted with major victories for non-communist 
parties, encouraged Byrnes to organize another meeting with Molotov in December 1945.97      
The Moscow foreign ministers’ conference offered the estranged allies an opportunity to 
readdress their seemingly intractable differences. After an initial round of discussions, Stalin 
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surprised the secretary of state with a Russian proposal that allowed for the inclusion and of a 
small number of non-communist politicians in the Bulgarian and Romanian governments.98 
Grateful for this largely symbolic concession, the US diplomat reciprocated with a declaration 
that the Soviet Union, China, and Britain could participate in decisions regarding America’s 
military occupation of Japan.99 Remarkably, the newfound spirit of cooperation also extended to 
nuclear energy when Byrnes obtained Molotov’s agreement to support the creation of the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission.100 Though the conference ended with only modest 
achievements, it appeared as if these diplomatic developments might serve as a basis for future 
cooperation between Washington and Moscow.          
The secretary of state’s perceived victory, however, remained unappreciated and short-
lived. Immediately after his return to the US he encountered severe criticism from the President 
and prominent members of Congress who feared that the recent agreements made at Moscow 
weakened America’s standing in the world. Truman, for example, privately chastised Byrnes for 
making important decisions in Russia without first seeking approval from the White House.101 In 
particular, the president rebuked his secretary of state for releasing a communique at the 
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conclusion of the conference before notifying Washington of its contents.102 Additionally, 
Truman expressed dissatisfaction with Stalin’s concessions in Eastern Europe and stated that 
they did not go far enough to justify a US decision to recognize Romania and Bulgaria.103 
Congressional leaders, meanwhile, denounced Byrnes’s offer to internationalize certain aspects 
of America’s nuclear technology. Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a ranking member 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, informed the president that he disliked the secretary 
of state’s proposal because it lacked a realistic scheme to verify Soviet compliance. Congress, he 
warned, “shall hold the Executive Department responsible” for any deficiency in the atomic 
agreement.104 To Byrnes’s disappointment, the results of the Moscow Conference inadvertently 
hurt US-Russian relations, which by the end of 1945, had already deteriorated considerably.105          
Persistent displeasure with the Soviet Union’s policy towards Eastern Europe prompted 
the Truman administration, which had received increasing pressure from Congress and the 
American people, to adopt a more adversarial role at the beginning of 1946.106 This stance 
became apparent in January when the US declined to grant a multi-billion dollar loan to the 
USSR.107 Though willing to fund Moscow’s post-war reconstruction of its devastated country, 
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Truman and Harriman wanted to use the financial assistance to induce political concessions from 
the Kremlin.108 Suspicious of American intentions, Stalin refused to accept the loan’s conditions 
and made preparations for Russia to adopt a new autarkic economic policy.109        
On February 9, 1946 the Soviet dictator gave a pre-election speech to announce the start 
of a new Five-Year Plan. He noted that this harsh economic program, which had been 
responsible for the USSR’s industrialization during the 1930s, guaranteed Moscow’s victory 
against Nazi Germany during World War II and illustrated the overall superiority of “the Soviet 
social order.” 110According to Stalin, Russia required more centralized planning because it 
needed to quickly rebuild and expand its shattered war-torn economy. He concluded that only a 
revitalized nation, with a well-funded scientific community, could enable the USSR to safeguard 
its interest against aggressive capitalist nations, which had historically begun wars over access to 
raw material and foreign markets.111  
Stalin’s speech immediately provoked a wide range of reactions in the United States. 
Publicly, mass media outlets such as Time Magazine condemned the Soviet dictator’s suspicions 
of his loyal allies and labeled it “the most warlike pronouncement uttered by a top-rank 
statesman since V-J Day.”112 Conversely, The New Republic agreed with the Russian leader’s 
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indictment of capitalism and urged the US government to “demonstrate our good faith” by 
lending $6 billion to the USSR for their reconstruction program.113 Newsweek, meanwhile, 
expressed little alarm when it observed that the speech, in effect, acknowledged Washington’s 
current economic superiority over Moscow.114 Privately, administration officials expressed 
equally diverse opinions about meaning of Stalin’s statements. According to Secretary of the 
Navy Forrestal, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas considered the Soviet leader’s 
message nothing less than a “declaration of World War III.”115 Secretary of Commerce Henry A. 
Wallace, however, concluded that the Russian’s rhetoric reflected the Kremlin’s justified fear of 
America’s growing political, economic, and military encirclement of the USSR.116 Interestingly, 
Truman dismissed his subordinates’ anxieties when he publicly commented, “Well, you know 
we always have to demagogue a little, before elections.” 117 For the president, Stalin, like all 
national leaders, had simply given a political address designed to gain support from his domestic 
audience. Despite the White Houses’ attempt to downplay the speech’s significance, the State 
Department made new preparations to reevaluate the Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards the 
US and its allies.     
On February 13, 1946 H. Freeman Matthews, the Director of the Office of European 
Affairs, asked George F. Kennan, the Charge d Affaires at the US embassy in Moscow, for an 
analysis of Stalin’s pre-election speech and how it could affect international relations.118 The 
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diplomat’s 8,000 word response, aptly known as the “Long Telegram," ultimately provided the 
intellectual framework for America’s evolving containment policy against the USSR.119 Divided 
into five main sections, this influential missive scrutinized the Soviet leadership’s stated beliefs, 
explained the rationale for these views, predicted Moscow’s future strategic initiatives, and 
concluded with advice for Washington’s policy makers.120  
According to Kennan, Communist officials believed that capitalist nations harbored 
intrinsic hostility towards socialism and sought to destabilize the USSR. Consequently, this 
Marxist understanding of the world enhanced Russia’s already strong xenophobia, which had 
historically dominated their collective mindset.  The Kremlin’s “neurotic view of world affairs,” 
therefore, derived from their overriding fear that any open and sustained contact with external 
forces, especially Western ideas, could undermine Moscow’s fragile regime.121 For these 
reasons, the Soviet government had to weaken and eliminate perceived foreign threats in an 
effort to safeguard its internal security.122  
In Kennan’s opinion, Russia had adopted a multifaceted foreign policy to achieve their 
long term goals. For example, the Kremlin utilized or intended to develop official programs to 
expand their industrial base, improve the Red Army, dominate Eastern Europe, project power 
into the Near East, and gain United Nations support for their disruptive foreign policy goals.123 
Likewise, Moscow had concurrently implemented unofficial “subterranean” policies to create 
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dissent within Western nations and weaken their influence in other countries.124 To this end, 
Kennan insisted that the Kremlin had directed communist parties worldwide to infiltrate third 
parties such as labor unions, civil rights organizations, liberal publications, and churches in an 
effort to destabilize the world’s capitalist governments, especially in the US and Britain.125  
Despite these dire warnings, Kennan observed that the Soviet Union, unlike Nazi 
Germany, respected the “logic of force” and did not want to risk a war with the Western 
Powers.126 Furthermore, he optimistically concluded that Russia’s dictatorial regime, already 
unpopular with its own people, might eventually collapse because of its inability to adequately 
govern the reluctant nations of Eastern Europe.127 He, therefore, advised his superiors in 
Washington to formulate a long term “constructive program” against the USSR’s subversive 
propaganda and, at the same time, offer firm guidance to endangered nations around the 
world.128 Finally, he recommended that the Federal government “must see that our public is 
educated to the realities of [the] Russian situation” despite the “ugliness of the picture.”129 In this 
manner, the American people could realistically assess the ongoing situation without being 
tempted to adopt an irrational attitude that embraced “hysterical anti-Sovietism.”130        
Kennan’s Long Telegram made an immediate impact with officials in the US foreign 
policy establishment. Within the State Department, bureaucrats such as Matthews labeled the 
text “magnificent” while Loy Henderson, the director of near eastern affairs, acknowledged that 
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its assessment “hits the nail on the head.”131 Similarly impressed with the dispatch, Byrnes 
promptly sent summaries of the “splendid analysis” to US diplomats stationed worldwide.132 
Readership of the dispatch widened considerably when Harriman sent a copy to Forrestal who 
viewed the cable as an authoritative confirmation of his own beliefs concerning Soviet 
intentions.133 Consequently, the secretary of the navy enthusiastically sent copies of the telegram 
to every member of Truman’s cabinet, including the president, and “made it required reading for 
hundreds, if not thousands, of higher officers in the armed services.”134 In relatively short order, 
the precepts of Kennan’s telegram transformed Washington’s conception of US-Russian 
relations, which heretofore had been mostly confused and unrealistic.135  
The reorientation of America’s policy towards the USSR first manifested itself in a series 
of speeches during the last weeks of winter, 1946.136 On February 27, Arthur H. Vandenberg, the 
ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave a widely publicized 
address in Congress that asked the rhetorical question: “What is Russia up to now?”137 In his 
response, he explained that the US and the Soviet Union’s rival ideologies had complicated post-
war negotiations, which threatened the future viability of the UN. In a thinly veiled criticism of 
the Truman administration, he declared that the superpowers could “live together in reasonable 
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harmony if the United States speaks as plainly upon all occasions as Russia does.”138 The 
Senator elaborated that the White House must immediately “abandon the miserable fiction…that 
we somehow jeopardize the peace if our candor is as firm as Russia’s always is; and if we 
assume a moral leadership which we have too frequently allowed to lapse.”139 Furthermore, he 
observed “there is a line beyond which compromise cannot go” and that Moscow must clearly 
understand where those parameters exist.140 He concluded that only a tough US stance could 
“win Soviet respect…and trust;” two prerequisites necessary to ensure world peace.141  
Vandenberg’s stinging rebuke of the president’s foreign policy team put additional 
pressure on Byrnes, who had already planned to address the Overseas Correspondents Club 
twenty-four hours later on February 28.142 In the wake of Stalin’s new five-year plan, Kennan’s 
telegram, and the senator’s speech, the secretary of state decided to use this event as a public 
forum “to set forth our position on existing problems.”143 Byrnes boldly declared that even 
though mutual “suspicion and distrust” currently prevailed, the US had a “responsibility to 
use…influence to see that other powers live up to their covenants.” 144 He decried any form of 
international aggression “accomplished by coercion,” specifically the deployment of military 
units in “small…impoverished states,” and the “undisclosed penetration of power” against other 
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governments.145 Finally, he warned that nations “must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve 
strategic ends” and concluded that if “we fail to work together there can be no peace…for any of 
us.”146 Derisively known in the media as “the Second Vandenberg Concerto,” the speech 
received high praise from the Senator who openly endorsed the “new American approach” 
towards the Kremlin.147    
Of all the grand pronouncements made during this time, none achieved greater fame or 
scrutiny than Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech.148 Invited by Truman to address 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, the former prime minister used the 
occasion to highlight his concerns about the Soviet Union’s post-war behavior, especially in 
Europe.149 After being introduced by the president, Churchill began his speech with an urgent 
appeal for a coordinated international response to the twin problems of “war and tyranny.”150 A 
new military conflict, he believed, could only be prevented if the UN’s member states 
empowered that organization with an effective multi-national police force.151 To that end, he 
called for the development of a “fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples” whereby 
the US, Canada, and the British Empire could jointly utilize their collective armed services for 
peacemaking operations.152 Furthermore, Churchill envisioned this proposed military alliance as 
a means to counter the Soviet Union’s tyrannical domination of Eastern Europe. He boldly 
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declared: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended 
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and 
Eastern Europe.”153 Only Athens, he noted, “with its immortal glories-is free to decide its 
future.”154 The English statesman subsequently warned that Moscow’s “expansive and 
proselytizing tendencies” directly threatened Turkey, Persia, and the Far East.155 Moreover, he 
believed that Western nations such as Italy and France needed to guard against the Kremlin’s 
“Communist fifth columns,” which constituted “a growing challenge and peril to Christian 
civilization.”156 True world peace, he concluded, could only be sustained if Washington 
maintained its military superiority and sought to unite a free and prosperous Europe.157    
Predictably, Churchill’s powerful anti-Soviet speech elicited a strong response from 
America’s media, public, and political establishments. While the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal praised the address, the Chicago Tribune rejected the notion of an exclusive 
military alliance with London’s “old and evil empire.”158 Likewise, the New York Post described 
the former prime minister’s statements as a “call to world disunity and war.”159 Public 
demonstrations, meanwhile, accompanied Churchill as he traveled to the east coast shortly after 
his visit to Fulton, Missouri. In New York City, for instance, the Englishman encountered an 
estimated 2,200 protestors chanting, “We want peace-Churchill wants war” outside the Waldorf-
Astoria where he attended a large dinner in his honor.160 This occasion also showcased the 
serious concerns that many of Washington’s political elite had with the speech. Notables, such as 
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Eleanor Roosevelt failed to attend the event, which she boycotted with the statement that “the 
Russian position in world affairs ha[d] not been properly presented in this country.”161 
Additionally, Senators Claude Pepper, Harley M. Kilgore, and Glen Taylor issued a joint 
statement that asserted that Churchill’s aspirations “would destroy the unity of the Big Three” 
and threatened to “cut out the throat of the United Nations Organization.” 162 To Truman’s 
embarrassment, his secretary of commerce, Henry Wallace, publicly denounced the former prime 
minister’s message when he claimed it “would lead to war.”163 The dangerous speech, he 
concluded, did not express the official policy of the American or British governments.164           
Not surprisingly, the Kremlin condemned the British statesman’s speech and tried to 
exploit the controversy surrounding it. The Russian newspaper Izvestia conveyed Moscow’s 
official views when it published Soviet historian Eugene Tarle’s harsh assessment of the Fulton 
address.  The prominent professor dismissed Churchill’s poetic claims of a Communist iron 
curtain in Europe and instead focused on London’s worldwide dominion over its own reluctant 
colonial populations. The English, he argued, habitually violated the sovereignty of other 
nations; the most recent example centering on Athens where Britain had just used its army to 
“force upon the Greek people a hated regime of Fascist monarchy.”165 He concluded that 
Churchill’s message intended to weaken America’s historical friendship with Russia because 
cooperation between these two nations threatened the future of the British Empire. Stalin also 
reiterated this view in a lengthy interview with Pravda where he labeled the former prime 
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minister a “firebrand of war.”166 In his opinion, the speech represented “a dangerous act 
calculated to sow the seed of discord among the Allied governments.”167  Furthermore, the 
Soviet leader compared Churchill’s plan to create an alliance of English speaking nations with 
Hitler’s theories about the master race. According to the Russian dictator, the proposal meant 
that only “nations speaking the English language…should rule over the remaining nations of the 
world.”168 The USSR, he contended, rejected such ideas.  
The overall reaction to the Westminster speech surprised Truman, who eventually tried to 
distance himself from the controversy. When a reporter asked the president if his presence during 
the address could be construed as an endorsement of its contents, the beleaguered chief executive 
responded that he “didn’t know what would be in Mr. Churchill’s speech.”169 Moreover, he 
argued that the prime minister “had a perfect right to say what he pleased.”170 This statement, 
however, purposefully misled the public because the president had received a copy of the address 
prior to its delivery and heartily approved the language of the text.171 Though political 
expediency motivated Truman’s reaction, his attempts to insulate the White House from this 
crisis inadvertently reinforced the widely held belief that the US did not have a coherent foreign 
policy towards the USSR.172  In the absence of a strong presidential statement on the subject, 
                                                          
166 “Stalin interview with Pravda on Churchill,” New York Times, March 14, 1946, 4.  
167 Ibid., 4. 
168 Ibid., 4. 
169 Truman, Public Papers: 1946, 145.   
170 Ibid., 145. 
171 In his memoirs, Secretary of State Byrnes recalled that he provided an advanced copy of Churchill’s 
address to Truman, who subsequently refused to read the text because the president wanted to deny having any prior 
knowledge of its content.  Secretary of Commerce Wallace, however, eventually learned that Truman did, in fact, 
read the speech beforehand and personally approved its message. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 349;Wallace, The 
Price of Vision, 558.         
172 George M. Elsey, a naval duty officer in the White House Map Room, believed Truman’s 
“ambivalence” towards the Soviet Union led to his disassociation of the Iron Curtain speech. In his opinion, the 
president assumed too much of a “lighthearted, casual attitude” towards the USSR and needed to acknowledge the 
true severity of Russia’s threat to America’s interest. George M. Elsey, An Unplanned Life A Memoir (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2005), 137-8.  
56 
 
many Americans continued to maintain a positive attitude towards Russia and valued them as a 
worthy ally.173   
Conclusion 
The deterioration of US-Soviet relations between February, 1945 and March, 1946 
occurred because these two nations had diametrically opposed strategic visions for the post-war 
world. Moscow’s determination to create a security buffer zone in Eastern Europe directly 
conflicted with Washington’s desire for a democratically elected and economically free 
continent. Consequently, America and Russia’s relentless pursuit of these irreconcilable policies 
drastically reduced their willingness to cooperate on a wide range of issues and established the 
basis for the Cold War.      
While conflicting national interest and ideological differences gradually challenged the 
alliance’s solidarity, the untimely death of Franklin Roosevelt highlighted the Big Three’s 
growing tension. Though FDR had begun to manifest increasing concern about Stalin’s unique 
interpretation of the Yalta Agreement, it is impossible to know what he might have said or done 
in the aftermath of World War II. What is certain, however, is that Harry Truman originally 
endeavored to pursue his late predecessor’s foreign policy under the guidance of Roosevelt’s 
cabinet and State Department. Unfortunately, the new president’s inexperience, coupled with his 
blunt personal style, inadvertently magnified the ongoing tensions that existed between 
Washington and Moscow. Despite these shortcomings, the substance of Truman’s decisions, if 
not its communication, represented a continuation of FDR’s known agenda towards the Soviet 
Union during the first half of 1945.    
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A possible deviation from Roosevelt’s plans occurred when Truman attempted to use 
America’s economic power and atomic energy monopoly as diplomatic leverage against the 
USSR. This overbearing approach, however, needlessly antagonized an already suspicious 
Soviet leadership and ultimately failed to induce any significant concessions from the Kremlin. 
The White House, therefore, floundered during its first post-war conferences with Moscow and 
struggled thereafter to find a viable strategy to enhance US influence with the Russians. 
Consequently, Truman, like FDR before him, downplayed US-Soviet differences in an attempt to 
maintain normal relations with Stalin. Predictably, this tactic served only to mislead and confuse 
large segments of the American people, who still believed in the vitality of the Big Three 
Alliance.      
By early 1946, growing concerns about the Kremlin’s future intentions provided the 
impetus for Kennan’s Long Telegram, which furnished the rationale for America’s future 
containment policy. While this influential cable specifically counseled government leaders to 
educate the nation about the true state of affairs between the US and the USSR, the chief 
executive continued to overlook Washington’s difficulties with Moscow, much to the chagrin of 
the internationalist in Congress. Likewise, the commander-in-chief dismissed his adviser’s 
concerns about Stalin’s February 9 election eve speech. Unlike many officials in his 
administration, Truman correctly viewed the address as a political message aimed at Russia’s 
domestic audience and steadfastly refused to overreact to the dictator’s statements. The 
president’s subsequent treatment of Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain Speech,’ however, unfortunately 
muddled the situation when he first appeared to endorse the prime minister’s address, only to 
distance himself from his statements once controversy ensued. Regrettably, this development 
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created the impression that the US appeared uncertain about its ongoing commitments to 
Western Europe’s security.  
The chief executive’s actions throughout 1945 and the first half of 1946 demonstrated his 
initial desire to preserve America’s alliance with the USSR. It also reflected his unwillingness to 
expend political capital on issues that could politicize Washington’s foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union. Such a scenario threatened to increase domestic criticism of the White House, 
which could undermine his ability to shape the nation’s post-war strategic outlook. The 
president’s habit of minimizing US-Russian tensions, therefore, illustrated how he remained 
unprepared during his first year in office to implement a dramatic shift in America’s policy vis-à-
vis Moscow. More importantly, this approach inadvertently created the need one year later for 
Truman to rely on scare tactics to implement his ad-hoc policy to preserve Western influence in 
Greece. In essence, the president himself created the preconditions that led to the Truman 












Chapter Three   
A Failure to Communicate: Truman’s Public Statements and  
American Foreign Policy in 1946 
 
Throughout 1946, President Truman’s efforts to publicly downplay Washington’s 
differences with Moscow inadvertently created dissension within his own administration, which 
only served to confuse the American peoples’ understanding of US-Soviet relations. While the 
White House successfully countered the Kremlin’s attempts to dominate Iran and Turkey, it still 
issued public statements that failed to reveal the president’s growing negative private 
assessments concerning Stalin’s future intentions. Pressing domestic considerations, meanwhile, 
severely undermined Truman’s ability to persuade an exhausted electorate that the US needed to 
adopt a more expensive confrontational foreign policy in the near future.    
The first major post-war crisis occurred in Iran during the spring of 1946. Occupied by 
the USSR and Britain since 1941, the Allies agreed at Potsdam to withdraw their military forces 
from this strategically important nation within six months of Japan’s final surrender. As the 
March 2 deadline approached, however, it quickly became apparent that the Soviet government 
did not intend to honor its promise to evacuate the Red Army. The Russians maintained an active 
military presence, in part, because they opposed Tehran’s continued refusal to grant exclusive oil 
concessions to Moscow.1 As early as 1944, Stalin had encouraged the local Tudeh Communist 
party to engage in nation-wide demonstrations against the central government in an effort to 
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induce it to modify their policy. When Iran’s leadership fought back and attempted to suppress 
the leftist group in 1945, the Kremlin orchestrated an open rebellion in territory still under its 
direct control.2 Unable to prevent the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, 
the Iranians desperately turned to the Truman Administration for assistance against the USSR.  
At first, Secretary of State Byrnes declined to publicly pressure the Soviet Union because 
he did not want to “imply that we have already formed a fixed opinion with regard to the merits 
of the case.”3 Discreet American diplomacy, he believed, could resolve the crises without 
inadvertently inflaming the situation. Initially optimistic, Byrnes personally questioned Stalin 
about the subject in the hopes that the Russian might reconsider his course of action. To his 
dismay, the Soviet leader insisted that the Red Army needed to remain in northern Iran because 
he believed saboteurs sponsored by Tehran intended to attack Russia’s Baku oil fields.4 
Dissatisfied with the Kremlin’s explanation, the secretary of state decided to openly support 
Iran’s request to have the UN Security Council address the issue.   
Moscow’s subsequent reaction to Washington’s diplomatic efforts greatly alarmed the 
Truman Administration, which intensified the crises atmosphere between the two superpowers. 
For example, the Russians dismissed Iran’s appeal to the UN and argued that if the international 
organization investigated this matter, then it also needed to examine Britain’s military presence 
                                                          
2 "Decree of the CC CPSU Politburo to Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 
'Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran'," July 
06, 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, GAPPOD AzR, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5. Obtained by 
Jamil Hasanli. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112021.  
Accessed June 28, 2015. 
3 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray), January 28, 1946, U.S. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII, The Near East and Africa (Washington DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1969), 317. Hereafter FRUS. 
4 Memorandum of Conversation by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, December 19, 1945, FRUS, 1945 Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, 685. 
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in Greece and Indonesia.5 Furthermore, the Kremlin claimed that its 1921 treaty with Iran 
allowed the Soviets to deploy troops into its southern neighbor if “conditions become disturbed” 
within that nation.6 Moscow insisted that only bilateral negotiations between itself and Tehran 
could resolve the ongoing situation.  
Not surprisingly, tensions increased substantially when the March 2 deadline passed and 
the USSR still maintained troops in northern Iran. Three days after the deadline, Byrnes sent a 
diplomatic note to the Soviet government that reiterated the American demand for an immediate 
withdrawal of all of their troops from the region. To mobilize public opinion and perhaps placate 
some of his domestic critics, the secretary of state also issued a press statement that summarized 
Washington’s message to Moscow.7 Any hopes for a quick diplomatic resolution faded the next 
day when the State Department’s vice-consul in Azerbaijan, Robert Rossow, Jr., cabled Byrnes 
with reports of “exceptionally heavy Soviet troop movements” advancing towards both the 
Turkish border and the interior of Iran.8 According to Truman, the sudden influx of Red Army 
troops into the area had three important implications for the US. First, a persistent Russian 
occupation of Iran put Turkey’s national security at risk, which might induce Ankara to concede 
control of the Dardanelles region to Moscow. Second, if the Kremlin controlled the vast Persian 
oil fields, than it “would be serious loss for the economy of the Western world.”9 Finally, the 
USSR’s aggressive behavior threatened smaller nations and jeopardized the stability of the 
international order. Consequently the president adopted a firm, if understated, stance to counter 
what he viewed as unwarranted Soviet aggression.   
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Publicly, Truman downplayed the communist threat and tried to minimize the negative 
impact of Stalin’s defiance. For instance, at a March 8 press conference he expressed his doubt 
that Moscow intended to go “down a one-way street” and leave the nascent UN organization.10 
When asked what he intended to do if the Russians continued their refusal to evacuate their 
troops, the commander-in-chief only responded with the vague assurance that the issue “will be 
handled when it comes up.”11 Privately, however, the president directed the Pentagon and State 
Department to send clear messages to the Kremlin that conveyed the White House’s strategic 
interest in the near east. A week earlier, Truman had already ordered the 45,000 ton USS 
Missouri to Istanbul ostensibly to transport the body of Turkey’s late ambassador back to his 
homeland.12 Despite the State Department’s insistence that the voyage had “no political 
implications,” most informed people generally understood the implicit message of the warship’s 
deployment.13 The president also instructed Byrnes to send a second diplomatic note to the 
Kremlin demanding an explanation for Russia’s recent troop movements.14 When Moscow failed 
to respond to this message, the secretary of state released a press statement on March 12 that 
described for the first time how the Soviets had reinforced their troops in northern Iran and why 
these maneuvers potentially threatened Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.15 Within three days Kennan 
reported from Moscow that TASS dismissed Byrne’s concerns about the region and claimed his 
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account “absolutely does not correspond to reality.”16 Forty-eight hours later the charge d 
affaires asserted that the USSR deployed its military units in an effort to intimidate Tehran with 
respects to their ongoing bilateral negotiations concerning oil concessions. The UN, he 
concluded, could resolve the crises in a manner that preserved Russia, Iran, and America’s 
national prestige.17 Administration officials agreed with this recommendation and renewed their 
efforts to achieve a solution through the Security Council. 
On March 25, the Kremlin announced a preliminary settlement with Tehran that 
mandated the withdrawal of all Russian forces within six weeks.18 Later that day Iran’s UN 
ambassador denied that his nation made a secret agreement with Moscow and called upon the 
Security Council to use its inaugural session to investigate Soviet activities within his country. 
For his part, Truman supported this move because he believed the USSR “would carry on local 
aggression unless world opinion stopped them.”19 Predictably, the Russian ambassador to the 
UN, Andrei Gromyko, asked the Council to remove the issue from the agenda and allow 
Moscow’s bilateral talks with Tehran to continue unhindered. When Byrnes refused to acquiesce, 
the Soviet delegate angrily denounced the proceedings and walked out of the session.20 The 
impasse, however, lasted until April 4 when Moscow and Tehran announced the conclusion a 
comprehensive agreement that gave the USSR a controlling interest in an Iranian oil company in 
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return for the Kremlin’s promise to evacuate its troops within a month.21 As tensions diminished, 
many in the Truman administration believed that only America’s strong stance against Russia 
had preserved Iran’s sovereignty from Soviet aggression.22  
Clearly, the Iranian crises, in addition to Stalin’s February 9 election eve address and 
Churchill’s March 5 Iron Curtain speech, had together created the distinct impression that the 
Big Three no longer intended to cooperate with one another on foreign policy matters.  For his 
part, Byrnes expressed great satisfaction with the State Department’s successful mobilization of 
US and world opinion against the Soviets in regards to the Iranian issue. He observed that “many 
of our newspapers and correspondents who had previously misunderstood our position…had 
been greatly shocked at Russia’s attitude toward a small state.” 23In his opinion, “Russian 
popularity in the United States had been completely dissipated.”24  Though originally a 
proponent of negotiations with the Kremlin, the secretary of state now exhibited a more 
Trumanesque attitude towards the USSR. As for his counterpart in Moscow, Molotov angrily 
denounced what he viewed as hypocrisy in the allied camp. Britain, he declared at the Paris 
foreign ministers conference, still maintained “troops in Greece, Palestine, Iraq, Indo-China, and 
elsewhere” while Russia based its soldiers only in “security zones and…lines of 
                                                          
21 On October 22, 1947 the Iranian Parliament handed the Soviet Union a major diplomatic defeat when the 
legislative body voted against the oil concessions treaty by an overwhelming vote of 102 to two. With the Red Army 
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communication.”25 He added that London seemed intent on ignoring persistent requests from 
nations such as Egypt to withdraw English military units from their sovereign territory. “How 
long,” the Soviet foreign minister asked, “can such things go on?”26 Within this prevailing 
mindset, the Russian government prepared to make its next move.            
On August 7, 1946, the Kremlin sent a diplomatic note to the Turkish government that 
asserted that the 1936 Montreux Convention did not provide adequate security for the Soviet 
Union. The message enumerated four separate instances during World War II where the Axis 
powers used the Dardanelles to transit warships into the Black Sea to fight against the USSR. As 
such, the Kremlin claimed that only a joint defense of the straits by Moscow and Ankara could 
provide a satisfactory solution.27 This request prompted an immediate response from the Truman 
administration, which viewed the move as another Soviet attempt to threaten and dominate one 
of its neighbors.            
Within days of receiving a copy of the diplomatic note, US Ambassador Edwin C. 
Wilson sent an urgent message to Byrnes in Paris, which expressed his growing anxiety 
concerning Stalin’s long term intentions. Acknowledging Moscow’s age-old dream of 
controlling the Bosporus, the nervous diplomat warned his superior that the Soviets intended to 
undermine Ankara’s independence and replace it with a friendly regime. Furthermore, he 
predicted that if Turkey became another Russian satellite, then the “last barrier” to the Persian 
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Gulf and Suez will have fallen.28 The temptation for the Kremlin to conquer the rest of the 
Middle East, he concluded, “would be more than human nature could withstand.”29 Ultimately, 
Wilson’s cable expressed the sentiment of what many officials in the Truman administration 
already had about the USSR. Consequently, when the president met with his advisors on August 
15, 1946 to discuss America’s options, a consensus quickly emerged for a tough US response. At 
the meeting Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson expanded on Wilson’s theme and declared 
that if the Soviets seized control of Turkey, then Greece and Britain’s line of communication to 
India could collapse. He argued that Washington needed to respond to Moscow’s “trial balloon” 
with a strong message that rejected any possibility of the Soviet Union participating in the 
Dardanelles’ defense.30 To emphasize the seriousness of the situation, Acheson recommended 
the sending of a large naval task force to the eastern Mediterranean to join the USS Missouri 
already deployed in the region.31 Forrestal concurred with the acting secretary of state and 
suggested that the administration give a background briefing to the major newspapers in an effort 
to mobilize public opinion.32 In the end, Truman accepted the unanimous decision of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the secretaries of state, war and navy and decided to send the US fleet to the 
region. When Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dwight D. Eisenhower commented that this 
course of action might lead to war with the USSR, the president replied that he understood the 
risk but insisted that the White House needed to safeguard Turkey’s independence in order to 
promote America’s vital interest in the Middle East.33      
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Washington’s strong diplomatic and military initiatives encouraged Ankara to resist 
Moscow’s demands and subsequently persuaded the Kremlin to withdraw its request.34 While the 
short-lived crises ended peacefully, it also conceivably could have resulted in open warfare 
between the super powers. Interestingly, Truman personally ignored Forrestal’s advice and never 
made any public comments concerning this issue and the risk involved. In the end, the Turkish 
episode illustrated the president’s lack of communication with the American people even as he 
adopted an open ended political and military commitment to safeguard Turkey’s sovereignty.35       
The Iranian and Turkish crises helped create a consensus within the US foreign policy 
establishment as officials gradually accepted the view that the Soviet Union posed a persistent 
threat to its neighbors and, by extension, Washington’s political and economic interest. Newly 
converted to this mindset and anxious to prove his toughness as a negotiator, Secretary of State 
Byrnes now wholeheartedly expressed the administration’s plan to counter Russian intransigence 
in Germany. Despite this growing trend for a tougher American policy, Secretary of Commerce 
Henry Wallace remained the last prominent member of the administration who still advocated a 
more conciliatory approach towards the USSR. The New Dealer’s outspoken beliefs, however, 
inadvertently highlighted the contradictions in Truman’s overall foreign policy and helped create 
an embarrassing situation that forced the president to publicly reveal his anti-Soviet position.    
On September 6, 1946, Byrnes gave an important speech in Stuttgart, Germany that 
signaled a major shift in America’s policy towards that conquered nation and redefined 
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Washington’s role in Europe’s political future.36 The Allied Control Council, he claimed without 
naming the Soviet Union, failed to adhere to the principles of the Potsdam agreement. According 
to the year old accords, the four occupying powers promised to develop a central administrative 
bureaucracy to coordinate the resources of a unified German economy. The failure to achieve 
this goal, the secretary of state warned, jeopardized the post-war recovery of the entire European 
continent.37 To remedy this situation, he announced the US intended to unilaterally restore 
limited self-rule to the German people. A democratically elected government, he observed, could 
better organize and manage the Reich’s economic assets. In connection to this objective, Byrnes 
also revealed the Truman administration’s intention to combine America’s economic zone in 
Germany “with any or all of the other zones willing to participate in the unification.”38 
Furthermore, he declared Washington’s new plan to increase German industrial production, 
which thus far had been limited by the Allies. Increased trade, the diplomat argued, created the 
prerequisites for a “self-sustaining economy,” which in turn benefited all the nations of the 
region.39 Consequently, the secretary of state opposed any attempts by outside powers to 
politically detach the Rhineland and Ruhr from Germany. Finally, in a thinly veiled reference to 
the USSR, Byrnes commented that the US refused to accept any scenario where Germany 
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became “the satellite of any power.”40 America, he dramatically concluded, vowed to maintain 
its military presence in its occupation zone.  
Not surprisingly, world opinion immediately fragmented in response to this pivotal 
speech. In the US, the New York Times praised the secretary of state’s clarity and asserted that it 
“was the most comprehensive and clear cut” message concerning foreign policy since the 
Potsdam conference.41 Likewise, Britain’s Daily Mail described the address as “a breath of fresh 
air” while Italy’s Il Giornale d’ Italia expressed relief that “Mr. Byrnes had placed a tombstone 
on United States isolationism.”42 Predictably, the communist-controlled Berliner-Zeitung 
condemned the speech and warned that America’s new proposals risked permanently dividing 
the Reich into separate nations.43 Interestingly, the Soviet government’s press organ, TASS, 
refrained from offering any critical comments and instead published a brief thirty-two line 
summary of the US program.44 In stark contrast to this relatively benign presentation, newspaper 
editors from across France conveyed their intense disappointment with Washington’s unilateral 
decision to keep the Ruhr and the Rhineland within the Reich.45  
Like their nation’s newspapers, official government statements reflected a wide spectrum 
of opinions concerning Byrnes’ speech. London’s Foreign Office, for example, applauded 
Washington’s decision to stay involved in Europe’s post-war economic recovery.46 Similarly, 
German administrators from the US occupation zone approved most of the secretary of state’s 
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suggestions and welcomed the prospect of a permanent American military presence in their 
country.47 The French government, however, disliked the idea of a resurgent Germany and 
questioned the Truman administration’s long term commitment to maintain its troops in the 
conquered nation. Furthermore, Paris expressed its concerns that the Soviet Union could 
influence the proposed central bureaucracy and eventually seize control of the entire Reich once 
the US army left the continent.48 As for the Kremlin, it appeared remarkably disinterested about 
the speech and simply commented that Washington’s leaders appeared ready to “interest 
themselves in European affairs and those of the whole world.”49 Equally amazing, the address, 
which received bipartisan support in the US, failed to elicit a public statement from Truman 
himself.50 Though many observers generally understood that the president had heavily influenced 
the speech, it seemed odd for the White House to appear aloof about this major foreign policy 
initiative.51 Within one week, however, events forced the chief executive to assume a more 
public role with respects to America’s increasingly adversarial stance towards the Soviet Union.  
Four days after Byrnes’ Stuttgart Speech, former vice-president and current Secretary of 
Commerce Henry A. Wallace met with Truman to obtain his superior’s approval for an address 
he intended to give at a political rally on September 12, in New York City. The language of the 
prepared text described the idealist’s vision for a new world order where Washington and 
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Moscow cooperated on a host of international issues.52 For example, he planned to remark that 
America and Russia should limit their competitive energies to the fields of economic and social 
justice. In doing so the two nations could eventually become more alike in the future, thereby 
enhancing the prospects for a lasting peace.53 To achieve this utopian goal, he argued, the White 
House and the Kremlin needed to accommodate each other’s interest in various parts of the 
world.54 The speech boldly declared that “we have no more business in the political affairs of 
Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, western Europe, and the 
United States…whether we like it or not the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of 
influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence.”55  In addition to his de-facto 
acceptance of the USSR’s domination of Eastern Europe, the secretary of commerce planned to 
announce that “we must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or 
outside the United States who want war with Russia.”56  The adoption of a tougher policy, he 
cautioned, simply created pressure for the Soviets to reciprocate in kind.57 Furthermore, Wallace 
expressed his concerns about Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech and warned that Washington could 
not trust London to advance America’s interest in the world. “Make no mistake about it,” he 
intended to inform his audience, “the British imperialist policy in the Near East alone, combined 
with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war.”58 Finally, the address 
concluded with the bold assurance that the president had read Wallace’s prepared remarks and 
agreed that “they represented the policy of his administration.”59  Surprisingly, Truman did 
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approve the speech. According to the secretary of commerce, he and the chief executive “went 
over it page by page, together…and again and again he said, ‘That’s right,’ Yes, that is what I 
believe.’”60 In contrast, the president recalled that he and Wallace spent only a few moments of a 
short fifteen minute meeting discussing general ideas contained within the address.61 With only 
enough time to “skim through the speech,” Truman endorsed it because he assumed “Henry was 
cooperating in all phases of the administration—including foreign policy.”62 Subsequent events, 
however, soon revealed the folly of this notion.  
The release of an advance copy of Wallace’s speech to the media created an immediate 
sensation in Washington. Stunned by the administration’s apparent decision to alter its 
relationship with both Britain and Russia, reporters eagerly quizzed the president at his weekly 
press conference held four hours before the secretary of commerce’s address in New York. 
When asked to confirm Wallace’s assertion that the White House sanctioned the speech’s 
contents, Truman bluntly replied, “I approved the whole speech.”63 Intrigued, a correspondent 
enquired if the address repudiated the state department’s foreign policy. The president 
emphatically declared that it did not. When pressed on the issue, he claimed that the ideas 
espoused by both Wallace and Byrnes “are exactly in line” with one another.64 Dumbfounded, 
the reporters filed their stories, which exacerbated the inevitable controversy that followed.65 
Predictably, the commerce secretary’s provocative address at Madison Square Garden 
elicited wide spread criticism from all quarters of the political spectrum. For example, numerous 
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leftist at the CIO sponsored political rally jeered and heckled the speaker when he urged the 
USSR to appreciate America’s economic interest in Eastern Europe.66 Likewise, politicians from 
both parties expressed their dissatisfaction after Wallace’s rejected Washington’s “get tough” 
policy towards Moscow.67 Democrat Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, issued a strong statement that supported the secretary of state and called for an end 
to “intraparty division.”68 The Republican National Committee adopted a harsher view when it 
denounced the speech as an “obvious attempt to submarine the Atlantic Charter.”69 Echoing this 
sentiment, Senator Robert A. Taft argued that the president, by approving the address, had 
“betrayed” Byrnes and the entire state department.70 For his part, Vandenberg publicly 
questioned the administration’s unity concerning its foreign policy and commented that “we can 
only co-operate with one Secretary of State at a time.”71 Bipartisan support in international 
affairs, he warned, could only continue if the US and Britain maintained a united front against 
the Soviet Union.          
Not surprisingly, Wallace’s speech created major problems for Byrnes, who currently led 
America’s delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Confronted with numerous questions from 
foreign diplomats who suddenly doubted Truman’s commitments to Europe and the Near East, 
the secretary of state immediately withdrew from the meetings until the president could settle the 
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matter.72 This occurred on September 14 when the White House declared in a press statement 
that the US government had not changed its established foreign policy.73 In language reminiscent 
of his previous attempt to disown Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain Speech,’ the chief executive insisted 
that while he approved Wallace’s right to “deliver” the address, he did not endorse his 
message.74 This disingenuous clarification satisfied no one, which prompted the media to 
castigate the president for his weak explanation. Time Magazine, for example, labeled the official 
excuse a “clumsy lie” while the New York Times wondered if Truman’s repudiation of his 
secretary of commerce inadvertently made the Soviets more suspicious of America’s 
intentions.75 Wallace, meanwhile, showed no concern for the president’s predicament when he 
defiantly told reporters on September 16 that he stood by his Madison Square Garden address 
and intended to give more foreign policy speeches in the near future.76 This unwelcome 
announcement finally provoked Byrnes to issue an ultimatum to the White House. In a terse 
cable, the distressed secretary of state declared: “If it is not completely clear in your own mind 
that Mr. Wallace should be asked to refrain from criticizing the foreign policy of the United 
States while he is a member of your cabinet I must ask you to accept my resignation 
immediately.”77 Unwilling to lose his cabinet secretary and jeopardize America’s ongoing 
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negotiations in Paris, the president attempted once more to resolve the crisis that he helped 
create.78  
On September 18 Truman met Wallace at the White House in an effort to reestablish 
order in his administration.79 The chief executive proceeded to inform his wayward subordinate 
that he needed to stop giving speeches about foreign policy.80 The New Dealer, however, balked 
at this demand and spent the following two and half hours trying to obtain concessions from the 
president.81 Finally, in what newspapers referred to as a “truce,” Truman allowed his commerce 
secretary to publicly speak about US-Soviet relations after the Paris Peace Conference concluded 
in October.82 Unimpressed with this new development, Byrnes hurriedly sent another angry cable 
to Washington and again threatened to resign.83 In an abruptly organized teletype conference, the 
commander-in-chief assured his secretary of state that Wallace still needed to obtain permission 
if he wanted to speak about foreign affairs in the future.84      
As Truman tried to placate the State Department’s leadership, the New York Times 
complicated the situation when it published a confidential letter written by Wallace to the 
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president dated from July 23, 1946. Leaked by an anonymous source, the classified document 
catalogued the secretary of commerce’s numerous concerns with America’s current foreign 
policy.85 One observation- that the Pentagon intended to wage a “preventive war” against Russia- 
infuriated the president, who promptly directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to refute the 
allegation in a joint press statement.86 Consequently, the exasperated chief executive asked for 
and received Wallace’s resignation on September 20, 1946.87 At a hastily called press conference 
the president explained that while private citizens could disagree with Washington’s foreign 
policy, “the government of the United States must stand as a unit in its relations with the rest of 
the world.”88 Furthermore, he expressed his full confidence in Byrne’s work and concluded that 
the White House and State Department’s conception of international relations remained 
unchanged.89 Despite his initial desire to remain publicly aloof about such matters, Truman 
became increasingly identified with his evolving foreign policy. 
     Four days after Wallace’s termination, the president received a classified study 
regarding America’s current relations with the Soviet Union. Written by Special Counsel Clark 
Clifford and his assistant, George Elsey, the detailed 26,000 word report examined Russia’s long 
term strategic goals and suggested the various means by which Washington could respond to 
Moscow’s aggressive behavior.90 Comprehensive in scope, this noteworthy analysis gathered 
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information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the attorney 
general, and the secretaries of state, war, and navy. As such, the document revealed a consensus 
amongst the administration’s senior officials to implement a containment policy based on ideas 
formulated in Kennan’s Long Telegram.91      
The Clifford-Elsey Report asserted that Marxist theory guided the Kremlin’s overall 
foreign policy towards the US and Britain.  According to the study, Moscow’s firm belief in 
communism’s “inevitable conflict” with capitalism explained why Russia maintained the Red 
Army in Eastern Europe and failed to cooperate with America in Germany.92 Furthermore, it 
provided the rationale for the Soviet Union’s aggressive behavior towards Iran and Turkey. 
Despite these belligerent actions, however, the USSR currently desired peaceful relations with 
the West while it engaged in post-war reconstruction. The assessment predicted, however, that 
the Russians intended to strengthen and expand their political, military, and economic power 
until they achieved “eventual world domination.”93  
In addition to their analysis of Moscow’s general aspirations, Clifford and Elsey’s report 
described specific Russian challenges to Washington’s national interest. In stark language the 
study warned, “The Soviet Union is interested in obtaining the withdrawal of British troops from 
Greece and the establishment of a ‘friendly’ government there. It hopes to make Turkey a puppet 
state which could serve as a springboard for the domination of the eastern Mediterranean.”94 
Moreover, the assessment highlighted the Kremlin’s desire to acquire “atomic weapons, guided 
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missiles, materials for biological warfare, a strategic air force” and a large submarine fleet in 
order to intimidate the White House.95 Finally, the document detailed Moscow’s espionage 
efforts against the US and its active support for subversive movements within the country.96 
In the special counsel’s opinion, the Truman administration needed to convince Russia’s 
leaders that their confrontational policies lacked any prospect for success. Traditional diplomatic 
compromises, the report noted, must be ruled out because it encouraged the Soviets to demand 
more concessions.97 Instead, the study advised the president to adopt a comprehensive strategy to 
“restrain the Soviet Union and confine Soviet influence to its present area.”98 This required the 
federal government to expand America’s military force, including its nuclear and biological 
weapons stockpiles.99 In addition to deterrence, the document called for Washington to “support 
and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the 
USSR.”100 Clearly foreshadowing the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the assessment 
envisioned a broad open ended economic aid program designed to combat the Kremlin’s 
attempts to spread communism. Military assistance, the report cautioned, should only be used as 
“a last resort.”101 The study concluded that if the Soviets still refused to cooperate on 
international issues, than the US “should be prepared to join with the British and other Western 
countries…to build up a world of our own which will pursue its own objectives and will 
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recognize the Soviet orbit as a distinct entity with which conflict is not predestined but with 
which we cannot pursue common goals.”102   
After Truman read the Clifford-Elsey Report, he immediately asked his special counsel to 
bring all twenty copies of the study to the oval office. According to his aide, the president 
described the document as “powerful stuff” but insisted that it not be distributed to officials in 
the cabinet.103 “If it leaked” the chief executive warned “it would blow the roof off the White 
House, it would blow the roof off the Kremlin. We’d have the most serious situation on our 
hands that has yet occurred in my Administration.”104 Consequently, the assessment, which the 
commander-in-chief never acknowledged in either his memoirs or private diaries, remained 
classified until 1968.105 Despite its suppression, the report’s findings undoubtedly altered 
Truman’s general attitude towards the Soviet Union. For example, Elsey recalled how the 
president’s usual “relaxed view of the USSR” abruptly ended after he received the study on 
September 24.106 Likewise, Clifford noted at this time that the White House suddenly ended all 
active discussions pertaining to Russia’s longstanding request for a multi-billion dollar loan.107 
Clearly, the study had made a profound impact on the chief executive, who wanted to keep its 
contents secret from the American People.108   
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The 1946 mid-term election unquestionably influenced Truman’s prompt decision to 
keep the Clifford-Elsey Report from the public. Having just fired his controversial secretary of 
commerce, the president understandably did not want to refocus the nation’s attention to 
Washington’s foreign policy, especially at a time when it could become a new campaign issue. 
Furthermore, ongoing domestic issues had eroded the chief executive’s political support and thus 
prevented him from immediately implementing the study’s far reaching recommendations. Any 
attempt to transform America’s relations with the Soviet Union, therefore, had to wait until after 
the November 5 election.  
On June 4, 1946, Dean Acheson gave a speech in Boston where he announced that “the 
fundamental task in the conduct of our foreign affairs” centered on “focusing the will of 
140,000,000 people on problems beyond our shores.” Unfortunately, he wryly observed, the 
“people are focusing on 140,000,000 other things.”109 The under secretary of state’s comments 
referred to America’s numerous domestic problems, which had preoccupied Washington’s 
attention since September, 1945. The military’s massive demobilization, for example, created an 
acute housing shortage when millions of GIs suddenly returned stateside to resume their civilian 
lives.110 This, in turn, put additional stress on the nation’s economy, which struggled to convert 
its production to a peace-time basis.111 To make matters worse, the uneasy war-time alliance 
between the country's labor unions and business community had already dissolved as both sides 
sought to advance their respective interest at the other’s expense.112 Consequently, Truman’s 
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decision to end wartime controls for certain commodities in late 1945 inadvertently made the 
situation worse for millions of working class Americans whose wages had not increased during 
the previous four years.113 As labor unrest quickly spread across the US, the besieged chief 
executive mused: “Sherman was wrong…peace is hell.”114     
The nation’s preoccupation with domestic issues intensified throughout 1946. Numerous 
strikes, for example, caused major disruptions in the automobile, steel, and mining industries, 
which jeopardized the countries long term economic stability.115 The president’s tolerance for 
these work stoppages ended, however, on May 23 when 250,000 railway employees walked off 
the job.116 With interstate commerce essentially paralyzed, Truman went before congress on May 
25 and asked for emergency authority to seize industries, draft strikers into the armed forces, and 
arrest labor leaders. Perhaps not surprisingly, the railroad unions immediately ended their walk 
out, which the chief executive dramatically announced while giving his speech to the 
legislature.117 Although many people praised the president’s strong actions, it came at a political 
cost because he had alienated the Democrat’s liberal base. His party, therefore, entered the 1946 
mid-term elections in a much weaker and demoralized state.  
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Predictably, most Americans blamed the White House for America’s post-war economic 
chaos. High prices, food shortages, and labor disruptions eroded Truman’s popularity with the 
electorate.118 With respects to foreign relations, the president’s ambivalent public statements 
concerning Washington’s policy towards Moscow; combined with his vacillating reactions to 
both Churchill and Wallace’s speeches made him look disinterested and untrustworthy to a 
growing number of voters. Furthermore, liberal’s expressed dissatisfaction with what they 
viewed as a new confrontational policy against the Soviet Union while conservatives declared 
that it did not go far enough to free Eastern Europe from Russia’s domination. The ensuing 
discontent enabled the Republicans to win majorities in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives for the first time since 1928.119 With new congressional leadership intent on 
lowering taxes and scaling back military expenditures, the White House now appeared unlikely 
to implement the suggestions enumerated in the Clifford-Elsey Report.120    
Conclusion 
Though 1946 ended with Truman in a politically weakened state, he still had achieved 
significant diplomatic victories against the USSR, especially in the Near East and Europe. In Iran 
and Turkey, his administration utilized diplomacy and veiled military threats to prevent the 
Kremlin from dominating these two strategic nations. In both situations, however, the president 
made few public statements, preferring instead to have Byrnes and his State Department 
representatives speak on behalf of the US government. Likewise, when the commander-in-chief 
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decided to unilaterally alter America’s occupation policy in Germany he chose his secretary of 
state to announce the new program instead of himself. Clearly, the president had consciously 
chosen to publicly downplay, and in some cases, completely ignore Washington’s growing 
tensions with Moscow. Consequently, large segments of the American people remained 
uncertain about the White House’s evolving attitude towards the Soviet Union.      
The Wallace fiasco in September, 1946 highlighted the persistent confusion that 
continued to surround Truman’s foreign policy. The president’s curious approval of his secretary 
of commerce’s speech repudiated Byrne’s recently stated polices concerning Germany’s future 
and undermined US efforts to convince France and Britain that Washington firmly intended to 
stay involved in European affairs. The subsequent political controversy embarrassed the White 
House, which forced the chief executive to publicly support his secretary of state. In doing so, 
Truman alienated the Democrat’s liberal wing, whose general views Wallace had represented 
during his tenure at the Commerce Department. His abrupt resignation, therefore, signified an 
important development for America’s foreign policy because the government now possessed a 
more united outlook with respects to the Soviet Union. 
The Clifford-Elsey report accurately expressed the administration’s collective beliefs 
concerning the USSR’s post-war intentions towards the non-communist world. Unlike Kennan’s 
Long Telegram, which explained Soviet behavior within the context of Russia’s history and 
current adherence to communist doctrine, this internal study primarily limited its analysis to 
Marxism’s ideological influence on Moscow’s leadership. The Kremlin’s confrontational 
policies towards the capitalist west, the assessment observed, necessitated the need for the US to 
adopt a comprehensive long term strategy to safeguard its national security. Despite the report’s 
suggestion that the president explain these issues to the American People, Truman suppressed the 
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study’s existence because he correctly realized that its publication in September, 1946 could 
jeopardize Byrnes’ current negotiations with the Russians at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Furthermore, the president most likely understood that the report’s contents threatened to 
politicize foreign policy issues in the middle of a mid-term election campaign, which could 
weaken his bi-partisan support and hurt the Democrats at the polls.  
Truman’s domestic difficulties further hindered his ability to focus the nation’s attention 
on international affairs. Inflation, shortages, and labor strikes preoccupied the White House, 
which struggled to implement the government’s reconversion plan for the economy. Predictably, 
many Americans blamed the president for the countries numerous post-war problems and 
expressed their frustration by giving the Republicans majorities in both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives. Consequently, by the end of 1946, the beleaguered commander-in-chief 
faced a new conservative congressional leadership determined to lower taxes, reduce the federal 
budget, and impose a more isolationist foreign policy.  
The chief executive’s actions throughout 1946 continued to reflect the dichotomy 
inherent in his approach towards the Soviet Union. Though he adopted an increasingly tough 
stance against Moscow in nations such as Iran and Turkey, Truman continued to maintain a 
subdued rhetorical style with the American people. This approach began to change, however, 
when political pressure from the Wallace fiasco forced the reluctant president to publicly support 
Secretary of State Byrnes’ more hardline position. This development notwithstanding, the 
commander-in-chief still did not want to publicly address America’s difficulties with Russia, as 
indicated by his suppression of the Clifford-Elsey Report just one week after his secretary of 
commerce’s resignation. Only in the aftermath of his party’s disastrous performance in 
November’s mid-term election, did Truman appear receptive to his advisors’ request to speak 
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openly about US-Soviet tensions. Domestic factors in late 1946, therefore, encouraged Truman 


























Overstating His Case: Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine 
 
Harry S. Truman entered 1947 eager to regain the political initiative at home and abroad. 
Britain’s decision to withdraw aid from Greece, therefore, provided the ideal opportunity for the 
president to reassert himself with Congress and the American people. Despite his 
administration’s internal disagreements concerning the severity of the situation, the chief 
executive readily accepted the premise that Washington needed to safeguard Athens’s security 
from a perceived Soviet inspired insurgency. Unfortunately, the commander-in-chief garnered 
support for this endeavor by exaggerating the communist threat in the Balkans and overstating 
the scope of America’s required response. Though his speech, subsequently known as the 
Truman Doctrine, represented a continuation of the White House’s containment strategy; its 
arguments and presentation convinced the public that the US intended to embark upon a new 
long-term foreign policy against the Soviet Union.       
 Truman emerged from the 1946 mid-term election a changed man. Despite his party’s 
disastrous performance at the polls, the president exhibited a newfound confidence in both his 
private and public demeanor.1 In a letter to his wife, the chief executive boldly declared that “I’m 
doing as I damn please for the next two years and to hell with all of them.”2 Not content with the 
notion of being a caretaker president, Truman increasingly strived to imprint his personality upon 
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his administration while confronting the new Republican-controlled Congress.  For example, the 
commander-in-chief stopped invoking FDR’s memory and legacy, which became conspicuously 
apparent during his January 1947 state of the union speech when he failed to mention the late 
leader even by name.3 Beyond this stylistic change, however, the president also took substantive 
measures to increase his control and coordination of the executive branch. 
 On January 8, 1947, Truman revitalized the State Department and won wide spread 
praise from his critics when he replaced Byrnes with retired General George C. Marshall.4 
Enjoying near universal respect and admiration, the former army chief of staff received 
unanimous support from the Senate, which made the unusual decision to forgo hearings during 
his confirmation process.5 Consequently, the popular new secretary of state quickly assumed 
office and immediately began to restructure the demoralized department.6 In short order, 
Marshall replaced his predecessor’s lackadaisical management style with an organizational 
system that closely resembled his old command structure at the Pentagon.7 As a result, 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson now acted as his superior’s unofficial chief of staff; 
                                                          
3 “Text of President Truman’s Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Chicago Tribune, January 
7, 1947, 8. 
4 Byrnes originally tendered his resignation in April, 1946, only to have Truman persuade him to stay on 
until the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 355-6, 373-4; Truman, Memoirs, 
Volume 1: Year of Decisions, 559.  
5 Remarkably, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spent only twelve minutes deliberating Marshall’s 
nomination before reporting it to the full Senate. “Marshall Wins Unanimous vote from Senators,” Chicago Tribune, 
January 9, 1947, 3. 
6 A common joke at the time declared that “The State Department fiddles while Byrnes Roams.” This 
sentiment reflected the Foreign Service’s widespread frustration with Byrnes’ chronic aversion to bureaucratic work 
and policy planning. His lack of guidance, made worse by his constant traveling, produced an institution eager for 
Marshall’s strong focus and leadership. Oral History Interview, Joseph E. Johnson, June 29, 1973, 78, Truman 
Library.          
7Marshall also increased the State Department’s efficiency by reversing an old Byrnes decision that divided 
intelligence analysis according to geographic area. Consequently, a new Central Secretariat, under the command of 
Colonel Carlisle Humelsine from the Army’s General Staff, coordinated and unified the agency’s work. 
Furthermore, Marshall created the Policy Planning Staff and appointed George Kennan as its first director. This 
special body, unlike other offices in the department, examined long term problems and suggested possible 
recommendations. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 213-14 Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks: An Inside 
Account of the Genesis of the Marshall Plan (New York: HBJ, 1955), 101, 106-7.    
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charged with the task of distilling information into short summaries for future review and 
approval.8 This important development not only improved the department’s overall efficiency, 
but also enhanced Acheson’s role in organization, which substantially increased his ability to 
influence America’s relations towards the Soviet Union. 
The first, and perhaps most important event encountered by Marshall and Acheson 
centered on the ongoing Leftist insurgency against Athens’ reactionary government. Despite the 
presence of 26,000 British troops since 1944, armed partisan groups from the Greek Communist 
Party (KKE) and the National Liberation Front (NOF) ravaged northern Greece with raids 
designed to undermine the English-backed regime.9 London’s desire to supervise this war torn 
nation received Truman’s approval, who gladly limited America’s participation in the region to 
mostly monitoring current events.10 In doing so, the White House learned in October, 1946 that 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania provided weapons to guerilla units, which routinely used their 
territory as safe havens.11 Despite this worrisome development, the Pentagon assured 
                                                          
8 According to Joseph Jones, a special assistant in the State Department’s Public Affairs division, 
Marshall’s reforms “immediately straightened out the lines of authority” and “placed them in the hands of the man 
best qualified to be his chief of staff, Undersecretary Acheson.” Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New 
York: HBJ, 1955), 101, 106-7.  
9 When the Germans withdrew from Greece in October, 1944, the British Army occupied the nation and 
subsequently helped suppress a revolt instigated by leftist factions in the Greek resistance. Following their defeat, 
various insurgent groups such as the People’s National Army of Liberation (ELAS) and the National Liberation 
Front (NOF) fled into the countryside where they started a guerrilla warfare campaign against the English-sponsored 
government in Athens. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 198-9; Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review File: 
January, 1947 [Nos. 46-50], Number 50, Papers of Harry S Truman: Staff member and Office File (SMOF): Naval 
Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.          
10 While the British assumed primary responsibility for Greece, the US still participated in the nation’s 
post-war development. For example, in January, 1946, Washington granted an Export-Import Bank loan of $25 
million dollars to Athens in an effort to reconstruct its devastated economy. Furthermore, the White House sent 
nearly 600 Americans to Greece in March, 1946 to help monitor the nation’s first free elections. Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 198-9.          
11 Yugoslavia and Albania also deployed their troops in an intimidating manner. Belgrade, for example, 
doubled its border force from 35,000 to 70,000 soldiers between September 1 and October 24, 1946. Likewise, 
Albania positioned two thirds of its 65,000 man army along its border with Greece. In all likelihood, these nations 
used their militaries to deter Athens from sending its units across the border in pursuit of the leftist insurgents. Box 
19, War Department Intelligence Review File: October, 1946 [Nos. 34-38], Number 37, Papers of Harry S Truman: 
SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.         
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administration leaders that the “Greek Army is capable of suppressing the uprising.”12 Though 
the War Department’s Intelligence Division blamed the Soviet Union for its satellite’s aggressive 
behavior, it declared “that Greece will not be formally attacked by any of her neighbors to the 
north, especially with British troops on her soil.”13 Consequently, the president rejected Greek 
Prime Minister Tsaldaris’ personal appeal for foreign aid when he visited the US in December, 
1946.14 With the administration seemingly unconcerned about Athens’ immediate future, 
Marshall had no indication of an imminent Balkan crisis when he entered office one month later 
in January.                
By February, 1947, the situation changed when the State Department received negative 
assessments concerning Greece’s political stability. Early in the month, America’s Ambassador 
to Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, warned his superiors in Washington about the Greek economy’s 
imminent collapse. Such a development, he cautioned, guaranteed a KKE takeover in Greece, 
which could embolden the USSR to spread its influence throughout the Near East and North 
                                                          
12 In October, 1946 the Pentagon informed Truman that Greece’s 85,000 man army, though ill-equipped, 
retained the ability to combat the communist insurgents located throughout the northern part of the country. The 
president understood that Britain’s troops provided only moral support to the Greek military and never engaged in 
actual combat operations. Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review File: October, 1946 [Nos. 34-38], Number 
34 and 37, Papers of Harry S Truman: SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.    
13 Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review File: October, 1946 [Nos. 34-38], Number 37, Papers of 
Harry S Truman: Staff member and Office File (SMOF): Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman 
Library.    
14 Truman rejected Tsaldaris’s request, in part, because American officials lacked confidence in his ability 
to govern effectively. For example, a US intelligence report from November, 1946 heavily criticized the prime 
minister for his decision to exclude opposition parties from the Greek Cabinet. Only a true coalition government, the 
assessment concluded, could restore Washington’s confidence in Athens’ ability to solve its economic and military 
problems. Likewise, Tsaldaris’s stated desire to annex territory from Bulgaria and Albania caused diplomat Mark 
Ethridge to label him a “stupid fool.” Unimpressed with the prime minister, whom Dean Acheson called a “weak, 
pleasant, but silly man,” the Truman Administration declined to give large amounts of assistance to Greece until 
after he left office, which occurred in January, 1947. Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review File: November, 
1946 [Nos. 39-42], Number 40, Papers of Harry S Truman: SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, 
Truman Library; Oral History Interview, Mark F. Ethridge, June 4, 1974, 32, Truman Library; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 199.      
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Africa.15 Anxiety about Athens’ future also dominated messages from Mark Ethridge, a 
prominent American delegate on the UN’s investigative commission in the Balkans.16 In a cable 
to the Secretary of State, Ethridge declared that the Greek army suffered from poor leadership 
and low morale, which decreased its combat effectiveness against the armed insurgents. In his 
opinion, Athens’ unpopular government, combined with the KKE’s increasingly confident and 
aggressive stance in the northern part of the country convinced Moscow that “Greece is [a] ripe 
plum ready to fall into their hands in a few weeks.”17 A communist victory, he warned, enhanced 
the Kremlin’s ability to extend its influence throughout Europe, especially in France and Italy.18  
Not surprisingly, Marshall made immediate inquiries to confirm the veracity of these 
disturbing messages. On February 18, he ordered MacVeagh and Ethridge to meet with Paul 
Porter, director of the American Economic Mission in Athens, to determine the severity of 
Greece’s difficulties.19 On the same day, the secretary of state also asked the British Foreign 
Office to share their analysis with Washington. Within twenty-four hours, the US charge d’ 
affaires in London responded that “reports from British sources in Greece do not confirm [the] 
seriousness of internal Greek position as presented by Ethridge.”20 According to the English, 
Athens’ political and military institutions did not suffer from low morale. Only the Hellenic 
                                                          
15 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 
Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 16-7. 
16 On December 3, 1946 the Greek delegation at the UN persuaded the secretary general to examine 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania’s possible support of the armed insurgency against Athens government. On May 
23, 1947 the Balkan Investigation Commission declared, by a vote of nine to two, that Belgrade, Sofia, and Tirana 
provided safe havens, logistics, and training for Greece’s leftist bands. Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review 
File: December, 1946 [Nos. 43-45], Number 44, Papers of Harry S Truman: SMOF: Naval Aide to the President 
Files, 1945-53, Truman Library; Box 19, War Department Intelligence Review File: May, 1947 [Nos. 63-67], 
Number 67, Papers of Harry S Truman: SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.       
17 The United States Representative on the Commission of Investigation (Ethridge) to the Secretary of 
State, February 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 24. 
18 Ibid., 24-5. 
19 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, February 18, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near 
East and Africa, 25. 
20 The Charge in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State February 19, 1947, FRUS 1947, 
Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 26. 
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nation’s poor economy, London conceded, could eventually destabilize the country and create 
the conditions necessary for a communist takeover.21 In contrast to this rather sedate assessment, 
MacVeagh’s reply from February 20, emphasized that he, Ethridge, and Porter concurred that the 
problems in Greece are “so critical that no time should be lost in applying any remedial 
measures.”22 In the ambassador’s opinion, the “deteriorating morale” of the Greek government, 
military, and civilian population compromised Athens’ ability to prevent the nation’s “imminent” 
economic collapse.23 The diplomat concluded that if the US adopted “spectacular measures” to 
restore confidence in Greece’s future, then this “explosive situation” could be resolved with 
positive results.24  
The contradictory assessments received by the State Department went directly to Dean 
Acheson, who used his position within the organization to influence Marshall’s understanding of 
the Greek situation. On February 20, the undersecretary of state incorporated MacVeagh, 
Ethridge, and Porter’s observations into a memorandum recently written by Loy Henderson, the 
department’s director of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Originally entitled “Critical Situation 
in Greece,” the report received important input from Acheson, who rebranded it with the more 
alarming heading, “Crises and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece.”25  Completely 
ignoring London’s calm appraisal, the edited assessment summarized the dire predictions made 
by American diplomats and concluded that Washington risked losing the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Western Europe to “Soviet domination” if Leftist insurgents overthrew Athens’ 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 27. 
22 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 
Volume V:The Near East and Africa, 28.   
23 Ibid., 28. 
24 Ibid., 28. 
25 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1947, 
FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 29-31; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217.    
92 
 
government.26 The report advised the president to immediately send “a special bill to 
Congress…for a direct loan to Greece.”27  Acheson emphasized that only substantial US foreign 
aid, in the form of money and military equipment, could save the Hellenic nation from a 
communist takeover.28 Having highlighted the worst case scenario, the undersecretary of state 
presented his pessimistic analysis to Marshall, who subsequently instructed Acheson to prepare 
“the necessary steps for sending economic and military aid.29     
On Friday, February 21, the State Department received two diplomatic notes from the 
British Foreign Office informing Washington that London intended to end its aid program to 
Greece and Turkey no later than March 31, 1947.30 The United Kingdom’s decision, the 
messages concluded, necessitated immediate American assistance to both Athens and Ankara in 
order to safeguard these strategically vital nations from Soviet domination.31  Alarmed by this 
development, Acheson instructed Henderson and his staff to outline a proposal for Marshall to 
study before the secretary of state’s scheduled meeting with England’s ambassador on Monday, 
February 24.32 Consequently, the director of Near Eastern and African Affairs chaired a series of 
meetings throughout the weekend, which produced a strategic plan for the Truman 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 30. 
27 Ibid., 31. 
28 Acheson believed “substantial aid from the US” could increase Washington’s influence with Greece. 
Specifically, he hoped that foreign aid could induce Athens to accept a new “broad national coalition” government.  
Ibid., 30.  
29Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217.     
30 On the twenty-first, Marshall traveled out of town for the weekend to celebrate Princeton University’s 
Bicentennial. While the British did not officially inform the secretary of state until the twenty-fourth, they decided to 
send two advance copies of London’s diplomatic notes to the state department as a courtesy. Ibid., 217; Oral History 
Interview, Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973, 76, Truman Library.       
31 London explained that the United Kingdom’s week economy could no longer support its traditional 
overseas commitments. This admission did not surprise Truman and his foreign policy team because they regularly 
received intelligence updates about Britain’s economic status. The British Embassy to the Department of State, 
February 21, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 32-7; Box 19, War Department Intelligence 
Review File: February, 1947 [Nos. 51-5], Number 52, Papers of Harry S Truman: Staff member and Office File 
(SMOF): Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.  
32 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217-8. 
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administration to implement.33 Approved by Acheson, the memorandum suggested that the 
Departments of State, War, Navy, and Treasury collectively develop an aid program for the 
White House to incorporate into legislation specifically drafted for this situation.34 Furthermore, 
the document advised the president to brief congressional leaders and “acquaint the American 
people with the necessity of rendering assistance…to Greece and Turkey.”35 With public opinion 
sufficiently mobilized and the chief executive armed with legislative authority, the US could 
assume responsibility for safeguarding Athens and Ankara’s political, military, and economic 
stability.36 Ultimately, Henderson’s memo received support from Marshall, who subsequently 
assured Britain’s ambassador that Washington understood the implications of London’s 
decision.37   
Within hours of receiving the United Kingdom’s official diplomatic note, the secretary of 
state briefed the president and his cabinet about the changing situation in the Near East. Truman 
agreed with Marshall about the seriousness of the situation and directed the State Department to 
formulate a detailed policy based on Acheson and Henderson’s respective memorandums.38 In 
short order, the newly created Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey met 
                                                          
33 Henderson’s staff conferred with Kennan, who supported the idea of sending US economic aid to Greece. 
He rejected, however, giving assistance to Turkey because Ankara, unlike Athens, did not suffer from a war torn 
economy or communist guerrilla movement. Limiting American aid to Greece, he declared, safeguarded Turkish 
security without unduly antagonizing the Soviet Union with respects to their southern border. Acheson overruled 
Kennan’s objection and included Turkey anyway.  Oral History Interview, Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973, 87, 
Truman Library; Kennan, Memoirs:1925-1950, 316-7.  
34 Henderson originally wanted the proposed legislation to include Iran because it “was sorely in need of 
help following its tribulations during the war years.” Despite his enthusiasm, he acknowledged that “since the 
British had not asked us to assume any responsibilities with regard to Iran I did not push the matter.” Oral History 
Interview, Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973, 87-8, Truman Library. 
35 Memorandum Regarding Proposals Contained in British Aide-Memoires of February 21Relating to 
Greece and Turkey, February 24, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 41. 
36 Ibid., 41-2. 
37 Interestingly, the British ambassador informed Marshall that London had thus far kept its decision secret 
from Athens and Ankara. Lord Inverchapel concluded that it “probably would be disastrous to give such information 
to the Greeks or the Turks unless they could be informed at the same time that the United States Government had 
definite plans to aid them.”  Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs (Henderson), February 24, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 44.    
38 Truman, Memoirs: Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 100.   
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to explore the White House’s options. Chaired by the director of Near Eastern and African 
Affairs, the group determined that London’s diplomatic notes constituted an acknowledgement 
by the British government that it could no longer “maintain its imperial structure.”39 This 
development, some members concluded, compelled the US to develop a “worldwide program” to 
contain communism.40 In Henderson’s opinion, only a presidential speech designed to “electrify 
the American people” could garner the necessary support for such an ambitious plan.41 His 
group, however, could not achieve a consensus to implement an open-ended global program. 
Consequently, they established the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to set 
the parameters of a prospective US aid program for Athens and Ankara.42       
On February 26, the SWNCC reviewed the State Department’s assessments and agreed 
that a communist victory in Greece and/or Turkey irrevocably damaged America’s national 
security.43 The secretaries of state, war, and the navy reported to the president that Athens 
urgently required approximately $250 million in financial aid to prevent its economic collapse.44 
To this end, Marshall advised Truman to secretly ask the Greek government to formally request 
US assistance.45 Furthermore, he advocated the transfer of available US military equipment to 
                                                          
39 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 
February 24, 1947, 3:00 p.m., FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 45.                                                                                         
40 Not everyone on the committee wanted the US to financially assist nations around the world. General 
James K. Crain, for example, argued that London’s overseas commitments helped weaken the British economy. To 
avoid this eventuality, he wanted Washington to rely on military power to deter Moscow from seizing Greece and 
Turkey. This idea, however, received little support. Ibid., 46-7. 
41 Ibid., 47. 
42 Memorandum by the Chairman of the Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey 
(Henderson ) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) [Undated], FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and 
Africa, 48.                                          
43 Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson observed that “Greece and Turkey were of vital importance to the 
U.S. strategic position” while Forrestal emphasized the “strategic value of these areas to the Navy.” Minutes of a 
Meeting of the Secretaries State, War, and Navy, February 26, 1947, 10:30 a.m., FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near 
East and Africa, 57. 
44 Memorandum of the Secretary of State to President Truman, February 26, 1947, Volume V: The Near 
East and Africa, 58.  
45 According to Henderson, the State Department “prepared for the Greek and Turkish Embassies in 
Washington statements describing what we were planning to do and added to these statements the drafts of the kind 
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help Greece neutralize the armed insurgency.46 Finally, the three department heads advised the 
chief executive to educate both Congress and the American people of the need to support these 
two nations.  Not surprisingly, the president accepted these recommendations and immediately 
began the task of garnering support for the proposed aid program.47     
On February 27, congressional leaders from both parties arrived at the White House to 
receive their first briefing about the Greek crises.48 After speaking for a few moments about his 
decision to aid the beleaguered nation, the president invited the secretary of state to present the 
administration’s rationale for the new policy.49 Marshall subsequently described the negative 
implications of London’s decision to withdraw aid from Athens. A communist victory in Greece, 
he warned, jeopardized Turkey’s ability to resist Russia’s ongoing “war of nerves” against 
Ankara.50 He cautioned that if the Turks succumbed to Moscow’s pressure, “Soviet domination 
might extend over the entire Middle East to the borders of India.”51 Only American assistance, 
he argued, could safeguard the region from the Kremlin’s aggression. The secretary of state 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of requests we needed.” In this manner, the White House exercised control over Athens and Ankara’s official appeal 
for US aid. Memorandum by the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, [Undated], Volume V: The Near East and 
Africa, 59; Oral History Interview, Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973, 89, Truman Library.  
46 Ibid., 60.    
47  In his memoirs, Truman recalled the sense of urgency conveyed by State Department and Pentagon. 
According to the president, on February 26 his experts told him that a communist victory in either Greece or Turkey 
directly endangered the other nation’s ability to resist Soviet aggression. Echoing Dean Acheson, who briefed him 
about the SWNCC’s work, the president believed this outcome undermined US influence in Italy, Germany, France, 
and the Middle East. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 100. 
48 The eight-member Congressional delegation consisted of four legislators from each house. Truman, 
however, did not invite his most vociferous critic, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft, to the meeting. When 
Vandenberg immediately complained about his colleague’s absence, Acheson disingenuously described it as “an 
accidental omission.” Despite the under secretary’s explanation, the administration undoubtedly wanted to exclude 
Taft from these initial consultations with Congress. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219.     
49 Ibid., 103. 
50 Marshall acknowledged that Turkey’s situation differed from Greece’s armed insurgency. Despite this 
fact, the secretary of state insisted that Moscow’s persistent desire to dominate the Turkish straits forced Ankara to 
keep its obsolete army fully mobilized, which created a “drain upon the economy of that country.” US financial 
assistance, he argued, could modernize Turkey’s economy and military, thereby strengthening the nation’s long-
term national security. Statement by the Secretary of State, February 27, 1947, FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and 
Africa, 61. 
51 Ibid., 61. 
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concluded with a strong appeal for Congress to support the White House’s new endeavor. “The 
choice,” he reminded his audience, “is between acting with energy or losing by default.”52   
After Marshall finished his blunt statement, Acheson spoke to reiterate certain concepts 
for the representatives and senators.53 Relying on metaphors and hyperbole, the under secretary 
of state compared the situation in the Balkans to “apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one.”54  
A Greek collapse, he observed, could “carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, 
and to Europe through Italy and France.”55 Furthermore, he added that the US faced “an eager 
and ruthless opponent” bent on “playing one of the greatest gambles in history.”56 In Acheson’s 
opinion, the US needed to pursue a policy that actively countered all Soviet attempts to 
“penetrate” nations deemed vital to America’s national security interest.57 After the under 
secretary of state finished his remarks, the congressional delegation agreed in principle that 
Washington faced a pivotal decision.58 As the conference concluded, all parties agreed to meet 
                                                          
52 Ibid., 61. 
53 In his memoirs, Acheson believed Marshall “flubbed his opening statement” and needed help in his 
presentation. The under secretary of state recalled that “this was my crises. For a week I had nurtured it….it was my 
task to bring it home.”  Undoubtedly, he overstated his role in the proceedings because Truman and Vandenberg 
never mentioned it in their respective memoirs. On the contrary, the president declared that congressional leaders 
“appeared deeply impressed” with Marshall’s analysis. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219; Truman , Memoirs, 
Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 103.  
54 Ibid., 219. 
55 Ibid., 219. 
56 Ibid., 219. 
57 Ibid., 219. 
58 There is some disagreement amongst the meeting’s participants concerning how congressional leaders 
reacted to the briefing. For example, Truman recalled that “there was no voice of dissent” from the delegation 
whereas Vandenberg remembered that he and his fellow legislators made “general comments but no commitments.”  
Acheson, however, specified in his memoirs that Vandenberg urged the president to repeat the under secretary’s 
arguments in a speech to the American people. If he did this, the senator assured him, the chief executive could 
expect wide spread support from Congress. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 103-4; 
Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 339; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219. 
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again in the near future to discuss and review the specific details of the administration’s 
proposed policy.59  
Initially, the White House and State Department intended to keep the meeting’s contents 
secret from the public.60 The high profile gathering, however, attracted the media’s attention, 
which caused the Washington press corp. to speculate about the conference’s purpose.61 In an 
attempt to maintain control of the narrative, Acheson spoke off the record to approximately 
twenty correspondents to inform them about the Greek situation.62 Consequently, on February 
28, the American people learned for the first time about London’s decision to end assistance to 
Athens and why the administration intended to assume Britain’s responsibilities in the Balkan 
region. In a generally positive article, the New York Times reported that Truman’s tentative 
policy embodied something far more profound than just “a loan to a small Mediterranean 
country.”63 The Superpowers, the newspaper noted, viewed Greece as a “political battleground,” 
and as such, the besieged nation needed American aid to “halt the expansion of Soviet influence 
into Western Europe.”64 In a more neutral assessment, the Christian Science Monitor correctly 
speculated that the president’s rumored decision could “force a complete redrafting of United 
States plans for foreign relief expenditure.”65 Finally, the Chicago Tribune criticized the fiscal 
aspects of the White House’s plan with the argument that it ruined the Republican-controlled 
Congress’s ability to implement tax cuts to Washington’s $37 billion Federal budget. With $400 
                                                          
59 The congressional delegation returned to the White House eleven days later on March 10, 1947. Truman, 
Memoirs: Volume 2, 105.     
60 “Truman ask aid to Greece; British unable to bear cost,” New York Times, February 28, 1947, 1.  
61 Joespeh M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 144. 
62 Ibid., 144; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 220. 
63 “Truman ask aid to Greece; British unable to bear cost,” New York Times, February 28, 1947, 1.   
64 Ibid., 10. 
65 “US to play Key Greek Role?” Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1947, 1.  
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million already given to Athens since mid-1945, the paper also insisted that the chief executive’s 
policy guaranteed little success in stabilizing the country.66  
While Truman’s tentative Greek policy received intense public scrutiny in the press, his 
administration began the important task of drafting the president’s forthcoming address to the 
nation.67 Initial responsibility for this undertaking resided with Francis Russell, the State 
Department’s Director of the Office of Public Affairs. On February 28, he convened the 
SWNCC’s Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information to establish the themes and details of a 
prospective legislative message and/or presidential speech to the nation.68 By March 3, the 
interdepartmental group produced a report entitled, “Pubic Information Program on United States 
Aid to Greece,” which outlined many of the concepts later enunciated in Truman’s speech.69 In 
addition to its extensive background material and analysis, the document served as an important 
framework for Washington’s evolving containment policy.70 For example, the paper suggested 
that the president publicly refer to the armed insurgency in Greece as part of an open-ended 
global struggle instigated by the Soviet Union to undermine “free governments everywhere.”71 
                                                          
66 Interestingly, Acheson gave the president a similar assessment during a cabinet meeting six days later on 
March 7. According to the undersecretary of state, America’s previous $450 million dollars in foreign aid failed to 
improve Athens’ stability. The Greek economy, he warned the president, faced “complete disintegration” within 
weeks if it did not receive further assistance from the US. “Report British ask US take Greek burden,” Chicago 
Tribune, Notes to March 7, 1947 Cabinet Meeting, Box 1, File: March, 1947, Matthew J. Connelly Papers, Truman 
Library.   
67 Marshall did not make his first public statement about the Greek crises until March 4. The Secretary of 
State to the Embassy in Greece, March 4, 1947, FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 87. 
68 At this time, Truman remained uncertain about how to communicate his policy to the American people. 
Consequently, the State Department initially drafted a message that the president could use for either a written 
legislative request to congress or as a radio address to the public. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, 134; 
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell), March 17, 1947, FRUS, Volume V: The Near 
East and Africa, 121-3; Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 150. 
69 Jones, The Fifteen Weeks,152. 
70 The FRUS published the report’s most important section, entitled “Basic United States Policy,” which 
enumerated the core concepts found in the Truman’s final draft. Report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy 
Information of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, [Undated], FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and 
Africa, 76-8.   
71 Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 151; Report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information of the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee, [Undated], FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 76-8.    
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Only strong US economic assistance, the report observed, could safeguard democratic nations 
throughout the world from communist subversion.72 Pleased with the document’s conclusions, 
Russell instructed Joseph M. Jones, a member from his staff, to work with Loy Henderson in 
developing a preliminary text for the White House to consider.73      
     Incorporating numerous memoranda and internal State Department reports, the first 
drafts submitted to Acheson reflected the SWNCC’s strong anti-Soviet mindset.74 Though 
bureaucratic in tone and somewhat inelegant in style, these early versions of Truman’s speech 
received the under secretary of state’s eventual approval.75 Some diplomats, however, expressed 
reservations about the message’s global scope and impact. Kennan, for example, complained to 
Acheson that the “grandiose and…sweeping” nature of the text created potential problems for 
Washington’s overall relations with Moscow.76 Furthermore, he argued against US plans to assist 
Turkey, which he deemed unnecessary and ultimately dangerous for the region.77 Marshall also 
viewed the speech as too melodramatic and ordered significant changes to certain sections in the 
text.78 On March 6, for instance, the secretary of state told Acheson to excise a passage that 
equated communism with Nazism and Fascism. Moreover, he wanted to delete a sentence that 
                                                          
72 Ibid., 76-8. 
73 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 220; Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 150-3; Memorandum by the Director 
of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell), March 17, 1947, FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and Africa,123. 
74 Report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information of the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee, [Undated], FRUS, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 76-8; Loy Henderson and Joseph Jones’ drafts 
of the President’s Message, Box 6, File: Truman Doctrine Speech, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman Library; Jones, 
The Fifteen Weeks, 152-3.                                                              
75 Acheson held frequent drafting conferences in order to closely supervise Jones’ work. In one such 
meeting, the under secretary of state told the speech writer that “if F.D.R. were alive…he would make a statement of 
global policy but confine his request for money right now to Greece and Turkey.” In this manner, Acheson helped 
influence the scope of Truman’s message to Congress. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 154, 159. 
76 According to Jones, Kennan warned Acheson that the Russians “might even reply by declaring war.” 
Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, 315; Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 155. 
77 In his memoirs, Kennan blamed the Pentagon for “exploit[ing] a favorable set of circumstances in order 
to initiate a military aid program for Turkey.”  Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, 317.  
78 According to diplomat Charles Bohlen, he and Marshall thought “there was a little too much flamboyant 
anti-Communism in the speech.” Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1973), 261.  
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directly connected America’s security to Washington’s Greek endeavor.79 The under secretary of 
state dutifully made the requested changes and sent the revised draft to Truman for his 
approval.80  
On March 7, the president met with his advisors to discuss the latest developments 
concerning Washington’s aid package to Athens and Ankara.81 During that day’s morning staff 
meeting with Clark Clifford and Acheson, the chief executive decried the state department’s 
initial drafts because, in his opinion, they “sound[ed] like an investment prospectus.”82 Wanting 
“more emphasis on a declaration of general policy,” Truman directed his special council to assist 
the under secretary of state with further revisions of the message.83 Shortly afterwards, the 
commander-in-chief met with his cabinet to receive their views about the White House’s 
evolving containment policy. Secretary of Labor Lewis B. Schwellenbach openly worried that 
some Americans might oppose US assistance to Greece and Turkey because they believed “we 
were again pulling British chestnuts out of the fire.”84 Others officials, such as Harriman and 
Acheson, feared that Athens’ unsympathetic “reactionary” government could jeopardize the 
administration’s ability to mobilize public opinion to support the program.85 All participants, 
however, concurred with Forrestal, who stated that the Greek problem “was simply the 
                                                          
79 The sentence in question declared: “I consider the security of the United States demands that such funds 
and authority shall be made available immediately.” The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, March 
7, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa, 101.   
80 Ultimately, Truman overruled Marshall’s objection and included a sentence that connect America’s 
security to Athens’ and Ankara’s stability. Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman 
Doctrine, March 12, 1947, Public Papers: 1947, 180. 
81 On March 6, Truman returned to Washington from a four day state visit to Mexico. This cabinet meeting, 
therefore, provided the first opportunity for the president to review his administration’s work concerning America’s 
new Greek policy. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 104.  
82 The president’s complaint centered on unwieldy, bureaucratic passages such as the following: “Through 
the Import-Export Bank we extended a loan of $25,000,000 for the financing of self-liquidating projects.”  Ibid., 
105; . Loy Henderson’s draft of the President’s Message, Box 6, File: Truman Doctrine Speech, Joseph M. Jones 
Papers, Truman Library.                                                        
83 Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 105. 
84 Ibid., 104-5. 
85 Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 251.  
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manifestation of what had been in process of development in the last four years” and that the 
American people needed to “recognize it as a fundamental struggle” between the US and the 
Soviet Union.86 Convinced that he needed to mobilize public support for Washington’s new 
policy, Truman announced his decision to personally address a special joint session of 
Congress.87    
With a better idea of the speech’s purpose, Clifford and his assistant began revising the 
White House’s message for its intended audience. Interestingly, Elsey immediately disagreed 
with the chief executive’s new decision and wrote a memorandum to persuade him to reconsider 
his strategy. In a document addressed to the special council, the hesitant staff member correctly 
observed that “there has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which serves 
as an adequate pretext for the ‘all-out’ speech.”88 Furthermore, he feared a presidential address at 
this time could confuse and divide the public, which remained largely ignorant of America’s 
underlying problems with Russia. Truman, he concluded, needed to give a more limited speech 
that focused on Washington’s general desire to accelerate Europe’s economic reconstruction.  
Ironically, Elsey’s arguments inadvertently convinced Clifford to strengthen the anti-
communist themes in the president’s message. “This speech” he observed “must be the opening 
                                                          
86 Despite the global scope of the administration’s proposed containment policy, Truman privately viewed 
its application in a more selective manner. For example, when the secretary of the Interior asserted that America’s 
political retreat from China appeared inconsistent with the White House’s new policy, the president replied that 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist troops appeared unlikely to “fight it out” with the more dedicated Communists forces. 
In the chief executive’s opinion, “It would be pouring sand in a rat hole under [the] present situation.” Ibid., 251; 
Notes to March 7, 1947 Cabinet Meeting, Box 1, File: March, 1947, Matthew  J. Connelly Papers, Truman Library. 
87 According to Truman, convincing the American people to support his administration’s new Greek policy 
required “the greatest selling job ever.” Notes to March 7, 1947 Cabinet Meeting, Box 1, File: March, 1947, 
Matthew  J. Connelly Papers, Truman Library.  
88 In February, 1947 the Pentagon informed Truman and his advisors about the Soviet Union’s decision to 
extend the demobilization of its armed forces. The president knew, for example, that a shortage of skilled labor in 
the Russian economy necessitated the release of 500,000 soldiers from its military in late 1946. Furthermore, the 
War Department predicted that Moscow planned to cut additional troops levels again throughout 1947. Elsey to 
Clifford, Box 17, File:Truman Doctrine Speech, George Elsey Papers, Truman Library; Box 19, War Department 
Intelligence Review File: February, 1947 [Nos. 51-5], Number 52, Papers of Harry S Truman: Staff member and 
Office File (SMOF): Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman Library.    
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gun in a campaign to bring people to the realization that the war isn’t over by any means.”89 To 
this end, the special counsel and his assistant made more than one hundred changes to the state 
department’s initial draft in an effort to strengthen its language.90 Consequently, their revisions 
replaced numerous mundane passages with sentences designed to create a crises atmosphere. For 
example, Jones’ original reference to “the armed depredation of political dissidents” transformed 
under Clifford into an alarming description about “terrorist activities” conducted by “several 
thousand armed men.”91 Furthermore, the special counsel added metaphors and allusions to help 
explain the communist insurgency in an easily understandable manner.  
The seeds of totalitarian regimes” he wrote, “are nurtured by misery and want. 
They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They burst forth in 
their full stature when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must 
keep alive the flame of hope in the Greek people.92   
 
Moreover, Clifford feminized the nature of the threat when he wrote about how other nations 
“have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will.”93 He added that 
“political infiltration” and “violations” of Greek territory endangered Athens’ “national 
integrity,” which hindered its ability to maintain a “self-respecting democracy.”94   
                                                          
89 In his memoirs, Clifford recalled how “George’s memorandum highlighted for me the importance of 
assuring that the speech contained no half steps or ambivalent language.” Clifford, Counsel to the President, 133.    
90 According to Clifford, he and Elsey spent much of their time “Trumanizing” the State Department’s 
original drafts. Numerous revisions, therefore, focused on making the speech “sound more like Harry Truman and 
less like a committee product from State.” Clifford, Counsel to the President, 133-4, 135; Oral History Interview, 
George M. Elsey, July 10, 1969, 165-71, Truman Library.        
91 Clifford’s Annotated Copy of March 9 Draft; Elsey’s Annotated Copy of March 9 Draft , Box 17, 
File:Truman Doctrine Speech, George Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 
92 Elsey’s Annotated Copy of March 10 Draft, Box 17, File:Truman Doctrine Speech, George Elsey Papers, 
Truman Library; Clifford, Counsel to the President, 135. 
93 Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman: Containing the 
Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953. Volume 3: 1947 
(Washington, DC: US G.P.O., 1963), 178. 
94 Ibid., 177-9. 
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For his part, Elsey clarified the president’s message with arguably the strongest 
declaration in the entire speech. Known as the speech’s “credo,” this concise statement 
summarized the Truman Doctrine with the following three sentences:  
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and 
financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly processes.95    
   
Having highlighted the threat and proclaiming the proposed solution, the White House advisors 
returned the draft to Acheson and the president, who subsequently gave their final approval.96 
 While Acheson reviewed the revised drafts, Truman met again with congressional leaders 
on March 10, to announce his official decision about Greece and Turkey. Speaking to the 
fourteen-member delegation, which now included Senator Taft, the president described his $400 
million plan to safeguard Greece and Turkey from communist aggression. Not surprisingly, his 
briefing received “a cool and silent reception” from the legislators, who feared the financial and 
political implications of the president’s proposed policy.97 Vandenberg, however, assured the 
                                                          
95 According to Clifford, the speech “would not have achieved the status of a ‘doctrine’ without its three 
key sentences.” Elsey’s Annotated Copy of March 10 Draft, Box 17, File:Truman Doctrine Speech, George Elsey 
Papers, Truman Library; Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, 136, 138. 
96 Since March, 1947, there have been numerous claims concerning the authorship of the Truman Doctrine 
speech. Time magazine, for example, initially reported that Marshall wrote “three-quarters” of the address while 
Newsweek attributed Loy Henderson and his staff at the State Department with this honor. In 1955, Joseph Jones 
claimed that he, with Acheson’s supervision, primarily “held the pen” which wrote the draft used by the president. 
Years later, Elsey ridiculed Jones for “patt[ing] himself on the back for the great speech he had written.” Ultimately, 
Clifford correctly declared that “by the time the final draft was ready, so many hands had touched it that, despite 
some claims to the contrary, no single person could assert paternity.”  “The World,” Time, March 24, 1947, 18-20; 
Behind Truman’s ,” Newsweek, March 24, 1947; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, 148; Oral History Interview, George M. 
Elsey, April 9, 1970, 297, Truman Library; Clifford, Counsel to the President, 134. 
97 On March 4, the Republican controlled Senate voted to reduce the Federal budget by at least $4.5 billion 
dollars. Two days later the Democratic Congressional Conference informed the president that their support for his 
proposed aid package remained conditional. Assistance could be given, they announced, but only if it did not 
“further British policies in the Mediterranean” or help the Greek monarchy. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 221-
2; “Greek Aid Favored on Reserved Basis,” New York Times, March 7, 1947, 8. 
104 
 
chief executive that he supported the White House in this endeavor and announced his intentions 
to help pass the legislation.98      
 On March 12, 1947, Truman presented his case to the American people in a somber 
address before a special joint session of Congress.99 The Greek government’s “urgent appeal” for 
assistance, he declared, compelled the US to send economic and military aid to the beleaguered 
nation.100 Without mentioning the Soviet Union by name, the president characterized the armed 
insurgency in Greece as part of a global ideological conflict between totalitarian and democratic 
forces.        
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between 
alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is 
based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, 
freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression. The 
second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.101   
 
In addition to his request for US aid for Greece, the chief executive also wanted to assist Turkey 
in the “maintenance of its national integrity.”102 While he remained extremely vague about what 
                                                          
98 Truman, Memoirs: Volume 2, 105; “Truman Bares Scheme to Halt Reds,” Chicago Tribune, March 11, 
1947, 1.  
99 Congress interrupted Truman’s twenty-one minute speech only three times to applaud the president. 
Clifford, Counsel to the President, 137. 
100 Truman specified that he wanted to furnish $400 million dollars along with “civilian and military 
personnel… to assist in the tasks of reconstruction.” Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, April 12, 
1945 to January 20, 1953. Volume 3: 1947 (Washington, DC: US G.P.O., 1963), 176, 179.    
101 Ibid., 178. 
102 The president devoted only four of the speech’s twenty-eight paragraphs to Turkey’s need for US aid. 
Interestingly, he never specified exactly what threatened Ankara’s “national integrity.” Ibid., 178. 
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help Ankara specifically needed, Truman assured his audience that “the preservation of order in 
the Middle East” relied upon America’s support for this country.103  
 Having given the administration’s rationale for providing assistance, the president 
attempted to refute some of the potential arguments he anticipated from his critics.  For example, 
the chief executive argued that only the US possessed the necessary resources to support and 
safeguard the fledgling democracies currently under siege around the world. The war-torn British 
Empire, he stressed, could no longer contribute its wealth to such a large open-ended 
commitment.104 Furthermore, Truman maintained that the UN lacked the ability to “extend help 
of this kind,” especially within a timely manner.105 As for the Greece’s corrupt reactionary 
government, the president openly acknowledged its past “extremist measures” and political 
mistakes.106 Despite their numerous imperfections, the commander-in-chief insisted that Athens’ 
current cabinet represented “eighty-five percent” of the Greek Parliament and, therefore, 
constituted a democratic government.107 Moreover, he reassured his audience that Washington 
intended to send American economist and technicians to supervise the distribution of US aid to 
the Hellenic nation.108   
                                                          
103 Ibid., 178.  
104 Ibid., 177, 178.  
105 While he did not mention it in his address, the president and his administration believed Moscow’s veto 
in the Security Council made the UN incapable of dealing with the Greek Matter. Ibid.,177; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 223.                       
106 Truman declared that America’s aid program “does not mean that the United States condones everything 
that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist 
measures of the right or the left.” In addition, the president cleverly noted that the world’s knowledge of Athens’ 
excessive policies derived from their government’s transparent democratic nature. Special Message to the Congress 
on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947, Public Papers: 1947, 177.   
107 Truman argued that American aid to Greece’s economy could stabilize the country, thereby allowing 
Athens to develop a “healthy democracy.” Ibid., 177. 
108 The president emphasized “the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available 
to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting.” Ibid., 179.  
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 Truman finished his speech with a final appeal for the White House’s proposed program. 
Safeguarding the independence of free nations, he asserted, reinforced the principles of the UN 
Charter, which aimed to prevent the outbreak of another world war.109 To this end, the chief 
executive viewed his $400 million request as a reasonable appeal, especially when compared to 
the $341 billion spent by the US during its four year conflict with the Axis powers.110 Finally, 
the president boldly declared that “direct and indirect aggression” against the free nations of 
Greece and Turkey “undermine[d] the foundations of international peace and hence the security 
of the United States.”111 To do nothing, he concluded, “endanger[ed] the peace of the world.”112    
Not surprisingly, Truman’s address to Congress elicited strong reactions from around the 
world. Churchill, for example, praised the speech as “a great event” and boldly asserted that “if 
such a step had been taken by the United States before the last war, it would have stopped it.”113 
Likewise, the British Foreign Office stated they “were favorably impressed” with the address 
while their French counterparts greeted the development with “tremendous enthusiasm.”114 
Interestingly, Italy’s leadership initially viewed the president’s announcement as a tactical ploy 
designed to strengthen Marshall’s negotiating position at the Moscow Foreign Minister’s 
Conference. Despite their cynicism, Rome still used the occasion to ask the US to apply the 
                                                          
109 Ibid., 179. 
110 The chief executive downplayed the proposed $400 million aid package with the assertion that it 
amounted to “little more than 1/10 tenth of 1 percent” of America’s World War II budget. Ibid., 180.   
111 Ibid., 178, 180. 
112 Shortly after he addressed Congress, the president sent an interesting letter to his daughter, which 
revealed his thoughts concerning the Truman Doctrine’s purpose. “This terrible decision…,” he wrote, “had been 
over my head for about six weeks. Although I knew at Potsdam that there is no difference in totalitarian or police 
states, call them what you will, Nazi, Fascist, Communist or Argentine Republics. You know there was but one 
idealistic example of Communism. That is described in the Acts of the Apostles. The attempt of Lenin, Trotsky, 
Stalin, et al., to fool the world and the American Crackpots Association represented by…Henry Wallace,…and the 
artists in immoral Greenwich Village, is just like Hitler’s and Mussolini’s so-called socialist states. Your Pop had to 
tell the world just that in polite language.” Ibid., 180; Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, (New York: William 
Morrow & Company, 1972), 343.  
113 “Churchill Applauds Truman Action,” Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 1947, 7.  
114  Department of State Summary of Telegrams, March 13, 1947, Box 22, SMOF: Naval Aide to the 
President Files; January-May, 1947 File, Truman Papers, Truman Library.                                                                                                             
107 
 
newly announced Truman Doctrine to Trieste “because the same conditions of Soviet expansion 
prevail on the Adriatic as in the Eastern Mediterranean.”115 Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, meanwhile, issued predictable denunciations of the president’s plan or ignored the 
speech altogether.116 Interestingly, the Kremlin never released an official statement regarding 
America’s new foreign aid program.117 Notwithstanding this aloof attitude, Stalin’s government 
indirectly expressed its opinions through government and party press organs. Izvestia, for 
instance, published a two-column editorial that criticized the White House’s decision to 
intervene in Athens’ internal affairs, especially before the UN completed its Balkan Commission 
Report. The US policy, the paper claimed, weakened the international organization’s legitimacy 
and infringed upon Greek and Turkish independence.118 In a much harsher assessment, Pravda 
characterized Washington’s policy as a plan for “imperialist expansion under the guise of 
charity.”119 Western intentions to dominate the world, the periodical warned, “are inevitably 
doomed to failure.”120 Finally, TASS accused Truman of undermining the “democratic elements 
in Greece,” and cautioned its readers that America intended to seize control of the Hellenic 
nation.121  
                                                          
115 World Reaction to the President’s Speech on Greece and Turkey,War Department Intelligence Review 
File:March, 1947 [Nos. 55-58], Number 57, Box 20: SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 1945-53, Truman 
Papers, Truman Library.                                                                                     
116 The Polish government declared that “Truman was misinformed,” while Yugoslavia’s regime chose 
only to emphasize Britain’s “regret” at having to concede control of Greece to the US. Newspapers in both nations 
failed to publish any content about the speech. Ibid. 
117 The War Department’s Intelligence Division believed Truman’s decision not to name the USSR in his 
speech made it difficult for the Kremlin to make an official protest because “it would be an admission of totalitarian 







In the US, the president’s speech fulfilled part of its purpose by seizing the nation’s 
attention and forcing the public to reevaluate Washington’s relations with Moscow.122 The initial 
response to the chief executive’s appeal encouraged administration officials, who hoped to 
receive legislation from Congress by March 31.123 An internal State Department study, for 
example, reported that forty-one major newspapers and periodicals strongly supported the 
Truman Doctrine, while only fifteen opposed to it.124 Early congressional reaction, meanwhile, 
revealed qualified support for the White House’s plan. Of the first seventy-five published 
statements, thirty-five legislators supported the proposal, twenty-two expressed opposition, and 
eighteen adopted a noncommittal position.125 Though encouraging, these statistics also suggested 
that the president’s aid program still faced significant resistance in Congress, which made its 
passage anything but a foregone conclusion.   
Interestingly, domestic opposition to the Truman Doctrine emerged from both sides of 
the political spectrum. Henry Wallace, for instance, voiced the concerns of many progressives 
and liberals when he argued that “the entire policy of containing the USSR…by propping up 
reactionary regimes is bound to end in failure.”126 Furthermore, he castigated the 
                                                          
122 An unpublished poll conducted by the University of Denver’s National Opinion Research Center 
declared that seventy-six percent of those surveyed heard or read about the president’s speech. A similar four day 
poll by Gallup showed a seventy-five percent level of awareness. Confidential Summary, [Date Unknown] , File: 
Truman Doctrine Speech, Box 6: Speeches to Arthur Vandenberg,  Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman Library. 
123 The National Opinion Research Center revealed that sixty percent of those surveyed supported the 
administration’s plan to give $400 million to Greece and Turkey. Confidential Summary, [Date Unknown], File: 
Truman Doctrine Speech, Box 6: Speeches to Arthur Vandenberg, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman Library.  
124 Ibid.,  
125 Within forty-eight hours of Truman’s speech, only twenty-seven legislators gave unqualified support to 
the president while a further eight provided conditional backing for his plan. Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example, 
wanted the White House to immediately extend its new policy to other nations around the world, especially China. 
Likewise, Representative Alvin O’ Konski declared that the chief executive gave a “very timely message…and was 
ready to go along with him.” However, despite this support, the congressman admitted that the administration’s 
policy in East Asia vis-a-vis Beijing “befuddled” him. Department of State Office of Public Affairs, Division of 
Public Studies: Congressional Statements on President Truman’s Address asking Aid for Greece and Turkey, March 
12-14, 1947, File: Truman Doctrine, Box 6: Speeches to Arthur Vandenberg,  Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman 
Library.   
126 Henry Wallace, “The Way to Help Greece,” New Republic, March 17, 1947, 13. 
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administration’s circumvention of the UN and warned that Washington risked damaging the 
integrity and effectiveness of the nascent international organization. In his opinion, America 
needed to defer the problem to the Security Council, which could predicate its assistance on 
Athens’ willingness to adopt significant democratic reforms.127 Conservative Republicans, 
meanwhile, criticized the plan’s financial and military commitments. For example, longtime 
representative and isolationist Harold Knutson dismissed the president’s rationale for aid with his 
caustic observation that “the do-gooders won’t feel right until they have us all broke.”128 
Likewise, Senator William Revercomb openly wondered if the White House intended to send 
“our fighting men to back and protect the dollars we propose to grant.”129 In a parody of 
Truman’s speech, Senator Charles Brooks summarized his party’s fears and suspicions when he 
questioned whether the $400 million request represented “one-tenth of 1%” of a new war-time 
budget aimed against the Soviet Union.130 Despite these criticisms, however, the administration 
still believed it could pressure Congress to pass the chief executive’s program.131  
While the world contemplated the Truman Doctrine’s possible repercussions, the White 
House and its allies implemented a propaganda strategy designed to solidify public support for 
the Greek-Turkish aid package. For example, on March 21, the president signed executive order 
                                                          
127 Wallace wanted the Greek government to issue a general amnesty to the EAM, which he considered a 
primarily non-communist organization. Furthermore, he wanted Athens’ reactionary government to share political 
power with leftist parties and to initiate necessary tax reforms in the Hellenic nation. Only then, he argued, could 
Greece receive foreign aid from the UN. Ibid., 12-3. 
128 Department of State Office of Public Affairs, Division of Public Studies: Congressional Statements on 
President Truman’s Address asking Aid for Greece and Turkey, March 12-14, 1947, File: Truman Doctrine, Box 6: 
Speeches to Arthur Vandenberg,  Joseph M. Jones Papers, Truman Library.   
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 The day after Truman’s speech, Democratic Representative Carl Vinson described the Republican’s 
predicament to Forrestal. The legislator predicted that many conservatives on Capitol Hill could find it difficult to 
maintain their opposition to the White House, especially since the president enunciated many of the same anti-
communist views espoused by the Isolationist. The fiscally-minded Republicans, he concluded, “are all put on the 
spot now and they all have to come clean.” Excerpts of telephone conversation between James Forrestal, Secretary 
of the Navy and Congressman Carl Vinson from Georgia, March 13, 1947, File: Speech to Congress on Greece, Box 
27, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Truman Library.          
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9835, which created a Federal Employee Loyalty Program to investigate the political affiliations 
of government workers.132 By highlighting communism’s potential threat to US institutions, the 
administration undoubtedly wanted to instill a heightened sense of insecurity in the American 
People, thereby making them more inclined to endorse the commander-in chief’s foreign 
policy.133 In addition to employing scare tactics, Truman also established a special committee to 
help him influence important demographic groups throughout the country.134 Headed by 
Treasury Secretary John W. Snyder, this council subsequently sent cabinet members to meet 
with business, labor, farming, and religious leaders in an attempt to elicit the backing of their 
respective organizations.135 Concurrent with these efforts by the Executive Branch, Vandenberg 
also did his part to rally Congressional support for the pending legislation. Within hours of the 
president’s speech, the ranking Republican invited colleagues from both parties to submit written 
questions to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee so that it, in turn, could send them to the 
                                                          
132 Signed just nine days after the Truman Doctrine Speech, Executive Order 9835 established an invasive 
loyalty program that empowered the Federal Civil Service Commission to prevent the “infiltration of disloyal 
persons into the ranks of its employees.” In his memoirs, Truman claimed he created this policy, in part, because he 
wanted to “set up machinery” that protected individuals “against false charges based on rumors or unsubstantiated 
gossip.” Despite his stated goal, the program’s vague guidelines allowed government entities to utilize confidential 
informants, which the accused could not confront and cross-examine. Exec. Order No. 9835, 1 Code Fed. Regs. 129 
(Supp. 1947); Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 280.        
133 Not surprisingly, this policy gave the impression that communists threatened Washington’s security, 
which resulted in wide-spread paranoia throughout the country. Ironically, this development inadvertently hurt the 
Truman administration years later, when critics such as Senator McCarthy accused the State Department of 
purposefully allowing China to fall to the Communist in 1949. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and 
Hope, 284-5.   
134 Established on March 7, the Committee made a series of suggestions designed to gain wide support from 
various sections of American society. The group, however, angered Acheson with their proposal that only countries 
with free enterprise systems could receive foreign aid from the US. According to Clifford, the under secretary of 
state denounced this idea because it severely limited the application of the Truman Doctrine. “Did the existence of a 
Labor Government in Great Britain” he asked, “mean that we could not give them assistance?” Ultimately, the State 
Department succeeded in downplaying the economic status of potential recipient nations. Truman, Memoirs: Volume 
2, 105; Oral History Interview, John W. Snyder, February 4, 1969, 1098-99, Truman Library; Clifford, Counsel to 
the President, 137.      
135 Snyder recalled that he personally spoke to about “twenty-five or thirty leaders of groups and 
organizations.” These speeches, he insisted,  helped increase his listener’s “willingness to lend their assistance to 
backing up public opinion and supporting the aid program.” Oral History Interview, John W. Snyder, February 26, 
1969, 1165-7, Truman Library.                      
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White House for answers.136 In this manner, the Senator kept his fellow representatives well 
informed while indirectly helping officials in the State Department prepare for their hearings on 
Capitol Hill.      
Despite having influential allies in Congress, the White House still encountered 
widespread resistance from a skeptical legislature. For example, inquiries into the Truman 
Doctrine’s stated objectives created confusion and criticism amongst lawmakers, who disliked 
the Administration’s less then forthcoming attitude towards the subject. When asked if 
America’s foreign policy now revolved around containing communism, Acheson gave the 
technically correct response that the president’s speech never mentioned “a crusade against any 
ideology.”137 However, he also disingenuously elaborated that “we are not trying to take a blow 
at anyone, or any country, or any doctrine.”138 Dubious of this response, Senator Alexander 
Wiley told the under secretary of state in a confidential executive session that “the American 
people are not as dumb as we sometimes assume.”139 In his opinion, the US Government needed 
to “call a spade a spade, and say that this whole thing is to stop the impact of Russia at this 
particular point.”140 In addition to this rebuke, the Senator wanted the administration to publicly 
announce Washington’s real objective in the Near East, namely the safeguarding of America’s 
                                                          
136Francis O. Wilcox, the chief of staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recalled how 
Vandenberg worked tirelessly to compile and organize the administration’s answers into a special booklet for his 
colleagues’ benefit. Oral History Interview, Francis O. Wilcox, February 10, 1984, 60, Truman Library.     
137 Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 32-3.  
138 Ibid., 43 
139 Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, 94-5. 
140 Washington’s subsequent actions support the notion that the administration pursued an anti-Russian 
policy rather than an anti-communist program. For example, the White House exploited Tito’s rift with Stalin in 
1948 by approving a series of loans to Yugoslavia in September, 1949. This illustrated America’s willingness to aid 
a Marxist dictatorial regime for the purpose of weakening Moscow’s efforts in Eastern Europe. Ibid., 17; “US, 
Britain to Lend Yugoslavia $61 million, Belgrade Reports Say,” Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1949, 5; Current 
Economic Developments, September 26, 1949, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States,1949,Volume V, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (Washington DC: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1975), 965-6.    
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access to Middle Eastern oil.141 Though Acheson never repudiated his remarks, other officials 
eventually acknowledged the obvious motivation behind Truman’s aid package to Athens and 
Ankara. In a classified Senate hearing held on March 28, Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh 
admitted that the State Department viewed Greece and Turkey as a “strategic line” against the 
spread of “international communism.”142 If these two nations fell, he argued, Moscow could 
seize western Asia and “pick the lock of world dominion.”143 Similarly, Brigadier-General 
George A. Lincoln warned representatives that “we are in an ideological struggle” with the 
Kremlin, whose leaders appeared intent on engaging a “subversive war” against the West.144 
Understandably, these inconsistent statements frustrated lawmakers as they tried to discern the 
administration’s true objective in the Near East. 
Congressional hearings also focused on whether the White House intended to apply the 
Truman Doctrine to other nations around the world. When asked if he viewed Greece and Turkey 
as “lead off countries” for a larger program, Acheson replied that the government did not possess 
any “secret plans up its sleeve.”145 In another instance, a representative inquired if the 
administration viewed the president’s policy as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Again, the 
evasive diplomat responded, “No, I do not. I think that is a very loose and confused way of 
dealing with a specific situation.”146 Dissatisfied with these vague answers, committee members 
pressed the under secretary of state for precise information pertaining to the chief executive’s 
                                                          
141 Legislateve Origins of the Truman Doctrine, 94-5. 
142 Ibid., 66. 
143 To emphasize Russia’s danger to the US, MacVeagh quoted a speech by Stalin, which revealed the 
Soviet dictator’s desire to expand Communist revolutions throughout the world. Cited from a 1934 book entitled, 
The Foundations of Leninism, the address stressed that “the essential task of the victorious revolution in one country 
is to develop and support the revolution in others so the victorious revolution in a victorious country ought not 
consider itself as a victory self-contained, but as a means of hastening the victory in another country.” Ibid., 66. 
144 According to Lincoln, Washington’s conflict with Moscow resembled the rivalry between ancient Rome 
and Carthage.  Ibid., 160. 
145 Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 54.  
146 Ibid., 13. 
113 
 
foreign policy.  Senator Howard A. Smith, for instance, questioned if the administration intended 
to spend resources to counter communist activity in South America. Acheson insinuated that the 
White House might consider extending its aid program “if there are situations where we can do 
something effective.”147 However, when asked if the State Department also deemed China 
worthy of future American assistance, the diplomat shrewdly attempted to limit the Truman 
Doctrine’s scope with respect to Asia. In his opinion, Chiang Kai-Shek’s situation differed 
significantly from Athens’ predicament because the Nationalist Chinese government did not face 
imminent defeat.148 Furthermore, he refused to speculate about “hypothetical” scenarios 
concerning Washington’s besieged Far Eastern ally.149 Ultimately, Acheson assured Congress 
that the White House intended to review future request for assistance “according to the 
circumstances of each specific case.”150    
In addition to their concerns about the program’s purpose and scope, lawmakers also 
remained apprehensive about the military aspects of the president’s aid package. With half of 
America’s proposed assistance earmarked for Greece’s armed forces, numerous congressional 
leaders openly worried about the possibility of the US getting involved in an active shooting war 
against communist guerrillas.151 Senators Vandenberg and Connally, for example, opposed the 
                                                          
147 Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, 17.  
148 Chiang Kai-Shek did not suffer a major defeat until late 1948 when Mao’s reorganized Peoples 
Liberation Army (PLA) launched a successful offensive against Nationalist Government forces in northern China. 
Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 17; “China Policy: Experts Advise: Keep 
Aid Near Present Level We Can't Do More,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 1948, 1.   
149 Eventually Truman asked Congress in 1948 to provide $570 million to Chiang Kai-Shek’s government. 
Considering China’s geographic size (forty-one times bigger than Greece) and the strength of the PLA (forty times 
bigger than the communist guerilla force in Greece) this amount did not represent a comparable aid package when 
compared to Truman’s request for Athens. Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs,18; “China Policy: Experts Advise: Keep Aid Near Present Level We Can't Do More,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 22, 1948, 1; US Department of State, United States Relations with China:With Special Reference to the 
Period 1944-1949. [China White Paper.]Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949, 387-90.   
150 Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13. 
151 Of the $300 million allocated to Greece, $150 million went to military expenditures for arms, 
ammunition, equipment, and rations. The remaining aid went to agriculture ($20 million), foreign exchange cost 
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bill’s vague wording regarding the “detailing of officers and enlisted men” from America’s 
armed forces for the Greek endeavor.152 In their opinion, this gave the president a “blank check” 
for future military operations in the Balkans, which they feared might inadvertently cause a war 
between Washington and Moscow.153 In response, Acheson stressed the administration’s 
intentions to use US personnel only for equipping and training Athens’ army. Moreover, he 
predicted that America’s plan to strengthen Greece and Turkey actually decreased the chances of 
conflict because it does “a great deal to eliminate the sort of situation which would produce 
frictions between the great powers.”154 The Pentagon’s minimal participation, he argued, could 
indirectly eliminate the communist guerillas and stabilize the strategically important region.     
Arguably, the most contentious issue for Congress centered on Truman’s decision to 
bypass the United Nations. Representative Helen G. Douglas, for instance, denounced the 
president’s unilateral approach to foreign aid because she believed he inadvertently weakened 
the nascent international organization while damaging America’s long-term credibility. Rejecting 
this criticism, the under secretary of state insisted that the White House’s actions involved more 
than one nation and thus constituted a bilateral policy towards the Near East.155 In addition to 
this legalistic parsing of the lawmaker’s enquiry, Acheson also dismissed suggestions for the US 
to submit Greece and Turkey’s problem to the UN by bluntly declaring that this “would not be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
($50 million) and internal improvements ($80 million). As for Turkey’s aid, the US designated almost all of its $100 
million to Ankara’s military. Questions and Answers to the Greco-Turkish Aid Bill, The Department of State 
Bulletin Supplement, Vol. XVI, No. 409 A, May 4, 1947, 872-3. 
152 Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, 10. 
153 Ibid., 10. 
154 Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House Hearings, 19. 
155 In his legalistic answer to Douglas, Acheson argued that “we ought not to use this word ‘unilateral’ 
quite as freely as some of us do. Unilateral means something that one country does. What we are now talking about 
here is responding to a request of another country. That at least involves two countries.” Ibid., 46-7. 
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productive course.”156 Despite the State Department’s views on this matter, leaders such as 
Senators Vandenberg and Byrd continued to express their concerns about the administration’s 
decision to circumvent the global body.157 For his part, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee drafted legislation to correct the administration’s “colossal blunder in 
ignoring the UN.”158 Eventually incorporated into the Greek-Turkish Assistance bill, the 
proposed amendment directed the White House to end its aid program if the recipient nations or 
the Security Council deemed the assistance unnecessary.159 While Acheson correctly viewed this 
additional requirement as “window dressing” and a “cheap price for Vandenberg’s patronage,” it 
did ultimately increase public support for Truman’s aid program.160  
Finally, lawmakers expressed doubts about the true nature of Athens’ and Ankara’s 
respective regimes and questioned whether they constituted “free peoples” according to the 
president’s speech. Despite the Greek government’s reputation as being “undemocratic, corrupt, 
and reactionary,” the State Department characterized it as “essentially democratic” and insisted 
that both Greece and Turkey “are progressing along the road to democracy.”161 Dissatisfied with 
the administration’s answer, representatives such as Jacob Javits asked the under secretary of 
state if the US should be offering support to a right wing government that did not have wide 
spread support from its own people.162 Acheson replied that the Hellenic nation’s current 
                                                          
156 Acheson’s real reason for bypassing the UN centered on the Truman Administration’s legitimate fear 
that the Soviets might veto Washington’s proposal in the Security Council. Ibid., 46; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 223. 
157 In a speech before the Senate on April 22, Byrd reiterated that the US needed to involve the UN because 
he feared the Soviet Union might pursue unilateral actions elsewhere. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., April 22, 
1947, 3888-9. 
158 Vandenberg, Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 345. 
159 Ibid., 345-6, Acheson, Present at the Creation, 223-4. 
160 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 224. 
161 Jones, Fifteen Weeks, 185-7; Department of State Supplement: Aid to Greece and Turkey, May 4, 1947, 
874.  
162 Representative Javits noted that at least twenty percent of Greece’s eligible voters could not vote in the 
1946 election because of political oppression. He also speculated that the nation’s insurgency probably could not 
116 
 
government “was elected in an election observed by 700 Americans” and, therefore, enjoyed a 
legitimate mandate.163 If Congress withheld aid, he warned, Washington guaranteed the spread 
of totalitarianism to Athens.164                 
Despite their numerous doubts and reservations, lawmakers readily acknowledged the 
administration’s effectiveness in framing its foreign policy proposal. According to one prominent 
Republican Senator, the president’s request seemed like “a declaration of war.”165 In essence, the 
Chief Executive’s stark portrayal of Moscow’s subversive threats left Congress with little real 
choice but to endorse the State Department’s anti-communist plan for the Near East. 
Consequently, the Senate and House passed the aid package on April 22 and May 9, 
respectively.166 Pleased with this development, the chief executive signed the bill into law on the 
twenty-second, thus providing the US Government with the resources to continue and enhance 
its containment policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Conclusion 
Truman’s actions in 1947 salvaged his presidency and reoriented the American people’s 
conception of their nation’s foreign policy. His decision in January to replace Byrnes with 
Marshall restored much needed credibility and coherence to Washington’s heretofore muddled 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
survive without receiving wide spread support from the general population. Assistance to Greece and Turkey, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21, 56-7 
163 Ibid., 21. 
164 Acheson repeatedly told Congress that it needed to quickly pass Truman’s proposed aid legislation to 
avert Athens’ collapse. On March 20, 1947 the under secretary of state warned the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs that unless Greece received massive financial aid within one month, the nation “will get social unrest, a 
complete breakdown of government and industry, and…dissolve into economic and political confusion.” This 
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we can do except say ‘Yes.’” Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, 128. 
166 The Senate passed the bill 67 to 23 on April 22, while the House voted for the legislation 287 to 107. 
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foreign policy. Interestingly, the new secretary of state’s organizational reforms enhanced 
Acheson’s influence within the department, which undoubtedly affected how the White House 
perceived and reacted to the Greek-Turkish crises when it began a month later.  
Britain’s decision to withdraw troops from Athens, coupled with the administration’s 
highly selective interpretation of the Balkans’ geo-political situation, prompted the president to 
once again intervene in the Near East. Though conceptually consistent with his previous 
decisions concerning Iran and Turkey in 1946, the chief executive’s expensive new plan required 
a bold public statement in order to secure sufficient support from Congress. Accordingly, his 
advisors produced an address that incorporated the Greek insurgency within a wider ideological 
struggle. Employing sweeping rhetoric that linked America’s national security to the political 
orientation of other countries, the speech stressed that only immediate US assistance could 
eliminate the threat posed by totalitarianism. Not surprisingly, Truman embraced this strong 
message because he wanted the American people to realize the challenges posed by the 
Kremlin’s obstructive policies.   
The administration’s subsequent propaganda strategy helped pressure a skeptical 
Congress to pass the president’s aid proposal. For instance, Truman arguably established the 
Federal Employee Loyalty Program on March 21, 1947 in an attempt to generate and exploit a 
sense of insecurity about communist subversion amongst the American people. Likewise, the 
chief executive created a special committee headed by Treasury Secretary John W. Snyder to 
facilitate the White House’s ability to mobilize important interest groups across the nation. In 
this manner, an unlikely coalition of business, farming, and religious leaders became convinced 
that the Greek-Turkish assistance bill promoted free enterprise, helped the economy, and 
combated communism’s godless crusade against western values.  
118 
 
 Interestingly, while the president’s actions reinforced the notion that his assistance 
program constituted a new doctrine, the State Department made efforts during congressional 
hearings to correct misconceptions about the policy’s scope and purpose. Acheson, for example, 
downplayed the legislation’s potential universal application when he declared that the 
administration did not intend to provide comparable economic/military aid for Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist Chinese government.167 Furthermore, the diplomat flatly rejected the notion 
that Truman’s ideas somehow extended the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to the entire 
world. Ultimately, the undersecretary of state remained purposefully vague about the policy’s 
future implications and refused to address specific scenarios put forth by lawmakers.            
Despite its label as an economic assistance bill, the Greek-Turkish legislation essentially 
remained a military assistance program designed to deter the Soviet Union in the Near East. In 
his zealous efforts to pass this legislation, the chief executive overstated Athens’ strategic 
problems and exaggerated Russia’s subversive threat to America’s long term security. In doing 
so, his rhetoric inadvertently elevated the new policy to the stature of an open-ended doctrine. 
While the commander-in-chief achieved his short-term objective and immediately enjoyed 
increased political support because of it, he did eventually regret how the public viewed his 
policy.168 In March, 1957, the former president wrote a letter to Clifford on the tenth anniversary 
of his famous speech and admitted that “I never was very much impressed that that policy was 
named the Truman Doctrine. Like the Marshal Plan, it was only a part of the foreign policy of 
                                                          
167 This is not to suggest that the Truman administration did not provide aid to Chiang Kai-Shek’s. The 
China Aid Act of 1948, for example, gave nearly $500 million to the Nationalist Government. While this assistance 
did not prevent Mao from winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949, American foreign aid did ultimately safeguard 
Taiwan’s security from threats emanating from the mainland. US Department of State, United States Relations with 
China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. [China White Paper.], 387-90; Raymond H. Geselbracht, 
ed., Foreign Aid and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015), 
101,116-7.    
168 In November, 1946 Truman received only thirty-two percent approval from the American people. By 
April, 1947 his approval increased to sixty percent. “After Two Years,” Time, April 7, 1947, 5.    
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the United States, and that is how history should refer to it.”169 Despite his regret, Washington 
and the American people embraced the doctrine’s rhetoric and relied upon it to justify important 
decisions such as the Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift, formation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the US military involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 
Though he never meant to establish a new doctrine, the president’s speech ultimately forged a 
post-war bipartisan consensus, which resulted in a major paradigm shift for America’s role in 














                                                          






When Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945, he inherited a vague and 
contradictory foreign policy from his predecessor.1 Despite this impediment, the new head of 
state attempted in good faith to achieve Roosevelt’s agenda for the post-war world. While the 
inexperienced president’s blunt personal style undoubtedly magnified US-Soviet differences, his 
actions also revealed the White House’s ongoing efforts to maintain a productive relationship 
with the Kremlin.2 For example, when Stalin protested Washington’s sudden decision to end all 
Lend Lease shipments in May 1945, the chief executive immediately rescinded the order and 
sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to placate the Russian leader. Likewise, the commander-in-chief 
rejected Churchill’s reckless proposal to maintain American and British troops in Eastern 
Germany until the Soviets complied with the Yalta Agreement.3 Perhaps more importantly, 
Truman recognized Poland’s communist-dominated government in June, even though he 
personally resented the USSR’s oppressive behavior in that country. Though significantly 
different in tone and style, the new president’s foreign policy remained consistent with FDR’s 
strategic vision during the first half of 1945.    
Admittedly, the chief executive and his advisors believed they could use Washington’s 
military and economic power to induce Russian cooperation after World War II. The limitations 
of this strategy, however, soon became evident when the Kremlin refused to retreat from its 
                                                          
1 Roosevelt understandably deferred America’s numerous issues with Russia because he wanted to 
maintain the Grand Alliance until they defeated the Axis Powers. For him, the Allies could address questions 
concerning national boundaries and political alignments after the war.   
2 Though Truman and Molotov’s first meeting naturally garners significant attention, the chief executive’s 
subsequent decisions reveal him as a concerned leader who sincerely sought a good working relationship with 
Stalin.    
3 The new president rejected Churchill’s proposal, in part, because he viewed international agreements as 
solemn promises that could not be broken. Accordingly, if Washington and London failed to fulfill their obligations 
vis-à-vis Moscow, then they could not justifiably claim any outrage with Russia’s transgressions.        
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recently established buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Though frustrated with the Potsdam and 
London conference’s shortcomings, the commander-in chief instructed his cabinet to refrain 
from issuing any negative comments in public about Moscow’s perceived intransigence. In this 
manner, the president downplayed Superpower differences during late 1945 in the hopes of 
achieving an eventual understanding with the USSR.   
Truman’s ambivalent attitude towards Russia persisted into 1946 even as advisors and 
dignitaries began to express their apprehension about the Soviet Union’s future intentions. 
Stalin’s February 9 election eve speech, for instance, frightened some administration officials 
who viewed it as a de facto declaration of war against London and Washington. Other leaders, 
such as Wallace, feared that the Soviet leader’s address reflected the Kremlin’s anxiety about its 
perceived encirclement by pro-Western capitalist nations. For his part, the chief executive 
dismissed these concerns when he correctly declared that the Russian dictator made his 
statements for a domestic audience. Similarly, Kennan’s Long Telegram on February 22, failed 
to galvanize the president in the same manner as it did with Washington’s foreign policy 
establishment.  In particular, he ignored the influential cable’s recommendation that called for 
the White House to immediately educate the American people about the nature of the 
Communist threat. Thus, Truman wasted an ideal opportunity to speak about this topic when he 
deliberately distanced himself from Churchill’s controversial Iron Curtain Speech on March 5. 
Though he initially endorsed the address, the commander-in chief feigned ignorance about 
having advanced knowledge of the former prime minister’s remarks. Political pragmatism 
evidently outweighed his need to inform the public about the administration’s concerns. 
Consequently, the chief executive’s public discourse during this period revealed him as a 
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cautious leader unwilling to inform the US electorate about the disintegrating state of affairs 
between Washington and Moscow.  
Despite the president’s reluctance to speak openly about the Superpower’s ongoing 
tensions, he implemented an effective containment policy against the Soviet Union throughout 
1946. In both Iran and Turkey, his administration successfully utilized diplomacy and veiled 
military threats to prevent the Kremlin from dominating these two strategic nations. The 
commander-in-chief, however, made few public statements regarding these matters, preferring 
instead to have Byrnes and the State Department’s representatives speak on his behalf. This is 
remarkable, especially in the case of the Turkish straits, because the White House believed these 
crises could possibly escalate into open warfare between Washington and Moscow. Truman, 
nevertheless, remained discreet about foreign policy issues, which inadvertently hindered the 
American people’s ability to fully understand the status of US-Soviet relations.4    
The chief executive’s understated style eventually created serious problems for his 
administration by September, 1946. The president’s endorsement of Wallace’s Madison Square 
Garden speech directly challenged many of the conclusions found in Byrnes’ recent statements 
concerning the United States’ occupation policy in Germany. Predictably, this development 
undermined the State Department’s efforts to convince Paris and London that Washington firmly 
intended to stay involved in European affairs. The ensuing political controversy embarrassed the 
White House, which forced Truman to publicly support his secretary of state and the policies he 
espoused.5 Arguably, this avoidable chain of events raises questions about the president’s 
                                                          
4 A strong presidential statement or series of speeches could have provided clarity for the American people 
as they focused on these important foreign policy issues throughout 1946.  
5 Truman’s subsequent attempt to insulate himself from the Wallace controversy is reminiscent of his 
efforts to dissociate the White House from Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech. In both instances, the chief executive 
appeared to embrace a political decision only to withdraw his support when the public turned against it.  
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original intentions. Though the commander-in-chief disputed Wallace’s claim that he read the 
entirety of his speech beforehand, he should have already known that his progressive secretary of 
commerce intended to convey a foreign policy position contrary to the administration’s views.6 
Either the chief executive committed another careless error similar to his Lend Lease decision 
sixteen months earlier or he used his subordinate’s speech as a trial balloon to test the American 
people’s receptiveness to the prospects of accepting a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe.7 Whether his actions constituted an oversight or a miscalculation, the results obligated 
Truman to embrace a more public stance regarding America’s difficult relations with the Soviet 
Union.  
Four days after Wallace’s resignation, the Clifford-Elsey report prompted the president to 
reevaluate Washington’s policy towards Moscow. Originally commissioned to compile a list of 
Russia’s broken promises, the White House special counsel and his assistant instead produced a 
comprehensive review of the Kremlin’s geopolitical goals in the hopes of convincing the 
commander-in-chief to adopt a more vigilant diplomatic posture. The stark assessment 
undoubtedly affected the chief executive, who immediately ordered all copies of the study locked 
away in a safe. Despite the report’s suggestion that the president speak to the American people 
about the Soviet threat, Truman remained silent because he believed that a national conversation 
about this topic could jeopardize Byrnes’ current negotiations with the Russians at the Paris 
Peace Conference.8 Furthermore, the commander-in-chief understood that the report’s 
                                                          
6 Wallace’s private letter to Truman in July, 1946, is evidence of the secretary of commerce’s foreign 
policy outlook. Even without this specific message, everyone in Washington already knew about his accommodating 
attitude towards the Soviet Union.   
7 This may have been the president’s original intention with Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech. 
8 Just as he did with Kennan’s Long Telegram, the chief executive ignored the report’s wise 
recommendation that called for him to educate the American people about Washington’s difficulties with Moscow.    
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conclusions threatened to politicize foreign policy issues in the midst of a mid-term election 
campaign, which could weaken his bi-partisan support and hurt the Democrats at the polls.  
The Republican’s electoral victory in November, 1946, influenced the chief executive’s 
conception of US-Soviet relations. With extremely low approval ratings, the beleaguered 
president faced a new conservative congressional leadership determined to lower taxes, reduce 
the federal budget, and decrease America’s international commitments. Conversely, Truman no 
longer needed to worry about appeasing his party’s liberal base, which he already alienated with 
his handling of the Wallace fiasco.9 The new domestic situation, therefore, prompted the 
commander-in-chief to co-opt the Republican’s vociferous anti-communist propaganda, which 
his opponents used so effectively as a campaign issue in the recent election. Eager to regain the 
political initiative at home and abroad, the president looked for an incident to enhance his stature 
with the American people.    
London’s decision to withdraw troops and foreign aid from Greece in February, 1947 
provided Truman with an ideal opportunity to revitalize his presidency. With Dean Acheson 
wielding increased influence in Marshall’s State Department, the foreign policy establishment 
assumed a more hardline attitude towards the Soviet Union.10 Undoubtedly, the under secretary 
of state viewed the developments in the Balkans with sincere concern. However, his biased 
evaluation of these circumstances skewed his superiors’ ability to accurately analyze Athens’ 
situation. Combined with Truman’s desire to personally confront the Soviets in a public manner, 
the White House enthusiastically accepted the need for a new foreign aid program for the Near 
East.   
                                                          
9 Recall that Truman also angered his party’s liberal wing when he threatened to draft striking workers into 
the armed forces in May, 1946.  
10 Acheson readily accepted pessimistic assessments from anti-Soviet officials such as Henderson, 
MacVeagh, Ethridge, and Porter.  
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From the Truman Doctrine’s inception, the administration utilized fear and suspicion to 
elicit support for its proposed aid program. For example, Acheson used disease metaphors and 
melodramatic hyperbole when he briefed the congressional leadership about Athens’ turmoil on 
February 27, 1947. Likewise, the president’s speech before Congress on March 12, helped 
created a crises atmosphere when he subtly equated the forces of totalitarianism with the 
depraved acts of rapist and sexual predators.11 Furthermore, the chief executive established the   
Federal Employee Loyalty Program just nine days after his address because he wanted to instill a 
heightened sense of insecurity in the American People, thereby making them more inclined to 
support his foreign policy. Finally, the undersecretary of state repeatedly misled Congress about 
the Greek government’s stability in an effort to accelerate deliberations and achieve a quick 
legislative victory.12 By exaggerating the problem and intentionally spreading paranoia, the 
administration obtained the authority to assist Greece and Turkey.    
Harry S. Truman undoubtedly believed in the riotousness of his foreign aid program. 
Heavily influenced by Acheson and Marshall, the president sought to convince the American 
People that they needed to support his new policy. His decision, however, did not constitute a 
new open-ended doctrine meant for the entire free world. On the contrary, the chief executive’s 
efforts to help Athens and Ankara represented another short term solution that had become a 
hallmark of his pragmatic ad-hoc style of decision making. Unlike his previous demeanor with 
respects to Iran and Turkey in 1946, the commander-in-chief faced the Greek crises in a high 
profile manner because he believed only a national speech could successfully mobilize public 
                                                          
11 In her book, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms, Denise Bostdorff observed 
that “since freedom often has traditionally feminine connotations-Lady Liberty, for example-its need for protection 
in Truman’s address and in other US Cold War rhetoric may not be surprising.”  Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman 
Doctrine, 129. 
12 Recall that US aid did not begin to arrive in Greece until October, 1947. This contradicts Acheson’s 
earlier prediction on March 20, that Athens only had one month’s worth of supplies remaining in their domestic 
inventory.     
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opinion.13 Largely drafted by Clifford and Elsey, the address employed sweeping language about 
the dangers of totalitarianism and connected America’s security directly to Athens’ and Ankara’s 
well-being.14 The special counsel, however, admitted that he and his assistant did not view the 
speech as a doctrine. In Clifford’s opinion, Elsey’s three sentence credo elevated the address into 
something more than they originally intended. Similarly, the rhetoric they drafted had little 
bearing on reality. The common belief that the Truman Doctrine proclaimed an anti-communist 
philosophy appears incongruous especially when the US provided loans to Yugoslavia in 1949 
after Tito split with Stalin. Likewise, the speech’s assertion that Washington only wanted to help 
democracies seemed dubious when the first two beneficiaries of America’s aid led reactionary 
governments in Greece and Turkey. As for its world-wide scope, the president had no intentions 
in sending money to Chiang Kai-shek’s government in 1947, much to the chagrin of the China 
Lobby in Congress.15 In essence, the Truman administration became a victim to its own success 
in creating an overly simplistic world view for the American people. Though he never meant to 
establish a new doctrine, the chief executive’s speech ultimately resulted in a major paradigm 
shift for his nation, which now viewed international events through the prism of universal 
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million aid package designed to stem Mao’s recent offensives in Northern China. This decision, however, is still 





PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF 
CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947 
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:  
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance 
before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this 
country are involved.  
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your 
consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.  
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial 
and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in 
Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the 
Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.  
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the 
appeal of the Greek Government.  
Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek 
people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving 
country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.  
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When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had 
destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. 
More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were 
tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out 
practically all savings.  
As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, 
was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.  
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential 
to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in 
solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic 
assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are 
indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must 
have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for 
economic and political recovery.  
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American 
administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to 
Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in 
improving its public administration.  
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several 
thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of 
points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United 
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Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and 
alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.  
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is 
small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the 
government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-
supporting and self-respecting democracy.  
The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain 
types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate.  
There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.  
No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek 
government.  
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or 
economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or 
liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.  
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an 
urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are 
not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.  
It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing 
effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public 
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administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made 
available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece 
self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.  
No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its 
defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The 
Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the 
members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, 
including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the 
Greek people.  
The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has 
made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States 
condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the 
past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past 
advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.  
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.  
The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less 
important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The 
circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. 
Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United 
States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.  
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.  
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Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United 
States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its 
national integrity.  
That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.  
The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer 
extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.  
As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must 
supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.  
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to 
Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.  
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of 
conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from 
coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was 
won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.  
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has 
taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make 
possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our 
objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions 
and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them 
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on 
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free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace 
and hence the security of the United States.  
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes 
forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent 
protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, 
Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been 
similar developments.  
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative 
ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.  
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free 
institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom 
of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.  
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and 
the suppression of personal freedoms.  
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.  
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.  
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is 
essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.  
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The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the 
status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by 
such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain 
their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek 
nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control 
of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. 
Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.  
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect 
upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to 
maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.  
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against 
overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free 
institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. 
Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to 
maintain their freedom and independence.  
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to 
the West as well as to the East.  
We must take immediate and resolute action.  
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I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the 
amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have 
taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to 
Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the 
prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.  
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and 
military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of 
reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material 
assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction 
and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.  
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most 
effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be 
authorized.  
If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this 
message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the 
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together.  
This is a serious course upon which we embark.  
I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States 
contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world 
freedom and world peace.  
135 
 
The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 
tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this 
investment and make sure that it was not in vain.  
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in 
the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a 
better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.  
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.  
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely 
endanger the welfare of our own nation.  
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.  
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